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Introduction
The rural future in Australia and New
Zealand: mapping the terrain of
rural change
Francesca Merlan and David Raftery
On 16 October 2006, Australian Prime Minister, John Howard, announced
funding of $350 million to assist Australian farmers struggling with drought,
whose circumstances had been declared ‘exceptional’. This announcement has
many precedents: since 2001, $1.2 billion worth of such payments has been
disbursed to Australian farming families (Peatling 2006). What was distinctive
about the announcement of the drought payments of 2006 was the assertion of
national agricultural values that accompanied such routine implementation of
policy. The Prime Minister, in announcing these disbursements, stressed that
farming was central to Australia’s psyche and that family farms should not be
allowed to die:
It is part of the psyche of this country, it is part of the essence of Australia
to have a rural community…Not only would we lose massively from an
economic point of view [but] we would lose something of our character.
We would lose something of our identification as Australians if we ever
allowed the number of farms in our nation to fall below a critical mass.
(Peatling 2006)
In January 2007, the Australian Federal Government unveiled its $10 billion
National Water Plan, a scheme that purported to reform systems of irrigation
management. This plan sought federal control of the Murray-Darling Basin river
system, formerly managed by the states of Queensland, New South Wales,
Victoria and South Australia. The plan conceded the need for ‘structural
adjustment’ and made provisions for relevant structural assistance, including
the buy-out of water resources previously allocated to irrigators. The Prime
Minister, in this case, was explicit about the need, and the political will, to ‘buy
out’ particular agricultural interests: ‘Enhancing the overall viability of irrigation
districts will require structural adjustment…The Government stands ready to
provide structural assistance and, if necessary, to purchase water allocations in
the market’ (Howard 2007). We see here a moment in which a familiar rhetoric
of support for free enterprise and opposition to state intervention is submerged
in an appeal to national and associated ‘rural’ values.
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As well as underscoring the need to better control irrigation allocations, the plan
devoted considerable attention to the restoration of environmental flows: water
that was not allocated to commercial agricultural purposes, but was dedicated
to the ecological health of the river system and its associated biodiversity
(<http://www.environment.gov.au/water/action/npws.html>).
A third major policy announcement relating to rural Australia came on 25
September 2007. At this time, the Federal Government announced further drought
assistance measures, valued at $714 million. What was especially significant
about this announcement was the juxtaposition of the established drought relief
payments with the ‘Exceptional Circumstances Exit Package’. This package
provided a means by which farmers could receive some financial compensation
for selling their farms and assistance in adapting to new business or employment.
Such assistance, however, was conditional on those farmers leaving their farms
and not returning to farming in an owning or operating capacity. This
government-sponsored departure from farms was clearly at odds with earlier
assertions of the inviolability of the rural–agricultural nexus.
The political motivations that lie behind such contradictory policy positions
have been interpreted elsewhere (Cockfield and Botterill 2006; Botterill 2003;
Halpin and Martin 1996). What is of most interest to us, however, are the ways
in which this chain of policy events clearly reveal three things: 1) that the
Australian family farm has become increasingly difficult to sustain; 2) that this
is acknowledged at the level of government and bureaucracy; and 3) that the
rural future is one in which the diverse and often competing social and political
interests that are physically and economically vested in ruralism compete keenly
at the level of political, scientific and cultural discourse.
The developed world and its rural future
These issues are not new ones. From many parts of the developed world comes
sobering evidence of rapid rural change. Many rural spaces have been emptied.
In Australia, Cribb (1994) asserted some years ago that the rural population had
‘tipped’ due to the exit from rural land to the point where rural populations
were unable to replace themselves. In the United States, entire areas where there
were formerly small towns and working farms have been vacated, or are only
sparsely occupied, while other areas are undergoing forms of ‘regional
suburbanisation’, reversing the twentieth-century pattern of rural exodus
(Salomon 2003). There is evidence in such parts of the ‘post-agrarian’ rural
Midwest of aggressive marketing of small-town life with different ‘growth
machine’ trajectories. The emergent landscape is a spatial structure with economic




In relation to these and other trends, there is some measure of agreement that
the entire developed world is participating in yet another, perhaps intensifying,
phase of what Lobao and Meyer (2001:103) have called, with reference to the
United States, the ‘great agricultural transition’. They describe this bluntly as
the ‘national abandonment of farming as a livelihood strategy’ (Lobao and Meyer
2001), evidenced by the exit of many farmers and the increasing concentration
and industrialisation of agricultural production. These changes are heralded in
different ways. There is a dramatic and persistent discourse of rural decline,
while at the same time, resistant, somewhat nostalgic urgings to return to former
agrarian practices and values can be found (Montmarquet 1989). Other
commentators, in describing rural scenarios, look more to the future (Bonnano
and Constance 2001; DeLind 1993) and highlight the position of rural communities
and spaces within densely integrated chains of mass-produced and marketed
food and fibre (Wilkinson 2002; Schusky 1989). The point found consistently
through these analyses is that rural areas and rural-dwelling people can be an
increasingly negligible concern in the production of food and fibre (Wilkinson
2002). Set against this depiction of an industrialised and de-socialised rural
landscape is the description of ‘new’ agricultural practices and values (DeLind
1993; McMichael 1999; Barham 2003) that stress the necessity of a sustainable
relationship among rural people, places and products.
In all of this, it is important to recognise the ambiguity and variability of the
term ‘rural’: take note of comments of the form, ‘national distinctions between
rural and urban are arbitrary and varied’ (IFAD 2001:17). There is nevertheless
agreement that what are referred to as ‘rural’ spaces are undergoing rapid and
continuing change, including a continuing decline in the proportions of
populations resident rurally and engaged in agricultural production, a rise in
occupations that are non-agricultural in origin (though sometimes with links to
agriculture) and increasing vulnerability to extra-local forces (Ray 1998).
There is no doubt about the reality of some of these trends. To adopt a ‘calamity’
view of rural change, however, would be to abdicate the effort to critically
engage with these diverse and novel intersections of social, economic and cultural
phenomena. It is in rural spaces, among rural populations, that these intersections
can be tracked, charted and critically analysed. One of the intended contributions
of this volume is to develop a critical understanding of the institutional vehicles
by which change is being driven. Beyond the pronouncements of politicians lies
a densely networked array of governmental bodies and processes, commercial
interests and social institutions through which agrarian, financial and
environmental imperatives are channelled. The authors of this volume are




Specifying the challenges to the reproduction of the present into a rural future
requires a depth of empirically and experientially based understanding. The
way that governance both enables and impinges on rural livelihoods, the
challenges that demographic trends pose for succession within farming families
and the commoditisation of land, labour and resources all form part of the
analyses contained within this book’s case studies.
The contributors to this volume came together in an attempt to stimulate
collective insight into trends of rural change. We have especially attempted to
build on insights that we accept as fairly well established and that also are
indicative sources of unpredictability and instability in rural transition: first,
that rural areas and people have been brought with greater intensity into complex
and global chains of food and fibre production; second, that globalisation and
neo-liberalism produce new vulnerabilities and uneven effects for rural people
(Gray and Lawrence 2001); third, that almost everywhere in the ‘developed’
world, there are big questions about how rural spaces are to be managed and
governed, and how rural populations can participate in their own governance
and that of the wider societies they inhabit. There was a concentration of
contributors with Australian perspectives, but New Zealand and Europe were
also represented.
Most of us accept that there has been rapid agrarian change, but for that very
reason we agree that it is important to transcend the customary identification
of ‘rural’ with ‘agrarian’ activity, or orientation to farming and related primary
production, for these developed-world countries in particular. A significant
literature of the past few years proposed the phrase ‘post-productivism’ in order
to describe the contemporary condition of rural spaces (Wilson 2001). This term
denotes the declining relative importance of agriculture and signals the
importance of understanding contemporary rural practices, and their regulation,
in new ways. This label, however, yields to the ‘post’ phenomenon, in that it
suggests a framework in which agrarian rurality still dominates one’s thinking.
Recently, Australian geographer John Holmes (2006) has used the phrase
‘multifunctional transition’ to refer to continuing change and diversification in
rural spaces, whereby varying mixes of production, consumption and protection
values underscore differing modes of rural occupancy. This phrase perhaps
better captured the spirit of exploration and possible plurality of rural futures,
which motivated the small conference in July 2007 at The Australian National
University at which most of the following chapters were first presented.
The literature on rural transformation is vast, but remains fragmented and is
often consigned to specialist publications and professional fractions (Lobao and
Meyer 2001). Why should this be so? The changes that such literature attempts
to chart affect us all and the spectrum of issues involved is great, so any attempt
at insight must continue to be multidisciplinary. And though coming from
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different disciplines—policy and political science, anthropology, sociology and
geography—contributors to this volume also agreed on some of the questions
that needed to be asked and answered in new ways.
1. What can we mean by ‘rural’? A vast amount of literature has probed the
meanings of this word, attempting to identify ‘rurality’ as a spatial and
social category. It appears, however, that the implications of the changing
character and porosity of contemporary ruralism still need clearer
recognition. People might live and work in what are conventionally defined
as ‘rural’ spaces, but highly variable combinations of cultural and social
experiences, access to information, training and engagement with policy
processes converge in new ways to define the attitudes, expectations and
aspirations of those who occupy rural spaces. We can assume no simple or
even ‘ideal type’ of contrast between country and city, farmer and urbanite,
but must understand some of the recent trends in order to appreciate
increasing diversification in the formation of rural experience, and changing
implications attaching to uses of ‘rural’ as a descriptive category.
2. What are some of the trends transforming and taking shape in rural areas,
and how might these condition possible futures? These include, and the
following chapters explore, changes in: a) demography; b) combinations
of rural activities; and c) implications of greater connectedness and
technologisation of rural areas.
a. Daniela Stehlik’s chapter and, in a different way, Lesley Hunt’s, analyse
the challenge of demographic transition, a well-recognised phenomenon
of developed-world societies. Farmers in the developed world are ever
older as a group, not simply because those who continue to farm are
ageing, but because fewer young people are entering farming.
b. What else is going on in relation to this trajectory of an ageing farm
population? No longer can we rest content with ‘pluri-activity’ as an
adequate label to describe the increasingly ‘other’ engagements of
those who farm and those who decide not to. For example, it is
insufficient to view participation in other forms of income
earning—so-called ‘non-farm income’—as if this were simply
supplementary to farming. There is evidence of more profound
transitions. The very expectations of many entering farming, even at
advancing age, as in Hunt’s paper, and those choosing not to enter it,
have changed. Those who farm engage in new mixes of activities and
are less accepting of isolated farm life. In some cases, this drives the
development of niche and boutique production nearer to population
centres, new blends of farming with other activities and the creation
of new occupational portfolios that could eventually reshape quite
substantially the demands on those who farm as one of their activities.
These sorts of transitions bring about challenges to the reproduction
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of rural life. If occupations and activities other than agriculture are
increasingly important factors within rural communities, how do these
new roles constrain or enable those striving to ensure their rural
futures?
c. What role does technology play in these transformations?
Connectedness of rural areas generally continues to develop, with
more roads and other infrastructure. There have been many studies
that have stressed the critical importance of telecommunications in
enhancing the economic competitiveness of rural-based industries
(Commonwealth of Australia 2008). But what of the changes in rural
communities that technological innovations such as broadband can
facilitate? Rather than simply a case of technology boosting or
enhancing existing economic structures, technology does have the
ability to collapse distance, create markets and provide the hardware
for new rural dynamics. Aitkin (2007) points the way to some of these
possibilities. From the perspective of representative politics, do these
changes mean new constituencies? Is the role of local government ever
more critical, given that the rural is more diffuse in its political and
cultural involvements?
3. What is the evidence of change and persistence in values relating to rurality?
To answer this question there needs to be a consideration of the influence
of long-term structural tendencies in developed-world countries. The
structure and persistence of certain values could be the clearest areas of
difference between ‘developing’ and ‘developed’ world rurality and its
regulation. Several of the chapters in this volume (Botterill, Morris) refer
to the character and persistence of developed-world ‘agrarianism’ and its
political and cultural influence—the explicit celebration of values and social
forms associated with agricultural activity, in complex but generally inverse
relationship to real small-scale ownership and occupancy of rural land.
Others (Peace) take as their chief focus related preservationist and restorative
efforts to sustain ruralism as it is thought to have been or as it should be.
Most interestingly, there is suggestion of shifts in terms of who is able to
claim legitimacy in their assertion of rural values, with agrarian values
encountering competition from other sources (Morris). Over a long period,
farmers and farming have tended to occupy a moral ‘high ground’ of positive
national and ethical values, even if this has been an idealised image. In the
context of agrarian transformation, in which many farmers leave the land
and the positions of those who remain change, this high ground is being
at least claimed, if not usurped, by environmentalists advocating abstention
from, or variation of, productivist land use.
4. What are the political and policy structures that have shaped rurality and
the relationship between country and metropole in particular ways? Several
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chapters address the question of the extent of influence of policy, its
long-term effects and the power differentials between policymakers and
‘policy-takers’ (those subjected to policy). John Gray discusses the ‘policy
effect’ of defining rural spaces, while Ian Gray discusses a long-term policy
and practice of administrative centrism in Australia. Peace and Morris
explore the contest for the legitimacy of different uses for rural spaces in
Australia and New Zealand, respectively. Some of these chapters look at
the lasting impacts of policy, and others at the disjuncture between policy
(especially of the recently influential ‘neo-liberal’ kind) and practice. From
anthropological contributors, we also receive accounts of the implementation
and consequences of policy from below—from the perspectives of farmers
and other rural dwellers who critically focus their relevant experience and
knowledge on policy and its likely impacts. The diverse regulatory and
governmental settings from which these accounts are drawn bring together
points (1–4) in real ethnographic detail. These ethnographic accounts are
drawn from situations that feature dynamic interactions among
governmental bodies, people, values and policy.
5. For developed-world contexts in which technological change has been at
the heart of agrarian and social change, when do we pay attention to
‘science’ and technology in relation to rural issues, and when do we not?
What happens when rural spaces are in effect laboratories of the latest
scientific technologies, but the expertise, technology and motivations for
farming are being transformed at a remove from any identifiable rural
population? Lyons and Scrinis detail the emerging regulatory networks
that could pertain to future nanotechnological developments in Australia.
The convergence of nanotechnology with already entrenched
biotechnological agricultural applications has produced speculation of an
impending ‘bio-serfdom’ (Rural Advancement Foundation International
1997), whereby farming livelihoods are dependent on the use of agricultural
inputs that are in effect privatised genetic resources. Such scenarios are
indeed future oriented, and the contribution of Lyons and Scrinis is a
concrete analysis of the regulatory systems applying to nanotechnology
and its potential rural impacts.
In order, the chapters, with identified central themes, are as follows.
Diversification and reorganisation of ruralism
John Gray distinguishes different attempts to define ‘rurality’, as a concrete
social space definable in terms of quantifiable measures and as an imagined
category or representation. He also presents a picture of the interrelationship at
the level of the European Union between continuing transformations in rural
areas and in policy, and underlines the significance of a ‘feedback’ relationship
between these two. Gray argues that while agrarian (and especially agricultural)
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activity was formerly seen as central, rurality has become increasingly decoupled
from agriculture, and this has been at least partly reflected in changing positions
of the European Union’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). Having arrived at
recognition of the heterogeneity of rural spaces and types of activities, and the
relative decline of agriculture among these, Gray foreshadows future research
and consideration of new forms of rurality from the vantage point of his long-term
field site in the Scottish Borders.
Policy and its long-term effects
Ian Gray explores the legacy of Australia’s long-practiced administrative centrism.
Under the label of ‘administrative geography’ of Australian rural development,
this chapter examines grain handling, irrigation and railways as examples of
administrative relations between rural areas and centres. He argues that centrism
has contributed to a culture of ‘rural dependency’ that continues to leave rural
people and areas averse to the idea and practice of governmental devolution,
and implies that such aversion is a current liability for devolved governance
options.
Values: persistent and changing
Linda Botterill asks for Australia in particular—but with implications for other
developed-world contexts—why there is little critical public analysis of rural
policy. She argues that all developed countries display forms of
‘agrarianism’—that is, belief in agrarian activities as worthwhile and inherently
wholesome, in greater measure than other forms of occupation. That agrarianism
persists, Botterill argues, is one of the reasons for the absence of rural policy
critique despite great change in the rural sector. Also, so deeply ingrained is
agrarianism that it can remain inexplicit as a ground of thinking and action.
Drought policy receives particular attention in her account of the influence of
agrarian values on the conceptualisation of legitimate rural activity.
Adrian Peace considers the implications of, and local community objections to,
the reintroduction of a vanished wallaby species to a national park in South
Australia adjacent to agricultural landholders. The tammar wallaby was
considered to properly belong in this area by national park managers and other
environmental and heritage bodies, but was experienced as a pest by farmers
and other locals. Peace argues that such institutions are ineffective in taking
local perspectives into account, and suggests the ‘ritual’ nature of much
community consultation. He thus highlights the issue of asymmetry of power
between state environmental and heritage institutions on the one hand and local
communities on the other, but also the pressures that have given rise to such
institutions and the imperatives that they must be seen to consult and to elicit
local participation. This chapter thus has implications for many other cases of
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similar interaction and for questions of rural management of competing land
uses.
Diversification and reorganisation of ruralism
Carolyn Morris illuminates the historical conditions under which high country
farmers of New Zealand’s South Island have been able to occupy the position of
‘stewards’ of the country they preside over as lessees, and an iconic position as
the ‘real’ New Zealanders in the national imaginary. Neo-liberalism emerged in
the 1980s as the principal ideological vehicle for the regulation of rural activities
and spaces in Australia and in New Zealand (and less consistently, but
nevertheless also elsewhere, in the developed world; see Pritchard 2001; Pritchard
and McManus 2000). This change brought with it overt disjunctions between
neo-liberal (‘free market’) rhetoric and practice, compared with earlier conditions.
Contradictions inherent in these new relations constantly surface against the
background of the global political–economic context in relation to which rural
policy is constructed. And, as illustrated above by the Australian Government’s
buy-out of irrigation interests in the Murray-Darling system, practices under
what is proclaimed to be neo-liberal policy can depart significantly from the
template the theory of neo-liberalism provides.
In New Zealand, these recent dramatic shifts to neo-liberal rural policy (from
1989) were shortly followed by ‘tenure review’ in the South Island high country.
This brought with it the possibility of privatisation of some areas—with massive
rates of profit for farmers in some cases resulting from the sale of portions of
privatised land, and assignment of some former pastoral areas to national
conservancy. These changes have altered the position of high country farmers
and farming in many ways—socioeconomically and ideologically. Morris argues
that high country farmers’ moral position has become more tenuous and that
the positive morality of stewardship that they formerly enjoyed could be shifting
to ‘greenies’ not engaged in commodity production on the land. This chapter
illustrates and amplifies some of the kinds of openness, and instability, that
neo-liberal rural policy can bring with it.
Lesley Hunt describes as a vehicle of change the increased tendency of ageing
‘baby boomer’ farmers to take up kiwifruit farming as an activity bridging the
transition between greater activity and retirement. She considers its implications
with respect to farmer subjectivities, person–land relationships and rural
occupation.
Daniela Stehlik in her chapter reconfigures some of the classic considerations of
‘rural sociology’. Stehlik asks what we can make of the ageing of developed-world
(and global) rural populations, and of farmers in particular, from her perspective
of concern with natural resource management systems in south-western Western
Australia. Concerned with the question of the relationship between
9
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intergenerational transition and sustainability, she adapts a framework for
consideration of the kinds of goods that can be intergenerationally transmissible,
placing emphasis on knowledge and social capital rather than on more
conventional ‘material’ goods.
Stehlik’s contribution importantly highlights two issues that relate to changing
directions and plurality of rural futures: a) transmission of knowledge in an
environment in which it is ever clearer that people seek ‘options’ and new ways
in which they can engage in rural occupation; and b) the creation of governing
structures that take the ‘environment’ as their concern, rather than necessarily
being delimited by other, pre-existing political boundaries.
New technology
Lyons and Scrinis take as their point of departure the widespread observations
that a nanotechnology revolution in the agri-food sector is well under way, but
remains largely beneath ‘policy and regulatory radars’. What are the potential
impacts and risks of this technological change with particular reference to the
agri-food sector? Why has nanotechnology elicited so little regulatory attention?
The convergence of biotechnology, nanotechnology and technical applications
such as precision farming collate unprecedented levels of site-specific information
relating to land, soils, water and organic life. The ownership of such technical
information, however, is largely privatised. This would seem to promote a further
dependence of rural communities on so-called ‘off-farm services and support’.
The convergence outlined above has been heralded by some as a greater
revolution than that of farm mechanisation (ETC Group 2004). The chapter
explores these issues and argues that a regulatory framework is urgently required.
The environmental, health and ethical controversies surrounding the cultivation
of genetically modified crops and the sale of genetically modified foods have
attracted widespread attention (UNESCO 2006; Lin 2007). Nanotechnology—the
technical manipulation of molecular material of one-billionth of a metre—poses,
however, a regulatory challenge to which no government has yet developed an
adequate response (ETC Group 2004).
Given the high level of technical expertise and political cooperation demanded
by the advent of genetically modified crops in Australia—even during trial
stages—it would be likely that one or more regulatory bodies would be created
to manage nanotechnological developments. The power invested in such bodies
would flow from many areas and interest groups—business, consumers, scientific
communities—all of whom have established procedures for engaging in the
resolution or management of highly technical problems and challenges. Where,
however, do rural people and rural lands find a place in such dialogues? Lyons
and Scrinis’s chapter opens up this wider anthropological and sociological
question of the relationship between scientific innovation and the public. What
10
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can be an effective modality in the management and oversight of rural
technological activities?
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Rurality and rural space: the ‘policy
effect’ of the Common Agricultural
Policy in the Borders of Scotland
John Gray
Abstract
A central aim of the European Union’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) since
its inception in the 1970s has been to sustain rural society, the landscape and
the environment, particularly those areas with less favourable production
conditions—that is, land with poor productivity, low production and declining
populations. Since 2003, the European Union’s CAP has undergone two major
reforms, the aim of which is to ensure the vitality and sustainability of rural
communities. The first focuses on market-related support and direct aid to
farmers for agriculture, including the Less Favoured Area Support Scheme. The
second focuses on broader rural development including diversification of
economic activities and stewardship for the environment. The aim of this chapter
is to trace changes in rural land use and landscapes on hill sheep farms that result
from the policy effect of the CAP: the dialectic evolution of the concept of rurality
embedded in the European Union’s CAP and the rural landscapes shaped and
used by hill sheep farmers in the Scottish borderlands.
Introduction
This chapter is a case study of the relationship between agricultural policy and
human activity as it is manifest in rural landscapes and concepts of rurality. The
particular case I analyse is the European Union’s Common Agricultural Policy
(CAP) and the activities and experiences of hill sheep farmers in the Scottish
borderlands. My aim is not just an analysis of the production of rural space in
this particular locality but a more general understanding of rural space/landscapes
(in Australia, Europe and North America) as materialisations of policy-motivated
formulations of rurality by governments (whether local, national or supranational)
and practically generated activities of those living in the locations deemed to be
rural by the policy. One of the characteristics of this dialectic of government
policy and local practice is what Bourdieu calls ‘the theory effect’:
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Due to the existence of a social science, and of social practices that claim
kinship with this science, such as…the conduct of politicians or
governmental officials…there are, within the social world itself, more
and more agents who engage in scholarly, if not scientific, knowledge
in their practices and more importantly in their work of production of
representations of the social world and of manipulating these
representations. So that science increasingly runs the risk of inadvertently
recording the outcome of practices that claim to derive from science.
(Bourdieu 1992:249–50)
In the case presented here, I am illustrating an analogous ‘policy effect’: the
representations of and policies for rural spaces devised by the European
Community in its CAP set the conditions for hill sheep farmers to produce in
their practices a concrete rural locality as a version of the rurality represented
in the CAP. The CAP records these mediated effects on agriculture and rural
landscapes of its policy in its analysis of the nature of rural spaces within the
European Community for which it has to devise further representations and
concomitant policies. In addition, not just a mutually entailed emergence of
policy and practice, the production of rural space/landscapes in the European
Union is also a dialectic of rurality as locality and rurality as representation.
Rural image/rural locality
In a survey of academic definitions of the ‘rural’, Halfacree (1993:32) posits a
distinction between rural as locality and rural as social representation. As locality,
rurality is a specific type of space that has a concrete geographical location where
its character is objectified in the physical and social attributes of that location.
In this mode, rural locations can be observed, analysed and mapped in various
terms: topographical attributes, the social composition of the people living and/or
working there, forms of activity, the nature of social relations and relations with
other spaces of similar or different type in other geographical locations. In the
mode of social representation, rurality is a de-spatialised cultural concept that
has a ‘disembodied and virtual character’ because it is not linked to a concrete
geographical location and thus it ‘lacks empirical clarity’ (Halfacree 1993:32).
Instead, it is a discourse about a type of space that is usually morally charged
and about the kind of social life that occurs in it. Often it includes landscape
images, either visual or verbal, placing the rural at a distance and thereby
presenting idealised pictures of society that are implied by but can never be
attained in everyday life (see Hirsch 1995:9, 23). In this mode, the rural is
something expressed rather than observed, interpreted rather than explained.
It is related culturally (by meaningful contrast and similarity of image) to other
representations of other types of spaces, particularly those of urban space (see
Williams 1975; Creed and Ching 1997).
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Since its inception in 1958 and throughout its ensuing development in the next
five decades, the CAP has conflated these two modes of conceiving rurality,
alternately adopting them first in producing agricultural policy on the basis of
an image of rurality and then in analysing the concrete rural localities that are
its effects. A third form of rurality mediates this dialectic of image and locality:
rurality as place. Here, I am referring to the way in which rurality is experienced
and practised by rural people in their everyday activities. I illustrate this mode
of rurality in the activities of hill sheep farmers as they respond strategically to
agricultural policy to maintain the economic and intergenerational viability of
their farms.
I trace the development of the CAP from its inception as part of the Treaty of
Rome establishing the European Community to the recent changes of the Agenda
2000 and Fischler II Reforms (2003). The development of the CAP is also a
‘history’ of the concept of rurality as it moves through its various forms—locality,
representation, particular experience of place—in the progressive dialect of
policymaking and agricultural practice through which rural space is produced.
My analytical location is a function of the timing of my ethnographic research
among hill sheep farmers in Teviotdale, a locality of 15 farms that straddles an
18-kilometre stretch of the River Teviot from its source to the mill town of
Hawick (see Figure 1.1). It is a landscape of a river valley surrounded by steep
hills reaching 600 metres high at the watershed and gradually decreasing in
height and density as one moves in a north-westerly direction towards Hawick.
The farms range in size from 160 to more than 2000 hectares, carrying 400 to
4000 breeding ewes. Hill sheep farmers differentiated the physical terrain in
terms of two categories of farmland. ‘Out-bye’—rough grazing or hill land—is
predominant in the locality. It is characterised by steep gradients, altitudes in
excess of 300 metres, harsh weather, boggy soil and nutrient-poor vegetation.
‘In-bye’—or park—are areas of lower-altitude flat fields that become increasingly
prevalent nearer to Hawick. All farms in the valley have some of both types of
land. The nine larger farms (more than 500ha) on the higher ground nearer the
watershed have a greater proportion of hill land (more than 75 per cent) and the
six smaller farms on generally lower ground have a smaller proportion of hill
land (less than 50 per cent). I did fieldwork in Teviotdale from 1981 to 2001. It
was during this period that I was able to describe how hill sheep farmers
strategically implemented the contemporary policies of the CAP with which
they were confronted. These policies reflected the CAP’s representation of
rurality during the 1960s and 1970s and the effects this had on rural landscapes
before my fieldwork. Assuming the actions of hill sheep farmers that I have
observed are indicative of how other farmers have responded to the CAP during
the 1980s and 1990s, I describe how their activities and their effects on rural
space/landscape have been recorded and objectified in the understanding of
rurality on which the Agenda 2000 and Fischler II reforms of the CAP are based.
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Rurality as agricultural
Creating a unified European Community in the late 1950s and early 1960s from
a context of national boundaries, wars and political fragmentation required a
communal space and common meanings. Because of its importance for food
supply, consumer costs and political importance, agriculture was the primary
vehicle for the construction of European communal space and the integration
of the member states (see Bowler 1985:10–12).1  Its three guiding principles were:
1) a single market, with no internal tariff protection imposed by member states,
which allowed labour, capital and agricultural products to circulate freely
throughout the community at comparable costs; 2) a community preference for
agricultural goods backed by an external tariff on products imported into the
community; and 3) a sharing of the financial burdens and benefits of the CAP
by the community as a distinct entity, rather than by distributional procedures




While these principles were overtly economic in character, they also identified
the types of practices that would produce the internal nature and geographical
limits of a distinct European space. The unified market, free internal movement
of agricultural products and common prices and common financial responsibility
de-emphasised the national partitioning of the European Community epitomised
by pre-existing import levies of member states to protect their agricultural
industry and by separate financial responsibility for their national agricultural
sectors. Simultaneously, the uniform external tariff and the sharing of the
financial burden of the CAP was the boundary that marked the limits of the
European Community.
Within this European space, a major difficulty in formulating agricultural policy
was the diversity of farming in member states in terms of resource endowment,
the range and average size of farms, the density of population, the level of food
self-sufficiency and the importance of agriculture in national politics. There
were, however, two similarities on which a commonness could be ‘codified’ (see
Bourdieu 1990:80) in formulating a European agricultural policy. First, all
prospective member states had established tariff mechanisms to protect their
farmers’ incomes and their agricultural sectors from cheaper imported agricultural
products and, remembering the privations during and after World War II, to
maintain strategic self-sufficiency in food supplies. Second, in all member states
there was an image of rural society portraying people and their agricultural way
of life in the countryside that had cultural value and political significance. The
five objectives of European Community’s agricultural policy2  that emerged from
these two points of convergence addressed issues of economic efficiency of the
agricultural sector and stability of prices, political issues of national
self-sufficiency of food supplies and reasonable prices for consumers, and social
issues of the equitable distribution of income to farmers. The two most important
objectives for understanding the effect of the CAP on rural landscapes and
concepts of rurality relate to the incompatible aims of achieving social equity
for individual farmers and promoting economic efficiency in the agricultural
sector. With respect to the former, the Treaty of Rome set as an explicit objective
for the CAP ‘to ensure a fair standard of living for the agricultural population,
particularly by increasing the individual earnings of persons engaged in
agriculture’ (Article 39[1b]). With respect to the economic efficiency of farming,
the Treaty of Rome set the objective of increasing ‘agricultural productivity by
promoting technical progress and by ensuring the national development of
agricultural production and the optimum utilisation of all factors of production,
particularly labour’ (Article 39[1a]).3
The social equity objective of maintaining farmers’ standard of living was vital
to an abiding goal of CAP—to preserve the image of rurality and the family farm
as the major feature of agriculture that in turn was the condition for rural
society—even if this inhibited the process of increasing economic efficiency in
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the agricultural sector. At the Stresa Conference in 1958, where the European
Community’s original objectives for agricultural policy were defined, it was
explicitly stated that ‘the structures of European agriculture were to be reformed
and become more competitive, without any threat to family farms’ (CEC [1958],
quoted by Folmer et al. 1995:12; see also Pearce 1981:7). This implied causal link
between family farming and the preservation of rural society continued to be
central to the European image of rurality throughout the 1980s. The 1987 Green
Paper, Perspective for the Common Agricultural Policy, states that its aim is ‘to
maintain the social tissue in the rural regions’ by ensuring continued employment
opportunities in agriculture. Moreover, the paper presents the community’s
image of rural space: ‘An agriculture on the model of the USA, with vast spaces
of land and few farmers, is neither possible nor desirable in European conditions,
in which the basic concept remains the family farm’ (European Commission
1985:II). The same aim and image of rural space were reaffirmed a year later in
the European Commission’s paper ‘The future of rural society’: ‘This
communication…reflects the Commission’s concern to avoid serious economic
and social disruption [caused by structural measures] and to preserve a European
rural development model based on the promotion of family farms’ (CEC 1988:67).4
In these statements, EC policy represented a rurality in which agriculture was
the encompassing activity defining the nature and values pervading the whole
of rural space.5  Rural space is a function of and is constituted by farming,
family-based production units and a specific form of social life. While there is
little specification of the attributes of farm, family and social life, family-based
agriculture and rural society are portrayed as mutually constitutive: farming
carried out by family production units is the condition for the kind of landscapes
and social life characteristic of rural space (Marsh 1991:16) and rural space is
the condition for and outcome of family farming.
This representation of ruralism as agricultural and vice versa is a version of
‘rural fundamentalism’, an urban-based and edifying image of agrarian society
pervasive in the member states of the European Community at the time: ‘farm
people…were thought to make a special contribution to political, economic and
social stability, economic growth and social justice’ and the ownership of small
parcels of land characteristic of the family-sized farm was considered to be ‘the
basis of a vigorous democracy’ (Bowler 1985:16).6  In this image, agriculture,
rural space and society are relatively homogeneous—it is where agriculture is
carried out predominantly on small-sized farms managed by families. In addition,
there is a causal relation between a specific form of agricultural production and
exemplary society. Family farming creates the kind of space where rural society
can flourish and where the ideals of wider society are nurtured and preserved.
Family farming sustains not just rural society, but society as a whole,
characterised by the ideals of stability, justice and equality. Thus despite the
claimed academic marginality of such romantic representations of peripheral
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rural farming communities (Macdonald 1993:10–11), it was this morally charged
image of rurality that was codified in the CAP. The link between material
(agricultural) production and moral reproduction that is characteristic of this
image of rural space continues through the progressive development of the CAP.
Intensification and diversification of agricultural
space/landscape
In the 1970s and 1980s, the effect of the CAP’s original market and price-support
mechanisms on agriculture began to be analytically identified as two interrelated
predicaments that threatened the viability of farming and rural society central
to the image of rural fundamentalism. They derived from the CAP’s conflicting
aims of social equity and economic efficiency; paradoxically, the programs aimed
at ameliorating them instead intensified them. The predicaments were known
as ‘the farm [income] problem’ (Bowler 1985:46–8; Garzon 2006:28, 42) and ‘the
rural problem’ (Kearney 1991:126).
The farm problem refers to the effects of general economic processes on the
agricultural sector, in particular the accelerating inverse relation between
increasing agricultural production by farmers and slackening demand for food
by consumers. On the one hand, as national economies in Europe develop in a
context of slow population growth, consumers spend less of their increasing
income on food. Thus growth of demand for agricultural products is less than
growth in income. On the other hand, as farmers use more and more technology
to increase agricultural production, the supply of food expands faster than
consumer demand. This process suppresses the prices of agricultural commodities
and the income of farmers. Low farm income, which threatens the viability of
rural society, is one of the two central issues of the farm problem specifically
addressed by the CAP. Since one of its goals is to ensure a fair standard of living
for farmers by maintaining income equity with other sectors of the economy,
market intervention mechanisms have been developed to prop up the prices
farmers receive for their products.7  Because support prices were above those
of the world market, however, there was a need to protect them by erecting a
clear boundary around the European agricultural market with import duties.
Thus a European space was created where family farms and rural society could
flourish, even if ‘artificially’ in economic terms.
Since EC analysts defined the essence of the farm problem as overproduction,
the second and more fundamental solution to the farm problem and the increasing
financial burden of price-support mechanisms was to decrease the size of the
agricultural sector. This was the central point of the review of the CAP carried
out by Sicco Mansholt in 1968. He suggested decreasing the amount of land in
production and decreasing the numbers of people engaged in farming. Such
‘structural’ changes would force small, economically inefficient farms (that is,
family farms) to go out of business and allow their consolidation into larger
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productions units. As a result, there would be larger farms with fewer farmers
producing a greater share of food required in the European Community, thus
increasing their incomes. This type of ‘resource adjustment’ (Bowler 1985:47)
requires people leaving the agricultural sector to look for employment in other
sectors. Spatially, this has meant that people leave the place where agricultural
production is carried out to look for work where industrial production occurs.
As I have argued above, in the early years of the European Community,
agricultural production was the essence and defining feature of rural space while
industrial production served the same signifying function for urban space. The
point, then, is that resource adjustment has a severe impact on the small,
inefficient family farms and society that the CAP was designed to preserve.
Structural adjustments caused depopulation of rural areas and jeopardised the
financial health of small family farms; they led to the establishment of large,
mechanised farms with absent owners and local managers—the ‘vast spaces of
land with few farmers’ that the European Community found undesirable. The
‘rural problem’ (Kearney 1991:126) refers to these threats to the mutual
dependence between small family farming and rural society brought about by
structural adjustments in the agricultural sector.
Producing rural localities
In order to address the incompatible aims of preserving rural society and farmers’
incomes on the one hand, and increase the economic efficiency of the agricultural
sector on the other, the CAP in the 1970s and 1980s introduced three instruments:
regional diversification, price-support mechanisms and structural measures.
Regional diversification and price-support mechanisms exemplified the way in
which the design of CAP instruments was based on the image of rurality as a
mutually constitutive relation between agriculture and rural society and on the
consequent analysis of agriculture in marginal agricultural areas, such as hill
sheep farming in the Scottish Borders. The analysis runs as follows: because of
the poor quality of the land there is inherent low productivity and poor financial
returns; in turn, these characteristics of hill sheep farming mean fewer
employment opportunities and less incentive to take it up as an occupation;
further, while consumer demand for lamb is relatively constant, hill sheep
farming is seasonal so that farmers sell their lambs when supply is high; this
depresses demand, the prices farmers receive and the level of income they can
expect. Together, these were the ways hill sheep farms manifested the ‘farm
problem’, and they threatened the viability of rural society by causing
depopulation in locations such as the Scottish Borders.
The implementation of all three measures required that real rural localities be
identified and this necessitated engaging in theoretical practices (Bourdieu
1992:250) to define rurality ‘objectively’ in terms of measurable attributes of
landscape, topography and spatial relations and in social attributes of farm size,
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family personnel and interpersonal relations. A principle means of doing this
was the Nomenclature unités territorial statistiques (NUTS) developed in 1980
by the European Union to statistically compare regional units from the level of
nation-state (level zero) to smaller regions (level three) (see Figure 1.2). On this
basis, rural localities could be made real through mapping and analytical
comparisons of demographic, economic and agricultural data. At first, rural
regions were defined solely by population density (more than 100 people/square
mile). This was later refined through the use of the Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) typology in which rural was differentiated
from urban solely on the basis of population density (more than 150 people/square
mile); within the rural areas, degrees of rurality were distinguished in terms of
the percentage of the population living in rural communities, from less than 15
per cent to more than 50 per cent.
Through the farming practices of hill sheep farmers in the Scottish Borders, all
three measures had the effect of transforming agricultural landscapes through
regional diversification of agricultural space within the community,
intensification of production and diversification of agricultural land.
Less favoured area: regional diversification of rural space
While the CAP defined a common space for the agricultural sector by
de-emphasising internal national partitioning, the policy instruments created a
different kind of internal partitioning. The community was divided into 166
NUTS 3 regions (CEC 1987) as a way conceptualising and ameliorating the effects
of structural transformations on rural society. This NUTS 3 regional spatialisation
was not based on the political differentiation of nations but on diversity in
topography, resources and potential for development in rural areas. This marked
an era of regional policymaking (Shucksmith et al. 2005; Bowler 1985:57) that
was lacking in the original formulation of the CAP. For the Borders of Scotland,
the most important of these regionalising polices was Directive 75/268,
establishing Less Favoured Areas within the European Community (see Figure
1.3). The stated objective of the directive was, again, social rather than economic:
to ensure the continuation of farming in areas characterised by poor natural
resources for agricultural production and to maintain the density of the rural
population in these areas. Less Favoured Areas were mountainous and hilly
regions with marginal agricultural potential because of the topography and soil
quality, low and declining population and/or poor infrastructure. They were
also the localities where family farms were concentrated.
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Figure 1.2 NUTS regions of Scotland
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Figure 1.3 Less Favoured Areas, 1997, showing NUTS 3 regions
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As a result of this directive, the hill sheep farming area of the Borders took on
a specific spatial quality. As a Less Favoured Area, it was a productively marginal
but still rural space for moral reproduction within the European Community
that needed special assistance. It was necessary to differentiate this type of rural
space because price-support mechanisms and structural measures by themselves
were insufficient ‘to sustain the traditional pattern of small-scale family farming
in the Community and to encourage the continued population of some remote
rural areas’ (Marsh 1991:16). Thus farms in Less Favoured Areas were eligible
for direct payments to compensate for the impediments to production imposed
by the environment or caused by CAP instruments that were beyond the control
of farmers. In the 1980s and 1990s, these payments, known as Hill Livestock
Compensatory Allowance (HLCA), were targeted to directly increase farmers’
incomes by being based on input (livestock numbers grazing on hill land) rather
than on output, as were the price-support mechanisms.8  As a result, farmers
were motivated to increase the numbers of stock on their land to increase the
HLCA payment.
Price-support mechanism: intensification of production
The second type of measures adopted by the CAP to address the farm income
problem and the concomitant rural problem and to preserve the localities where
farming and rural society could flourish were market-intervention schemes.
These worked by supporting the minimum prices individual farmers received
for their products. The most important of these schemes for hill sheep farmers
was the Sheep Meat Regime introduced in 1980. The Sheep Meat Regime was a
‘variable premium’ paid to farmers on their ‘finished’ or fat lambs.9 The variable
premium supplemented the market price a farmer received up to a
CAP-determined seasonally adjusted, weekly market price (the ‘variable’
component of the premium) that represented what farmers should receive for
their lambs to realise a fair income level. In addition, the regime included a ‘ewe
premium’ paid to farmers for every breeding ewe maintained on their farms.
This headage payment was meant to fill the gap between the UK guide price and
the EC-wide basic price for fat lambs. In Less Favoured Areas, the rate for ewes
on severely disadvantaged hill land was twice the rate for ewes on better quality
low-lying fields. Hill sheep farmers were unanimous in saying that without these
two price supports, which represented at least 25 per cent of their turnover, hill
sheep farming would not be viable.
The general effect of these price-support schemes on the agricultural sector was
to (over)-stimulate farm production: the more products sold on the market, the
more a farmer received in price subsidies and the greater the income; the more
ewes on a farm, the greater the total ewe premium received. They represented
nearly 90 per cent of the CAP budget. This reflects the importance to the
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European Community of rural space and the link between material production
in agriculture and moral reproduction in social life.
Structural measures: diversification of agriculture
In order to achieve economic efficiency in agriculture, the CAP adopted structural
measures or resource adjustments. These were aimed at controlling the productive
capacity of the agricultural sector so that the supply of agricultural products
matched the demand for food in the European Community. Structural measures
involve decreasing the amount of land in agricultural production, increasing
the size and technology input of farms in order to take advantage of economies
of scale and transferring labour and capital from farming to other sectors of the
economy. The two structural adjustment schemes that were used by almost
every Borders hill sheep farmer during the 1980s were the Agricultural
Development Scheme (European Community) and the Agricultural Improvement
Scheme (United Kingdom). These grant schemes provided financial support for
modifying the natural qualities of agricultural land, particularly the marginal
land in Less Favoured Areas, as a means of increasing the efficiency of labour
and the product efficiency of the farm. This is explicitly conveyed in an
explanatory leaflet:
The aim of an improvement plan is to bring about a lasting and substantial
improvement in the economic situation of your farms. The plan must
therefore show that, within a period of not more than 6 years, the
investments you propose to make will increase the earned income of each
labour unit needed to run the business. (Department of Agriculture and
Fisheries for Scotland 1986:1)
Grants, which in the Less Favoured Areas can cover up to 60 per cent of the
costs, are given to assist in a wide variety of expensive and technologically based
improvements to hill pasture: planting shelter belts; building and repairing stone
dykes and fencing for controlled grazing and lambing; spraying bracken to
improve the pasturage on hills; building roads for improved access to hill grazing
areas for delivery of supplementary feeding; building sheds to house ewes during
lambing; and, most important of all for hill sheep farmers, installing land
drainage, reseeding and regeneration of grassland for permanent high-quality
pasturage. These schemes were designed to improve the economic viability of
farms by increasing labour productivity, maximising profit and maintaining
rural society.
The way hill sheep farmers used these programs led to a diversification of
agricultural practice and rural landscape within and between their hill sheep
farms. Those farms with a high proportion of rugged hill land that could not be
converted into improved pasture were unable to switch production from
purebred hill lambs to crossbred field lambs. Since hill lambs are often too small
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to meet fat-lamb certification standards, they were sold on the store market
where they were not eligible for the variable premium. While these farms used
grants to convert as much land as possible to increased lamb production on
improved pasture and used supplementary feeding to fatten more of their hill
lambs, they largely remained ‘breeding’ farms in the sense that the majority of
their production was purebred hill lambs sold on the store market. Those farms
that had a greater proportion of low-lying hill land and flat fields converted the
former to improved pasture where they could raise less hardy but more prolific
field sheep and where the larger lambs could be fattened to the certification
standards of the Sheep Meat Regime. These farms sought to increase the
production of crossbred fat lambs that were eligible for the variable premium.
They were labelled ‘commercial’ farms because there was less emphasis on
breeding programs for purebred hill sheep and more emphasis on feeding
programs for crossbred field sheep.
The CAP’s representation and analyses of and policies for rural spaces within
the European Community that I have described thus far were thoroughly
agricultural and focused on issues of production (see also Ward and McNicholas
1998:28). Regions in the European Community were defined in terms of their
economic dependence on agriculture, policy issues within these regions were
seen to emerge from the ‘farm problem’ and the ‘rural problem’, and the
mechanisms devised to deal with these issues—price supports and structural
measures—were targeted at agricultural production. Further, the Less Favoured
Area directive was aimed at propping up with direct income support farming
in areas of marginal potential for agricultural production where small inefficient
family farms tended to predominate. These policies are consistent with a
representation of rurality in which rural space and society are a function of,
constitute and are encompassed by agriculture, particularly family farms. In the
next phases of the process, there is a significant change in the representation
such that rurality becomes autonomous from and encompasses agriculture. This
leads to a shift from agricultural policy to rural development policy in which
rural space becomes a location for consumption rather than primarily for
agricultural production.
Diversification of rural space
In the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s, the European Community began to
revise the representation of ruralism and the revisions appeared to appropriate
the changes the CAP had wrought on rural locations: regional diversification of
rural space, intensified production and agricultural diversification. I begin my
analysis of this newly formulated representation of ruralism with the 1988
European Community Commission report, ‘The future of rural society’. This
report is a reflective portrayal of rural space that describes the effects of the CAP
on farming (brought about by the actions of farmers in appropriating policy
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measures into their farming practices), the current problems facing rural society
and strategies for addressing these problems.
The report begins with the following description of rurality, which I quote at
length not only because it highlights the emerging autonomy of ruralism from
agriculture and the different types of spaces that now exist within it, but because
it still recognises: 1) the need to support farming in rural areas to offset the
effects of structural change on rural society; and 2) the mutually constitutive
relation between human activities in rural space and forms of social life—a more
general version of rural fundamentalism.
The concepts of the countryside or of rural society are by no means
merely geographic in scope, since economic and social life outside our
towns and cities is of great complexity, embracing a wide range of
activities… (CEC 1988:5)
Rural society [as locality], as it is generally understood in Europe, extends
over regions and areas presenting a variety of activities and landscapes
comprising natural countryside, farmland, villages, small towns, regional
centres and industrialised rural areas. It accounts for about half of the
population and a little over 80% of the territory of the Community.
But the concept of rural society [as representation] implies more than
geographical limits. It refers to a complex economic and social fabric
made up of a wide range of activities: farming, small trades and
businesses, small and medium-sized industries, commerce and services.
Furthermore, it acts as a buffer and provides a regenerative environment
which is essential for ecological balance. Finally, it is assuming an
increasingly important role as a place of relaxation and leisure.
[After the expansions of the European Community in 1973 and 1987,]
the Community has acquired a distinctly higher proportion of areas the
structures of which militate against proper economic—and
social—development. Most of these areas are rural in the extreme,
sometimes with 20–30% of the population still employed in farming.
(p. 15)
Notable in this description is the change in the relation between agriculture and
rurality. Agriculture exists within and is encompassed by rural space and society
rather than the other way around, as it was in the earlier representation. This
change foreshadows a major theme of the report: the decrease in the importance
of agriculture in rural regions. It proposes an urban-centric spatial model that
identifies three types of rural regions. Each of these regions is defined by its
relation to large conurbations; each is described as experiencing a different
problem brought about by the overall decrease in the importance of agriculture
within the European Community; and together these are referred to in the report
29
Rurality and rural space: the ‘policy effect’ of the Common Agricultural Policy in the Borders of Scotland
as the ‘three standard problems’ (CEC 1988:28–9). First, there are areas close to
cities experiencing ‘the pressure of modern life’ due to an influx of population
and competition for the use of land where agriculture is least important and
where there is a diversification of land uses between agriculture, industry and
leisure. Second, there are ‘outlying regions’ experiencing ‘rural decline’ due to
out-migration where agriculture remains relatively important but with decreasing
employment opportunities because of technological improvements in production.
Third, there are the ‘very marginal areas’ experiencing more marked rural decline
and depopulation where agriculture remains the most important sector of the
local economy and where there is little potential for economic diversification
because of the difficulty of providing services and infrastructure. The second
and third standard problems portray rural areas experiencing what Kearney
earlier called the ‘rural problem’ (1991:126). In this sense, the report appropriates
into its revised representation of rural space the effects of the structural
adjustments brought about by the implementation of the CAP.
The last paragraph of the quote is also significant to the revised representation
of ruralism. It describes a reconfiguration of the relation between agriculture
based on family production units and rurality. Now in relation to the large,
technologically advanced agribusiness farms, leisure areas and environmental
buffer zones, the spaces ‘furthest from the mainstream of Community life’ (CEC
1988:7)—where small family farming of the rural fundamentalist image
continues—are ‘rural in the extreme’: remote, depopulated and economically
marginal because of their heavy dependence on agriculture. The word ‘extreme’
is important in the paragraph because it is a narrative form of distanciation as
well as authenticity. Its use makes poorer agricultural regions, the Less Favoured
Areas like those of the hill sheep farming area of the Scottish Borders, into a
kind of distanced and marginal landscape—a museum-like place portraying the
original image of rural space where family farming and a valued form of society
continue to exist.
Overall, then, ‘The future of rural society’ records the marginalisation of
agriculture—especially small family-based farming—into the European
Community’s revised representation of rurality. Unlike the original ‘agrarian’
(Bonanno 1991) configuration, rurality is now portrayed as incorporating
heterogeneous activities and types of spaces. The nature of rural space is not
defined only by agriculture, even a diversified agriculture. Instead, the rural is
also a place for small industry and leisure activities in those areas where structural
adjustment mechanisms of the CAP have lead to a rural decline; and it is also a
place for environmental preservation in those areas where the price-support
mechanisms have led to farmers adopting intensive but ecologically damaging
methods of agricultural production as a means of maximising income from
subsidies. This representation of rural areas for leisure and environmental
preservation continued the moral-reproductive function of the earlier rural
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fundamentalist image that the CAP originally envisioned for farming in rural
society. In the former case, there is rural space for relaxation and recreation
necessary for regenerating the human spirit for people throughout the entire
European Community; and, in the latter case, there is rural space for regenerating
the environment essential to the ecological balance of the entire community.
Rural locations should be preserved not just for the farmers living there but for
the benefit of society as a whole.
Another implication of representing the rural as constituted by a diversity of
activities and spaces is that it also has a diversity of endogenous resources—not
just land for agriculture—that can be developed to expand and reinvigorate the
economy and society of rural areas. Instead of local farmers relying on CAP
price-support mechanisms to produce agricultural commodities for people outside
their rural locality, rural localities are now places that people from outside come
into to consume the diversity of things that now constitute rural localities: the
environment, heritage, beautiful natural landscapes, local customs and artefacts.
Agenda 2000 and beyond
I am now moving into a period of CAP policy development and the changes in
the measures designed to achieve the aims of the reformed CAP that occurred
after my last period of fieldwork among hill sheep farmers in 2001, just before
the outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease. Four farms in the fieldwork area had
to destroy all their sheep and the others were quarantined throughout the
outbreak. What follows, then, is suggestive of how these policy documents
construct the nature of rurality and an image of rural landscapes. It also sets a
framework for future research into the way in which hill sheep farmers have
practically adopted these policy measures together with the effects of the 2001
outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease.
To achieve the development of rural regions, the European Commission produced
a number of documents that transposed the image of diversified rurality into
tangible localities exhibiting characteristics of the pressure of modern life, rural
decline and very marginal areas and exemplifying the mediated effects of
previous agricultural policies. All of them envisioned a phasing out of
price-support schemes and placed a revised CAP within the broader agenda of
integrated rural development. This is a shift from a sectoral approach of assisting
agriculture throughout the European Community to a more territorial approach
supporting agricultural, infrastructural, educational, social and economic
development in specific localities. The principal analyses and policy statements
are: the MacSharry Reforms (1992), the Community Initiative for Rural
Development (LEADER), the Cork Declaration (1996), the Buckwell Report (1997),
culminating in Agenda 2000 (July 1997).
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Agenda 2000 identified four aims for the CAP. First, ‘ensuring continued
agricultural land use and thereby contributing to the maintenance of a viable
rural community; note here the continuing importance of agriculture to the
viability of rural communities’. Second, ‘preserving the countryside’. Third,
‘maintaining and promoting sustainable farming systems’. Fourth, ‘assuring
environmental requirements’. Agenda 2000 also re-conceptualised the CAP as
based on two ‘pillars’. Pillar one includes market and price mechanisms to support
agricultural production. Pillar two consolidates various programs and mechanisms
that contribute to rural development, including economic diversification,
infrastructural improvement, rural heritage, protection of the environment,
maintenance of the countryside, restoration of landscapes, extensification, and
set-aside. Less Favoured Areas continue in the CAP, now explicitly as a
component of Rural Development (pillar two), not only because of the impact
of the poor land on agricultural production and the decline in farming and rural
populations, but because of the environmental ‘high nature value’ of Less
Favoured Area landscapes. As a result, rural areas are now like areas of European
nature conservation interest—in fact, the two types of areas have large expanses
of overlap (see Figure 1.4).
A common theme in these policy statements and reports culminating in the
Agenda 2000 reforms is a reiteration of the effects that previous measures,
particularly price-support schemes such as the Sheep Meat Regime and support
through the Less Favoured Areas policy, have had on rural localities:
overproduction, polarisation of incomes between small family farms and large
technologically based farms, environmental degradation and continued rural
decline. Based on this analysis, Agenda 2000 stated the objectives for a
reformulated CAP for 2000–06. They incorporated the original aims identified
in the Treaty of Rome of achieving social equity for farmers and promoting
economic efficiency with new aims of environmental management and
multidimensional rural development to maintain the viability of rural society:
ensuring a fair standard of living for the agricultural community and
contributing to the stability of farm incomes; increased competitiveness
internally and externally in order to ensure that EU producers take full
advantage of positive world market developments; food safety and food
quality which are both a fundamental obligation towards consumers;
integration of environmental goals into the Common Agricultural Policy;
and creation of alternative job and income opportunities for farmers and
their families. (European Commission 1997b)10
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Figure 1.4 Less Favoured Areas (LFAs) and areas of European nature
conservation interest (EECONET) in the European Union
Source: EECONET.
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Figure 1.5 Objective one and objective two areas of the European Union
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In the Explanatory Memorandum accompanying Agenda 2000 (European
Commission 1997b), the ‘European model of agriculture’ is explicitly described
as competitive, using environmentally friendly production methods and including
a diversity of agriculture ‘rich in tradition…[and seeking] to maintain the visual
amenity of our countrysides [sic] as well as vibrant and active rural communities’
(European Commission 1997b, Explanatory Memorandum:5). Again, as in the
1987 Green Paper, there is an explicit juxtaposition of European agriculture with
Europe’s major competitors (that is, the United States), particularly the part it
plays ‘in society and in preserving the landscape, whence the need to maintain
farming throughout Europe and to safeguard farmers’ incomes’ (European
Commission 1997b, Explanatory Memorandum:6).
All payments to farmers under the CAP were dependent on their compliance
with (‘cross-compliance’) requirements to maintain their land in good agricultural
and environmental condition including appropriate stocking densities on the
land, and to ensure plant and animal health, environmental protection and animal
welfare. Recognising the consequences of price supports on inputs (that is,
headage payment on stock) for intensification and overproduction, financial
support under the Single Farm Payment Scheme for achieving these aims was
now to be made on a land-area basis. In recognition of the detrimental
environmental effects of intensive production, area-based direct support
payments were linked to requirements for farmers to use the land less intensively
in order to preserve the high nature value of landscapes in the Less Favoured
Areas (European Commission 1997a:20).
In order to achieve these policy aims in the 2000–06 period, European space was
re-spatialised to reflect the three priority objectives for the use of structural
funds under Agenda 2000. Two of them address the development problems in
remote areas (objective one) and rural areas facing a decline in traditional
activities (objective two)—that is, agricultural activities in the Scottish Borders,
by providing financial assistance for the creation of the heterogeneous activities
and spaces now represented as constitutive of rurality. As a result, rural regions
are now defined in ‘objective’ terms. The pun—referring to the objectives for
the structural funds and to the mode of defining and identifying real locations
of such ruralities in terms of objective measures such as population density—is
here intended. In the first sense of objective, rural localities are theoretically
characterised using a combination of the OECD measure of population density
at local and regional levels and the Eurostat approach of measuring the degree
of urbanisation by population density. On this basis, the European Community
is divided into ‘predominantly rural regions’ (about 10 per cent of the population
covering about 47 per cent of the European Community’s territory), ‘significantly
rural regions’ (about 30 per cent of the population and 37.4 per cent of the
community’s territory) and ‘predominantly urbanised regions’ (about 60 per
cent of the population and 15.6 per cent of the community’s territory). The
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geographical reality of these regions is attested to by the maps included in the
report, which objectify the characteristics of rural localities and spatialise the
community into tangible geographical spaces according to population density,
degree of urbanisation and rural and urban regions. In the second sense of
objective, these rural spaces are then assessed in terms of criteria relevant to
each of the three objectives for the use of structural funds. On this basis, maps
are produced that spatialise the European Community into tangible geographical
regions that objectify these problems; it is these regions that qualify for structural
funds to support rural development (see Figure 1.5).
Conclusion: future research
My description has chronicled revised representation of rurality as incorporating
heterogeneous types of spaces and activities, and has summarised policies and
mechanisms for implementation that objectify resulting images as concrete rural
localities. Only one of these activities, now in decline, is agriculture. I have now
reached the limits of my analysis. The next step is to conduct further
ethnographic research in Teviotdale. As I mentioned previously, Teviotdale was
also part of the area infected with foot-and-mouth disease in 2001. These two
events provide a complex context within which hill sheep farmers have adapted
their farming practices. My aim for my next period of fieldwork in Teviotdale
is to find out what has happened to its rural landscape and society as a result of
the way hill sheep farmers have appropriated the reformed policies and
mechanisms into their farming practices, and the effects on their sense of what
it means to live on family farms in a rural place.
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Endnotes
1  I use the term ‘common’ in the sense that Charles Taylor does in drawing a distinction between
common and shared meanings: ‘Common meanings are the basis of community. Intersubjective meaning
gives people a common language to talk about social reality…what it meant here is something more
than convergence. Convergence is what happens when our values are shared…But we could also say
that common meanings are quite other than consensus, for they can subsist with a high degree of
cleavage; this is what happens when common meaning comes to be lived and understood differently
by different groups’ (Taylor 1979:51, italics added).
2 The five objectives were: increasing agricultural productivity, ensuring a fair standard of living for
farmers, stabilising markets, guaranteeing food security and ensuring reasonable prices for consumers.
3 These are only two of the five objectives of agricultural policy identified in the Treaty of Rome. They
foreshadow larger policy initiatives, termed Pillar 1 and Pillar 2 in the Agenda 2000 reforms.
4  ‘The future of rural society’ paper, however, puts this image in a new configuration of agriculture
and ruralism.
5 The use of the term ‘encompassing’ follows Dumont (1980:239–45).
6 There is some support for Bowler’s assertion of the persuasiveness of this image in Europe at the time
when the CAP was being developed. His description of rural fundamentalism is reminiscent of William’s
(1975) historical analysis of the changing representation of the ‘country’ in English literature and of
Newby’s (1979:14, 18) notion of rural Romanticism as British society’s living ‘museum’ of its cherished
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values. In addition, Creed and Ching (1997:19) point to the notion of the ‘romantic trope of the
countryside as idyllic retreat’ in America. Unlike Bowler, however, these analysts also identify the
negative images and realities of living in rural society.
7  As we will see below, there was an explicit social policy to preserve rural society by ensuring that
farmers as the pivots of rural society were maintained.
8  In the early 1990s, the Beef Special Premium was introduced. This was a headage payment for beef
cattle. Since most hill sheep farms also carry some cattle, this was another important source of income.
I do no more than mention this scheme because sheep are the most financially and socially important
livestock for a hill sheep farm.
9  Fat lambs are ready for slaughter at the time of sale.
10 These objectives are presented in a different order in Agenda 2000. I have changed the order so that
it accords with the order in which I list the aims of the reformulated CAP.
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The Australian Federation brought together colonies that had developed
centralised administrative systems over an equally centralised pattern of
settlement. Rural society was developed under agrarian ideals that differentiated
country from city in social and political as well as cultural terms. While similar
ideals were held in Europe and North America, the colonial administration of
such important instruments of rural development as railways and local
government left Australian rural areas in a condition of dependency that the
regionalist traditions and stronger local governments of Europe and North
America might not have permitted. The expression of ‘country-mindedness’ and
the establishment of the almost unique National (formerly Country) Party
alongside administrative tradition have helped to preserve a climate in which
appeals to administrative apparatuses firmly based in state capitals have been
the principal recognised means of solving local problems. Rural culture as well
as the structural conditions of dependency could have blinkered community
perception of possible means of local advancement by way of self-governance,
other than where business opportunities are presented in familiar industries.
Much has been said and written about rural communities being blinkered to
economic opportunity, but despite some penetrating analysis, conflation of
economic and political dimensions remains a problem. Criticism of rural
communities for being blinkered and passive is paradoxical in a cultural context
in which self-reliance at the individual level is held as an important ideal and
farmer organisations have been very active. After examining some literature,
this chapter illustrates these points with brief references to the history of grain
handling, irrigation, natural resource management and railways in New South
Wales, from their establishment through to the restructuring that occurred
during and since the 1990s. In concluding, this chapter suggests appropriate
dimensions for cultural research and analysis.
41
Introduction
Any comparison between Australia and Europe—most obviously, the United
Kingdom—could not escape the fundamental point that Australia was colonised
while industrialising Europe was colonising. Colonial settlement grew relatively
rapidly during the late eighteenth century and, although much growth occurred
inland, each colony was administered from a capital city located on the coast
with very little delegation to local communities. The colonial relationship is still
apparent in each state’s administrative hierarchy and the federal system, making
reasonable overseas comparisons in governance enduringly difficult, even though
neo-liberalism and parallel new models of localising and regionalising governance
have been very influential in Australia and Europe.
This chapter focuses on a cultural element that is associated with this centralised
administrative system. The structure of the metropolitan–regional system in
Australia has been analysed extensively, and likewise rural cultures, but the
connection with governance is not made so often. There has long been a broad
interpretation of the rural Australian world view, or ‘community self-concept’
(Curry 2000:694, drawing on Clifford Geertz), available alongside the political
economy of regional development and disadvantage (see Gray and Lawrence
2001). Much has been written about farm cultures and their significance for
farm practice and environments (such as Vanclay et al. 1998). The rural
community studies literature has explored town culture in relation to ruralism
(see, for example, Gray 1991). The history of the National Party,
‘country-mindedness’ (Aitkin 1985) and new state movements have shown a
radical, sometimes almost revolutionary, element in rural culture. Though waning
at times, this element has been significant historically, but in the research
literature it has generally not been tied to current problems of economic and
social restructuring. There is a case for making this connection and reinterpreting
metropolitan–regional relations accordingly. The case is made below with an
eye to administrative structures and the prospects for regionalisation.
The administrative geography of Australian rural
development
Unlike the comparable countries of North America, and other than the national
capital created after federation, inland cities that could rival the capitals did not
arise in Australia. Inland Australia has possessed relatively little secondary
industry or commercial administration. No inland city has been able to rival the
administrative and commercial strengths of the coastal state capitals. A
by-product of this early dominance was the capacity of each colony to ignore
the others, except to attempt to ensure that neighbouring colonies did not siphon
trade. This rivalry substantially affected the pattern of settlement and
administrative relations among the state capitals.
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It is, however, possible to identify sub-state regions in terms of economic,
demographic and environmental characteristics to which the state boundaries
have little or no relevance. The states are sometimes said to be unnecessary
historical anomalies, hindering rational planning and development (see, for
example, Soorley 2004). Nevertheless, the states and particularly their capitals
dominate Australia’s political and economic geography. Despite a significant
drift of population to dispersed coastal towns where tourism and service
industries are growing, the state capitals remain demographically dominant and
are likely to remain so. For example, Sydney is projected to show about 70 per
cent of the population growth of New South Wales in 2031. Coastal areas are
expected to grow the most rapidly in percentage terms, while inland areas are
expected to continue to lose population (Transport and Population Data Centre
2004).
This relationship between country and city has a political element. It has
provided the basis of an important dimension of Australian politics with the
development of a continuing national political party, which has attempted to
represent the views of rural residents (see Costar and Woodward 1985). It was
founded on the ideology of country-mindedness: belief in the distinctiveness,
value and legitimacy of rural interests founded on agrarian values and
counterpoised with city interests. The city–country relationship is also expressed
in state–local government relations. Rural local government is a product of
colonial governments’ attempts to force local people to take responsibility for
some of the costs of development. From the outset, rural communities had to
seek favours from colonial governments for development to occur, and leaders
emerged around the need to promote local interests (Chapman and Wood 1984).
From the 1850s, the colonies permitted incorporation of local councils having
taxation (rating) capability. Many local government areas have relatively small
populations and hence have very limited revenue-raising capacity. The
governments of New South Wales and Tasmania found it necessary to enforce
incorporation in many areas. Chapman and Wood (1984:39) mention that in the
mid 1980s, just more than half of all local authorities had populations smaller
than 5000 people, despite some recent amalgamations of small rural councils.
Local councils have generally been reluctant to extend their responsibilities by
increasing their taxation revenue, and have been reluctant to combine with
other councils to form larger organisations. Local government continues to exist
only under the authority of state government legislation and administration.
With the likely exception of the one very large council, that of Brisbane City,
Australian local government is not capable of accepting sufficient effective
responsibility to become a likely vehicle for regionalisation, decentralisation
and certainly not devolution.
The Australian tradition of local government is one of small and subservient
institutions. State governments remain entrenched in the overwhelmingly
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populous and economically strong state capitals. Although appearing to attempt
decentralisation from time to time by transferring departments or parts of them
to regional cities, and sometimes later transferring them back again, the hierarchy
of state administration extends outwards and downwards, with some variation
among the states, from the capitals, as it has always done. Debate about the size
and strength of Australian local government has focused on economic efficiency
arguments rather than power and devolution (Dollery and Crase 2006). Where
devolution has occurred it has tended to be functions and responsibilities that
are devolved rather than power—a situation leading Dollery and Crase to support
the view that Australian local government is financially unsustainable.
Dependency, governance and rural restructuring
The culture of rural local government, and rural communities more broadly, has
been one in which subservience to the state government is understood—in the
sense that it is taken for granted as well as in the sense of familiarity. Debates
about rural restructuring among researchers and practitioners, including
small-town ‘revivalists’ (Gray 2005a) who seek to reverse the detrimental
economic and social effects of change, illuminate this culture. The researchers
do so as they implicitly propose that exerting influence over state governments
either amounts to expression of autonomy or at least indicates something other
than an absolute power relationship as rural interests are ‘translated’ (see
Herbert-Cheshire 2003) rather than exerted independently. The practitioners
are similar as they identify the culture to be changed as one of dependency
identifiable among individuals and expressed as the absence of
entrepreneurialism. Both groups—the researchers and the activists—are at least
partly correct in what they see and what they conclude. The problem is that
they tend to be a little myopic. Moreover, they conflate political powerlessness
and economic passivity.
Those who perceive a power structure see it in terms of struggle against central
government, while those who take an apolitical view see business failure amid
opportunity. Among those who acknowledge local–central power relations,
Herbert-Cheshire (2003:255) identifies previous research that shows ‘local people
to negotiate, challenge and ultimately transform rural policy’ but not create
policy for themselves as a truly autonomous organisation might be expected to
do. In her own research, Herbert-Cheshire uses actor network theory to
circumvent conceptualisation of power in terms of either passivity or resistance
and admits the possibility that those in power might be displaced by the
translation of interests towards something more consistent with those of the
formerly powerless. Herbert-Cheshire presents a scenario in which local people
are able to persuade a state government to modify and reverse its decisions to
terminate a train service and close a courthouse. She presents another scenario
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through which local people persuade a Commonwealth Government department
to change an industry-support funding formula.
While these cases certainly illustrate ‘translation’ and validate the rejection of
absolute conceptualisations of power, it is notable that in neither instance did
a community act without reference to a central government. They apparently
did not, for example, attempt to recreate the courthouse for themselves, start
their own freight service or establish their own sources for industry support.
In some parallel analysis, Herbert-Cheshire and Higgins (2004) contrast small
rural communities in terms of the response to decline as occurring in a single
dimension: one community heeding the neo-liberal dictum of the revivalists and
redefining itself as entrepreneurial while the other remains reactive to
government. They contrast entrepreneurialism with continuing political weakness
rather than, as they might, distilling two dimensions: economic passivity–activity
and political subservience–autonomy. An economically active, entrepreneurial
community can remain dependent, while it is conceivable, though admittedly
unlikely given the structure and culture of local government, that an
economically passive community could have some autonomy.
In Herbert-Cheshire’s comparison, the apparently economically successful
community ceased or reduced its level of protest to government while the
unsuccessful case chose to continue traditional anti-government protest,
contributing further to its own illegitimacy in the neo-liberal ideological
framework. The latter also did what we might predict given the tradition of
political/administrative subservience. What, however, of the former
entrepreneurial and apparently successful community? Herbert-Cheshire and
Higgins attributed the success to the enrolment of outside expertise, which,
under neo-liberal logic, was able to change the attitude of local people away
from dependency towards entrepreneurialism. They use success in obtaining
central government grant funding as an indicator of reform and renewal, as well
as some business development. As Herbert-Cheshire and Higgins note, however,
this success has not gone so far as reversing population decline and the problems
of agricultural industries. It has more to do with the ability of neo-liberal rhetoric
to define success and, I would add, its capacity to distract attention from the
political subservience–autonomy dimension.
In political terms, the successful community acted neither independently nor
in concert with other communities. It might have changed its economic world
view, but only at the prompting of central government and apparently only in
terms of its perception of local business. This observation prompts, at very least,
some critical questioning of whether or not this ‘success’, which Herbert-Cheshire
and Higgins show to be at least questionable, will prove to be in the community’s
long-term interests. It also prompts questioning of this world view in which
community action is seen only as entrepreneurialism to the denigration of political
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action, or the viewing of it as such becomes legitimate. From the perspective of
the history of Australian administrative tradition, this looks like the untranslated
(Herbert-Cheshire 2004) exercise of metropolitan power. For present purposes,
the important point is that although an entrepreneurial culture seems to have
emerged or an old one has been strengthened, the relationship with government
has not changed.
Is there any evidence of the relationship changing? Local government has been
changed by amalgamation of small councils into large ones, most dramatically
in Victoria. O’Toole and Burdess (2004) portrayed this as the emergence of a new
mode of governance because a variety of community organisations grew in
Victoria in response to local government amalgamations and the consequent loss
by some local communities of their own council. Changes to local government
have been and are being considered and implemented in other states, almost
always involving amalgamation. There is no evidence that amalgamations create
politically stronger institutions in their relations with central government.
O’Toole and Burdess (2004) discuss change in terms of the creation of community
organisations that react to enlarged local government in the familiar way—just
as local government is reactive to state government.
Of course it is easy to make accusations of passivity from a distance in time and
space, with no knowledge of the circumstances other than the communities
being small and suffering from restructuring. It is also absurd to expect a small
community to establish its own legal system or development funding
independently of central government. It is, however, reasonable to surmise, for
purposes of further investigation, that the traditional world view of the
community members would not have prompted them to consider non-government
(as Herbert-Cheshire and Higgins suggest) or locally governed alternatives. It is
hard to see success in obtaining central government funding as a sure step
towards autonomy. Very many small rural communities have organised
themselves to retain or develop local industries (Cocklin and Dibden 2005).
Perhaps the best type, or certainly best-known example, of a non-government
alternative is that promoted by the Bendigo Bank. The Bendigo Bank works in
partnership with local people to re-establish branches in small towns after the
metropolitan banks have withdrawn. While only partially localised, the rise of
Bendigo Bank branches in small towns does illustrate local participation in
development without central government involvement. It hints at what might
be done with greater cooperation and resource pooling among rural communities.
This view has a point of consistency with those who advocate community
self-help and entrepreneurship: ‘revivalists’, as apparent in Kenyon and Black
(2001) and Stoeckel (1998). From this perspective, the correct response to
neo-liberalism and restructuring is the development of local business and industry
of the kind that Herbert-Cheshire and Higgins identify in their successful case.
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This does not contradict the power relationship models, but it does ignore the
history of development through which rural localities have been created as
political dependencies of the metropolitan cities. It is frequently and reasonably
criticised for promoting or at least risking victim blaming. Nevertheless, it is
worth noting for the way it points towards a culture in which local
self-governance does not come to mind as a response to economic and social
decline. The existence of work such as Kenyon and Black’s and exhortations
like that of Stoeckel’s implies a cultural problem, though not necessarily one
that can be solved at the individual level, and not without reference to the
development of rural local cultures in a political relationship with metropolitan
Australia.
Radical rural governance
Locally governed alternatives are even more difficult to imagine given the status
of local government. What, then, of the National Party? Has it operated in the
political dimension that the revivalists ignore? The answer must be yes, but it
operates in the same governance framework as it has sought to change relations
within the political dimension rather than change the institutions of it. There
is, however, a streak of radicalism in Australia’s rural history. The proponents
of new states apparently have had no difficulty in imagining drastic institutional
change towards more regionalised governance.
The creation of new states has been a popular idea in many regional areas. It
effectively means secession from existing states, but it is specifically allowed
under the Australian Constitution if certain requirements are met. The new-state
movement has roots in the creation of existing states, but has progressed no
further despite the idea still retaining considerable support in Queensland and
New South Wales at least. The idea that regional government should replace the
states is also relatively popular, and not just in the rural areas that have been
the wellsprings of new-state movements (Brown et al. 2006). While
country-mindedness has promoted a rural-based political party, provided
foundations for new-state movements in rural areas and generally been consistent
with agrarian ideals of self-reliance, it has not helped to strengthen the only
form of government residing in rural areas: local government. Nor has it
successfully prompted effective agitation for reform of the federal system towards
regionalisation.
Australia faces a governance dilemma: there is popular support for regionalisation
at the same time as the states are losing influence to the Commonwealth, but
local government does not currently provide a platform for devolution. The
significance of the problem grows a little when trends towards ‘new local
governance’ elsewhere, particularly in the United Kingdom, are considered.
Here we see promotion of the idea of devolution alongside improvements in local
governance (Stoker 2004). This comes amid the ever-present evidence that
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bottom-up, local initiative provides the best platform for promoting or
ameliorating change and its effects and that central control can be unnecessary
and undesirable (for a British environmental example, see Hinshelwood 2001).
The significance of any change for the better in local governance has, however,
been vigorously questioned (Bonney 2004). Some change to rural local
governance, towards more participatory models, has been noted in Australia,
but some of the old structures are persistent (Pini 2006). Moreover, it is hard to
imagine ‘new localism’ taking hold in Australia: no Australian local council,
with the possible exception of Brisbane City, has anything like the capacity to
improve its environment as some of the big British cities have done. The debate
in Australia remains focused on amalgamations of very small councils into slightly
larger ones.
Research on rural local government has shown that the legitimacy of rural elected
councillors rests on their ability to defend the interests of the locality, frequently
against what are seen to be threats from central government, and initiatives that
could conceivably bring rate increases are resisted (Gray 1991). The amalgamation
of councils and the application of new management techniques, such as
competitive tendering, have partially redefined local government, but nothing
appears to have changed the traditional criteria for popular legitimacy (Welch
2002, using New Zealand and Australian illustrations). If there is a cultural
problem, as suggested above, there doesn’t seem to be any change happening
in local government to solve it. There could be something happening through
central government attempts at ‘whole-of-government’ programming and
participatory planning, but none of this indicates the rise of local institutions
that could be expected to take initiatives in a climate of relative autonomy. In
New Zealand, engagement and partnership have recently illuminated the
continuing problems of local government legitimacy and implicitly support
arguments for stronger regional governance (Scott and McNeill 2006). There is
no institutional basis for such change in Australia. Just as the revivalists seek
cultural change towards entrepreneurialism and have apparently found a platform
for it in some towns, so we might consider the existence of a platform for more
political cultural change towards the legitimisation of regionalism.
A culture of political subservience?
Given the enthusiasm with which the new entrepreneurialism of the revivalists
has been accepted in some communities, what has become of
country-mindedness? Looking at the National Party, one might think it has
faded at least a bit. The National Party, however, is still a country party and it
retains its country-mindedness, with indications of agrarianism (as with its recent
support for the ‘single-desk’ wheat exporter). The National Farmers Federation
(NFF) continues to represent rural industry, though it is an industry organisation
with only weak connections to rural communities and cannot be said to have
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been driven by agrarianism (Connors 1996) to the extent that the National Party
has. Nevertheless, both organisations represent the rural interest, to the extent
that there is a singular rural interest, though particularly the NFF is industry
rather than community focused. Their level of political activity and activism
contrasts with the passivity of the communities discussed above.
This could reflect the view that what is good for industry is good for the
community. Giving priority to farmer interests has been noted in regional local
politics (Gray 1991). When we consider the strength of activism, however, and
the high level of political organisation among farmers, it is surprising that there
has been so little activity at the local community level for the sake of local
community interests. The reason for this paradox might lie in the rigidity of the
state administrative apparatus and the low status of local government. In some
circumstances, rural organisations seem very keen and able to take over
government activities. In other circumstances, there seems to be no recognition
of the possibilities. Some examples will illustrate this problem by way of
contrasting the processes of privatisation in which opportunities have arisen for
rural industries and communities.
Grain handling
The privatisation of grain handling in New South Wales was taken on by a
farmer organisation as a great entrepreneurial opportunity and the capture of a
government function to which farmers had been subservient. The Grain Handling
Authority, previously known as the Grain Elevators Board, was sold in its
corporatised form, the NSW Grain Corporation, by the Prime Wheat Association
in 1992. In 2000, it merged with its Victorian counterpart. It merged with
Queensland-based Grainco in 2003. In a letter to the Leader of the NSW
Opposition, the Prime Wheat Association states:
We appreciate the support of your Party in our objective to acquire NSW
Grain Corporation Ltd on behalf of the growers of NSW. It is essential
that the privatisation of GrainCorp results in ownership by the users of
the system as a natural and logical extension of their production process.
The letter goes on to state that the association has 8000 grower members and
has been in existence since 1958. It concludes by saying: ‘Your policy of growers
acquiring ownership of GrainCorp as expressed by Mr Jack Hallam, Shadow
Minister for Agriculture, Rural Affairs and Forests receives our strong
endorsement’ (Parliament of New South Wales 1992).
Elias (2005) reports that only 22 per cent of Graincorp shares are in the hands
of farmers, but this does not alter the apparent enthusiasm and competence of
a farmer organisation through acquiring not just a business, but a government
function, which had been managed from Sydney since 1917. Farmers, at least
for a time, placed themselves much further towards the entrepreneurial
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autonomous ends of the economic and political dimensions of their relationship
with metropolitan Australia.
Irrigation
The recent history of irrigation is more complex, and differs among the states
and within states. Unlike Victoria, New South Wales privatised its water
distribution agency at the community level during the 1990s. The farmers were,
according to parliamentary statements, keen to take over the provision of
irrigation water at the local or regional level. ‘The irrigators are eager to be
handed the task of privatisation’ (Member for Murray, in Parliament of New
South Wales 1993). An interesting example of community involvement in the
process is that of Coleambally Irrigation Co-Operative Limited (CICL), which
took over from what was once the NSW Water Conservation and Irrigation
Commission (from 1976, the Water Resources Commission) in 2000. All 373 of
the cooperative’s customers are also members (Meyer 2005:116). In the same
year that the cooperative was corporatised (1997), the future membership was
facing uncertainties of water supply and pricing as the state government
discussed capping the quantities of water that could be diverted, issues that had
been on the political agenda for several years (Parliament of New South Wales
1997). Water conservation measures were required of the privatised entities and
were funded by the NSW Government (with respect to Murray Irrigation Limited,
see Meyer 2005:105). In drought conditions, however, on top of environmental
concerns and infrastructure problems, the management of water provision has
been difficult.
This is especially so for locally or regionally based organisations that are required
to manage state policy. It is reasonable to ask about the extent to which local
people, including cooperative members, are able to interpret and act on their
own interests. Just what privatisation and localisation/regionalisation have meant
to farmers and other local people should be questioned. An anecdote of potential
interest has been provided by an anthropologist working among irrigation
farmers in an area managed by a cooperative (A. Brown, personal communication).
In conversations about water and its management during some research on the
values and interests of irrigation farmers, a privatised irrigation organisation
was consistently referred to as ‘the commission’, being a reference to the Water
Resources Commission, which had ceased to exist in 1986. ‘The commission’ was
seen to have been an authoritarian, almost foreign, organisation. It did, as the
privatised entities must still do, police the use of water. This raises the possibility
that after the irrigation provider has been transferred to local ownership, though
not entirely local control, it is seen to remain unchanged. It is reasonable to
propose that the idea of local control is foreign to the irrigation farmer’s world
view. While grain handling indicates the legitimacy of the regionalisation of
industry functions and the ease with which the ideas of privatisation and farmer
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control fit into the rural world view, government functions might not be so
easily reconceptualised in regionalist terms.
Natural resource management
Among the rural functions of government, natural resource management (NRM)
has become the most regionalised. Before discussing the process, it is worth
differentiating regionalisation from regionalism. The latter refers to the idea,
held among regional people, that regional-level administration is preferable to
central administration. In the rural context, it is consistent with
country-mindedness, though it has no necessary agrarian element. Regionalisation
refers to the actions of central governments when they devolve responsibility,
with or without significant authority, to sub-state organisations. The
Commonwealth Government, with the cooperation of the states, has been
responsible for regionalising NRM since the national Landcare program was
established on a localised basis from 1988, but more significantly since the
National Action Plan for Salinity and the Natural Heritage Trust provided
substantial funding to organisations established on a regional basis (Moore and
Rockloff 2006). It is hard, however, to see much regionalism in these changes.
They have been instituted and delivered by central, state and the Commonwealth
governments in terms laid down by those governments.
Regional NRM organisations, typically known as catchment management
authorities (CMAs), have considerable power and resources. Although their
constitutions vary among the states, they are not, however, particularly
democratic. The CMA boards are often appointed rather than elected and central
government is seen to maintain control. In Moore and Rockloff’s (2006:268)
research, the idea that a local government’s elected representatives might
participate was rejected by NRM group members interviewed on the grounds
that local government was too parochial, despite local government being more
democratic and accountable to its constituents.
These organisations have a very shaky status on the political dimension of
regional–metropolitan, local–central relations. Despite having resources, they
do not have regionalist origins and are very much creatures of state governments,
although Moore and Rockloff see some opportunities for the exertion of regional
agency. They conclude that the challenge of democratised NRM is that of
transforming local government to suit effective regional delivery and democratic
accountability, something that is apparently absent from at least some regional
participants in CMAs.
Railways1
The examples above indicate the limitations of regional autonomy after some of
the major changes of the past 20 years in the context of neo-liberalisation of
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rural, industrial and environmental policies. They show that although an
entrepreneurial spirit has existed among farmers and others as members of
industry organisations, and can be stimulated by central government activity
at the local level, and although the interests of rural and metropolitan people
and institutions have been and continue to be counterpoised in the tradition of
country-mindedness, there seems to be limited readiness to become involved in
ways that, in the context of ‘new localism’ and potentially ‘new regionalism’,
could drive substantial change.
While it is problematic to explain the absence of a phenomenon, particularly
when it is basically ideological, I propose that the problem could be due to the
embedded nature of the rural world view in a tradition of administrative
dependency and a reluctance to break away from that tradition. We have seen
that reluctance, possibly in terms of the failure of Graincorp to maintain farmer
ownership, but more evidently in the hint of a culture of subservience to the
old irrigation provider and the rejection of local government as a vehicle for
regionalisation.
A historical explanation for this non-phenomenon is offered by the history of
the railways. More than any other institution, the railways, with some variation
among the states, present the history of administrative dependency. This is
partly because they were a very significant institution in rural development
economically and culturally. Blainey (1968) sees the steam locomotive as so
significant to the history of rural Australia and particularly the National Party
that he suggests that a steam locomotive rather than a sheaf of wheat should be
the centrepiece of its coat of arms, were it to have one. The railways established
the pattern of rural settlement. While doing so, they focused the economy of
each state, to slightly varying degrees, on the capitals. The railways were planned
and administered from the colonial capitals in ways that ensured that
metropolitan interests were furthered and alternative ports did not develop
sufficiently to compete, or develop at all. Among transport historians, Lee (2003)
makes this point about centralisation, though he does note variation among the
colonies, later the states.
New South Wales and Victoria developed railway systems that focused the
exportation of primary products on the colonial capitals and a few other ports,
such as Newcastle in New South Wales and Geelong in Victoria. The more
decentralised Queensland pattern is a consequence of the great distance between
Brisbane, the capital, and the important northern port of Townsville, rather than
any decentralising design by the colonial government. The other states’ railway
systems were centralised to varying degrees, with Western Australia being the
most like Queensland due to its possession of a long coastline and a small number
of widely separated ports. The idea of creating more ports in the centralised
states was floated. For example, in 1911, a Royal Commission recommended to
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the NSW Government that a port be developed north of Newcastle and another
south of Sydney, with systems of railway lines to serve them, in order to effect
decentralisation (Gunn 1989). No such development occurred, though inland
extensions of the system connecting Sydney continued into the 1930s. The
Commonwealth Government has worked with the states on the interstate railway
system, but has left the regional lines entirely to the states.
The railways enabled the creation of a rural society consistent with the image
valued by an urban mercantile class rather than that valued by the rural
aristocracy. Railway development was part of a deliberate program of social
change, by way of the creation of a yeoman farmer class, conducted amid conflict
between the ‘squatters’ and urban dwellers dominated by commercial interests.
Change was fuelled by an ideology of civilisation. The railway would bring law
and order and the institutions of religion and education to the inland. The railway
was seen as one of ‘the rudiments of bourgeois civilisation’: a means to ‘tether
the mighty bush to the world’ (Clark 1978:96). After noting how appreciative
local populations were to the railway service, Gammage (1986:217) puts it bluntly:
‘But the railways were built to serve men in Sydney who equated progress with
the economic advancement of the metropolis.’
Gammage (1986:219) illustrates the subservience of a small town to the Sydney
railway authorities: ‘railway people, including railway workers, were convinced
that some Narrandera street trees had been accidentally poisoned from a railway
drain, but in 1983 the men in Sydney decided that this was not the case, and
the [local government] council was obliged to let the matter drop’. Even local
construction works were contracted to Sydney builders (Sharp 1998). Rural
people have been well aware of their place in the relationship between rural
interests and railway administrations.
Corresponding with the rise of road transport since the 1950s, the railway systems
have come to be defined politically as problems more than as assets. Regional
railways have been seen as problems almost from their opening. In New South
Wales during the 1960s, the railways’ finances rather than their capacity to
provide transportation became a serious political problem, despite the railways
still being able to cover operating expenses into the 1970s and freight services
doing so into the 1990s (Industry Commission 1991). Nevertheless, the solution
adopted by all governments except that of Queensland has been to privatise
freight services and, in some instances, passenger services as well. In each case,
buyers willing to continue regional services, for at least some period, were found.
While this change has been going on, the practice of ‘cost shifting’ has worsened.
Cost shifting occurs when a regional railway is abandoned without any
compensation to local government for the increased damage to be suffered
consequently by local roads. The additional road maintenance costs can be
substantial, which when accompanied by local concerns about road safety, gives
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local government an interest in rail transport. Such is the weakness of the still
highly dispersed local government system that it has been unable to counter the
problem. Many councils have protested to state governments about the
deterioration of services and appealed for them to be improved, or in some cases
restored, after cessation. At least one council has considered taking over a railway
(Bourke Shire in 1989; see Industry Commission 1991). It was not successful.
There has been no organisational platform and not much indication of enthusiasm
among rural people for running their own railway system—certainly nothing
comparable with the levels of enthusiasm and organisation shown by farmers
through the privatisation of grain handling and irrigation. This differs
substantially from the experience in North America, where there are now many
locally and regionally operated railways, which are products of local initiative
(Beingessner 2003). It should not be attributed to a lack of enthusiasm on the
part of rural people or to a lack of entrepreneurialism or to the absence of the
idea (see Lander and Smith 2004). Rather, sense can be made of it in terms of the
centralised administrative tradition maintained by government and the
contradictory nature of the relationship between railways and local communities.
Conclusion: some research directions
In concluding her discussion about potential applications of anthropology to
regional development, Eversole (2005) points to the potential that the ‘insider’s
perspective’ has to illuminate and explain some of the problems faced by people
seeking to develop Australia’s non-metropolitan regions. She advocates
application of ethnographic methods to interpret the ‘ways of doing things’ of
regional people. In this chapter, I have explored some recent literature on
local–central, or regional–metropolitan, relations in the context of the processes
of neo-liberalisation and restructuring. I have attempted to refine current
conceptualisation of economic dependency and political subservience.
Consideration of these two elements as separate dimensions, alongside the
problems of restructuring, provides a more penetrating analysis of the condition
of rural communities, particularly potentially those not doing well: those most
likely to be subject to the exhortations of the revivalists.
Having separated the economic from the political, for present analytical purposes
at least, attention is turned to the political dimension. For present purposes and
in the context of Australian history, this means state government administration
and its relationship with local institutions, particularly local government. We
find that centralism at the state level has been a profound element in this
continuing relationship. When looking at some examples of privatisation into
rural hands, we see faltering change towards devolution. Most importantly, we
see a hint of evidence that rural cultural tradition does not easily accept
devolution and probably lacks the resources to manage it to advantage. When
we look at what might be or become significant devolution in the NRM context,
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we see no evidence of regionalism of a kind that seeks genuine devolution. This
does not indicate an absence of regionalism but rather an application of a kind
of regionalisation from the state that does not facilitate devolution. When we
look at the history of the railways, we see an administrative institution that has
cemented centralisation, in New South Wales at least, and very little evidence
of regionalist thinking about transport problems.
Where to for anthropology? There are obviously some propositions here that
ethnography could help to test. Even if the propositions are ultimately seen to
fall over, exploration and interpretation of relations between rural people and
the institutions of the state hold some promise for those, such as Herbert-Cheshire
and Moore and Rockloff, who are concerned with regional sustainability and
good governance. It is probably no coincidence that it is the traditionally
well-organised farmers who have responded to regionalisation, even if they have
neither seized nor maintained control. What of the other members of rural
communities? What of their relations with farmers? What of relations between
local government, its constituents and the states? All three of these questions
have been tackled in the past. It might now be time to tackle them
ethnographically again to build a platform for equitable and sustainable models
of regional governance.
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Politics has famously been described as the ‘authoritative allocation of values’
and the political science literature has discussed the mechanisms through which
different values are represented in the policy process. Much of this research has
focused on explicitly stated values that can be identified as competing interests
in the community. This chapter discusses the existence of an apparently pervasive
value in Australian agricultural policy development, which is rarely articulated
and is not represented by an identifiable interest group or ‘watchdog’. The value
is agrarianism. Agrarian imagery and appeals to national identity are frequently
used to explain rural policy decisions. This is ironic, given that in recent years
rural policy in Australia has been dominated by neo-liberal economics with an
emphasis on structural adjustment, productivity improvement and
deregulation—goals that are apparently at odds with agrarian values. This
chapter will explore the influence of agrarianism in Australia, including its
limiting impact on the level of policy debate and its role in sustaining the National
Party as a force in Australian politics.
Introduction
Politics has been described as the ‘authoritative allocation of values’ (Easton
1953:129) and the public policy literature discusses how values are incorporated
in policy development processes and how decision makers balance the conflicting
values that inevitably arise. Almost every policy decision involves a compromise
between differing objectives, many of which are anchored in particular values:
the trade off between inflation and unemployment is a clear example in economic
policy, as is the balance between wages and profits. With a few exceptions, the
discussion of values in the policy process has focused on identifiable values
promoted by particular advocates within the policy community. Using
agrarianism in Australia as an example, this chapter will argue that this
interpretation of the role of values is superficial—that there exist deeper,
fundamental values in a polity that do not need advocates, as their influence is
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pervasive. These values might not even be recognised or named but their impact
can be seen.
This examination of agrarianism in Australia arises from a simple question: why
is there so little public critical analysis of rural policy in Australia? Rural policies
are rarely subject to the general scrutiny that applies, for example, when welfare,
education or health policies are considered. When public interest in rural issues
is aroused, it tends to be in response to events such as drought, which evoke
general sympathy and support for government efforts to provide subsidies or
other forms of government intervention. Why is such unquestioning support
not forthcoming for other groups in the community, such as the unemployed,
the disabled or single mothers? This chapter argues that this sympathetic response
is the result of a residual agrarianism in Australian culture, which is shared by
many developed countries, which dates back centuries, and which attributes to
farmers certain virtues and idealised characteristics that generally place them
beyond reproach. What makes this agrarianism interesting in Australia is that
this country is one of the most urbanised in the world and, with a highly efficient
agricultural sector, has one of the lowest levels of government support for
farmers. In multilateral trade negotiations, Australia has criticised the United
States and, more particularly, the European Union for farm policies that are seen
as trade distorting and economically inefficient. Ironically, the motivation for
these policies is much the same agrarian sentiment that motivates sympathy in
Australia for farmers in difficulty and which provides the basis for the image
cultivated by the National Party in differentiating itself from its opponents and
from its coalition partners.
The chapter is set out as follows. The first section describes the characteristics
of agrarianism, its history and its Australian manifestation, ‘country-mindedness’.
The second section draws on the political science literature in examining the
role of values in the policy process, and finally the chapter examines agrarianism
and politics, specifically their role in sustaining the National Party and insulating
rural policy from critical analysis.
Agrarianism and country-mindedness
In his fascinating history of agrarianism, Montmarquet (1989) tracks the idea
and its many interpretations from the early classical thinkers, through the French
physiocrats and Thomas Jefferson, to Wendell Berry in the twentieth century.
His book illustrates the point made by rural sociologists that the agrarian concept
is both nebulous and malleable, and that it can be used rhetorically for apparently
contradictory purposes (Beus and Dunlap 1994; see, for example, Halpin and
Martin 1996:21). The seminal definition of agrarianism is provided by Flinn and
Johnson, who identify the following five ‘tenets of agrarianism’:
60
Tracking Rural Change
• ‘farming is the basic occupation on which all other economic pursuits depend
for raw materials and food’
• ‘agricultural life is the natural life for man; therefore, being natural, it is good,
while city life is artificial and evil’
• farming delivers the ‘complete economic independence of the farmer’
• ‘the farmer should work hard to demonstrate his virtue, which is made possible
only though [sic] an orderly society’
• ‘family farms have become indissolubly connected with American democracy’
(Flinn and Johnson 1974:189–94; italics in original).
This description encapsulates two important features of agrarianism. First,
agrarianism rests on the belief that agricultural pursuits are inherently
worthwhile and wholesome. Montmarquet (1989:viii) summarises this as ‘the
idea that agriculture and those whose occupation involves agriculture are
especially important and valuable elements of society’. Farming pursuits are
regarded as conducive to the development of moral behaviour and thinkers such
as J. S. Mill and Thomas Jefferson advocated small-scale agriculture for social
rather than economic reasons. Mill argued of small-scale peasant agriculture as
practised in Europe that ‘no other existing state of agricultural economy has so
beneficial effect on the industry, the intelligence, the frugality, and prudence
of the population…no existing state, therefore is on the whole so favourable
both to their moral and physical welfare’ (Mill 1893:374).
Griswold (1946:667) explains that, for Jefferson, ‘agriculture was not primarily
a source of wealth, but of human virtues and traits most congenial to popular
self-government. It had a sociological rather than an economic value. This is the
dominant note in all his writings on the subject.’
More recently, Wendell Berry (1977:11) linked the demise of small-scale
agriculture to the rise of undesirable characteristics of exploitation, waste and
fraud, suggesting that modern life had caused a ‘disastrous breach…between
our bodies and our souls’. His contrast between the exploitative mind and
nurturing is consistent with earlier interpretations of agriculture’s worth, which
extends beyond the economic to the moral. As well as promoting virtue,
agricultural activity is seen as valuable because it is regarded as the starting
point of civilisation—without settlement, art, culture and other pursuits that
depend on large groups of people could not have evolved. Settlement allowed
for specialisation. Agriculture, as opposed to hunting and gathering, provided
the basis for settlement.
The second important characteristic of agrarianism is that it is half of a dichotomy,
the other half of which is non-farm life and which on all counts fails to measure
up to the morally superior, if economically inferior, status of farming. Flinn and
Johnson (1974:194) refer to the agrarian perception that ‘city life is artificial and
evil’ and they go on to argue that ‘[w]ithin agrarian belief there is pride, a certain
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nobility, in what man accomplishes by the sweat of his brow. There is suspicion
about a man who makes a living by using his head and not his hands.’
This dualism was evident in Jefferson’s thought. Initially, he hoped that the
United States would remain an agrarian society, allowing Europe to house
manufacturing activity and cities and their associated social problems. He argued
that:
The loss by the transportation of commodities across the Atlantic will
be made up in happiness and permanence of government. The mobs of
great cities add just so much to the support of pure government, as sores
do to the strength of the human body. It is the manners and spirit of a
people which preserve a republic in vigor. (Cited in Griswold 1946:668)
In the Australian context, Don Aitkin has summed up agrarianism as
country-mindedness. The term is of uncertain origin but is traceable to the
beginnings of the Country Party in the 1920s. Aitkin’s formulation of the
characteristics of Australian agrarianism reflects many of the points just
discussed: the wholesome nature of agricultural activity and the contrast between
the virtues of farming and the unpleasantness of urban life:
(i) Australia depends on its primary producers for its high standards of
living, for only those who produce a physical good add to a country’s
wealth.
(ii) Therefore all Australians, from city and country alike, should in their
own interest support policies aimed at improving the position of primary
industries.
(iii) Farming and grazing, and rural pursuits generally, are virtuous,
ennobling and cooperative; they bring out the best in people.
(iv) In contrast, city life is competitive and nasty, as well as parasitical.
(v) The characteristic Australian is a countryman, and the core elements
of the national character come from the struggles of country people to
tame their environment and make it productive. City people are much
the same the world over.
(vi) For all these reasons, and others like defence, people should be
encouraged to settle in the country, not in the city.
…
(viii) But power resides in the city, where politics is trapped in a sterile
debate about classes. There has to be a separate political party for country
people to articulate the true voice of the nation. (Aitkin 1985:35)
Point five is of particular note given the highly urbanised nature of Australian
society and it is also important in the context of the influence of agrarian ideology
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on Australian culture. Stehlik et al. (1996) describe the notion that Australians
are
essentially rural creatures transplanted against our will in urban
metropolises around the eastern seaboard of the continent. To many of
us ‘the bush’ evokes a natural, pristine essentially good place which may
be less than the city we live in, but somehow it is still morally our
national conscience. We respond emotionally to the ideology of the
pioneering spirit, the challenge against the unknown, the concept of ‘the
rural’.
Popular culture in Australia draws on this type of rural imagery with television
programs such as A Country Practice, McLeod’s Daughters and Blue Heelers
drawing on the rural myth with their portrayals of rugged individuals with
hearts of gold facing hardship with stoicism and good humour. Many of these
shows include cynical city types won over by the simplicity and basic goodness
of rural living. Australian athletes have been dressed in Driza-Bones and Akubras
for Olympic opening ceremonies and the Sydney 2000 Olympics drew on rural
iconography in its welcome to the world. As Finkelstein and Bourke (2001:46)
point out, advertising also draws on the rural–urban contrast, reinforcing this
image as ‘an enduring and successful element in the formation of Australian
culture and identity’.
The rural myth is further strengthened by its links to the other great source of
Australian identity: the ANZAC legend. Although it is debatable how accurate
the sentiment is, there is a perception that Australia’s diggers in World War I
came disproportionately from the ‘bush’ (Botterill 2006:25–6). Farm groups
occasionally exploit this link between the bush and the ANZAC legend—the
most recent example of which is in a media release by the National Farmers
Federation (NFF). Drought-affected farmers in Australia were offered free holidays
in New Zealand by the Federated Farmers of New Zealand and the airline Jetstar
donated 100 free air tickets to facilitate farmers taking up the offer. When it
appeared that farmers might lose their drought-related welfare payments while
on their free holiday, the NFF lobbied the government to change the rules. The
government complied and the NFF put out a media release announcing the
change, including the following statement: ‘When times are tough farm
communities stick together, and we appreciate our NZ counterparts’
understanding and outstanding generosity very much. It is one of the best
examples of the ANZAC tradition…digging in and giving each other a hand
when it’s needed most’ (National Farmers Federation 2007).
The role of values in Australian rural policy
As with all policy areas, agricultural policy is developed against a backdrop of
conflicting values, such as the differences between environmental and production
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values and between importers and exporters (for example, over the stringency
of quarantine requirements). In his seminal work on incrementalism, Lindblom
(1959) argued that one of the advantages of incremental policy development was
the capacity for policy to address values that had been overlooked in earlier
iterations. He described the policy process as serial and remedial and he argued
that this was an effective way for policy to be developed. He also argued that
for this process to work successfully, each value should have a watchdog that
focused on particular aspects of the policy to ensure that it was represented.
More recently, Thacher and Rein have made a similar argument about strategies
for balancing values in policy development. They suggest several approaches
that can be adopted to address value conflict. The first of these, ‘policy cycling’,
is similar to Lindblom’s serial and remedial incrementalism, suggesting that
policymakers ‘focus on each value sequentially, emphasizing one value until
the destructive consequences for others become too severe to ignore’ (Thacher
and Rein 2004:463). The second strategy they identify is the construction of
‘firewalls’ that divide responsibility for different values among institutions
‘ensuring that each value has a vigorous champion’ (Thacher and Rein 2004);
the similarities with Lindblom’s watchdogs are clear.
The interesting aspect of these approaches is that the analysis focuses on
identifiable values—values that have clear advocates and that can be easily
identified in the issues being debated in a particular policy area as different
perspectives on complex social problems. Rokeach (1979:55) goes as far as arguing
that ‘there are no terminal or instrumental values that will be “left over”, that
are not the focus of specialization by at least one social institution’. An alternative
perspective is that some values operate at a deeper cultural level and are not
articulated in policy debate. Feldman (1988:418) argues that widely shared core
values and beliefs ‘may be so pervasive that their presence in everyday politics
often goes unnoticed’. Sabatier refers to ‘deep core’ values that are exogenous
variables in policy advocacy and ‘are very resistant to change—essentially akin
to religious conversion’. They consist of ‘fundamental normative and ontological
axioms’ (Sabatier 1988:144). Williams is one of the few writers who points to
explicit values and those that are not:
some values are, indeed, highly explicit, and appear to the social actor
as phenomenal entities: the person can state the value, illustrate its
application in making judgments, identify its boundaries, and the like.
Other standards of desirability are not explicit; and social actors may
even resist making them explicit. (Williams 1979:17)
Different mixes of values will deliver different policy outcomes. In Europe,
agrarian values are clearly influential in the policy settings of the Common
Agricultural Policy (CAP). Ockenden and Franklin (1995:1) argue that ‘the CAP
provides evidence that agriculture carries a cultural and social significance far
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in excess of its economic importance. The policy is neither an afterthought nor
an expensive irrelevance, but the manifestation of the unique place of agriculture
in the psyche of industrial societies.’
In Australia, production values have dominated in recent years with policy
emphasis on productivity improvement and competitiveness. The mix changes
over time as different values gain ascendancy in policy debate (Botterill 2004).
Rural policy communities are archetypal ‘closed’ networks (see, for example,
Grant and MacNamara 1995; Smith 1992), which have a shared approach to
policy and which exclude competing views from the process. The peak Australian
farmers’ representative body, the NFF, was established in 1979 and from the
outset was at the forefront of neo-liberal debate. It has consistently advocated
free trade, domestic deregulation and labour market reform and it has extended
these policy prescriptions to its own sector. In its 1981 paper Farm focus: the
’80s, the organisation stated that the ‘NFF does not believe that any
industry—rural, mining, manufacturing, or tertiary—whether highly protected
or not—should be permanently shielded from the forces of economic change.
The overall interests of the economy demand that all industries must participate
in the inevitable adjustment process’ (National Farmers Federation 1981:48).
As Lawrence (1987:79) wrote, in the 1980s, the NFF became ‘one of the most
vocal proponents of a deregulated economy and a free enterprise agriculture’.
It was therefore at home in the agricultural policy community with the Australian
Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics (ABARE) and the Commonwealth
agriculture department, currently the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and
Forestry (DAFF). After several decades of highly interventionist agricultural
policies in Australia, agricultural economists in the 1960s began to question
policies of government intervention in agriculture (see, for example, Lloyd 1970;
Makeham and Bird 1969; McKay 1967) and, by the 1980s, neo-liberal approaches
to rural policy were firmly entrenched. While agrarian values were clearly
articulated in the first half of the twentieth century (see, for example, Chifley
1946), they seemed to disappear from policy settings from the 1970s onwards.
Policies have focused on deregulation, structural adjustment and productivity
improvement, examples of which include deregulation of the dairy industry,
privatisation of the former Australian Wheat Board and changes to regulatory
arrangements for the wool industry.
The language of policy statements, however, does not necessarily match the
reality of policy implementation and policymakers are not averse to appealing
to agrarian sentiment when explaining decisions that might otherwise appear
inconsistent with stated policy direction. Within the rural policy community
there is no identifiable watchdog for what might be characterised as agrarian
values; the main players have for more than two decades pursued neo-liberal
policy objectives (Botterill 2005). The absence of a visible agrarian interest,
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however, has not meant that these values have disappeared from policy. They
remain an important socio-cultural phenomenon and appear to have an important
role in protecting rural policy from rigorous critique, thus facilitating the
emergence of inconsistencies in approach between rural and non-rural policies.
These inconsistencies are disguised either by rhetoric that reflects overall
government policy direction while hiding the reality of implementation or by
the use of values-based language to justify inconsistencies when they are obvious.
The National Party has been particularly effective at using agrarian imagery for
this latter purpose and in defence of its position as part of the Australian political
landscape.
A good example of the gap between the rhetoric and the reality is the National
Drought Policy (NDP). Agreed by Commonwealth and state governments in
1992, the NDP was a watershed in government responses to drought. It followed
the removal of drought from the natural disaster relief arrangements and was
based on the principle that drought was not a disaster but part of Australia’s
climate. The NDP was based on principles of self-reliance and risk management
and argued that drought was a risk to be managed by farmers like any other
risk facing the farm business. The policy included a series of programs aimed at
improving farmers’ risk-management skills and introduced tax-effective financial
risk-management programs aimed at encouraging farmers to build financial
reserves on which they could draw in dry years. The policy included an
important caveat: it introduced the concept of ‘exceptional circumstances’ to
describe circumstances that were so extreme that even the best manager could
not be expected to cope. In these conditions, further government support to
farm businesses would be triggered, however, it was available only to businesses
that were considered to have a long-term productive future in agriculture.
Policymakers were concerned that drought relief not act as a de facto subsidy
to otherwise unviable businesses.
In 1994, the NDP was augmented with the creation of a welfare payment,
currently called the Exceptional Circumstances Relief Payment (ECRP), which
was linked to exceptional circumstances declarations and this payment changed
the whole tenor of the program. The first major shift towards a more agrarian
approach was that the viability test did not apply to the welfare payment—so
farms that were ineligible for the business support could be eligible for the
welfare payment. This altered the incentive structure of the policy as the
availability of the welfare payment made attaining an exceptional circumstances
declaration more attractive, essentially undermining the objective of self-reliance
and risk management. Instead of being motivated to manage a current dry spell,
it was more sensible for farmers to make a case that the dry spell they were
experiencing was particularly bad in order to access government support. In
1999, ministers went so far as to change the definition of exceptional
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circumstances drought to elevate the impact of drought on income to the
threshold criterion (‘key indicator’) for a declaration (ARMCANZ 1999:63).
Until 2005, the welfare payment had been paid at the same rate as other
income-support payments available to the Australian community—for example,
the unemployment benefit. In May 2005, the government announced that it was
increasing by $10 000 the amount that a farmer could earn before their drought
payment was reduced (Truss 2005), meaning that farmers on drought relief could
earn more than twice as much a fortnight as an unemployed person before losing
any income support. Farmers are also not subject to any mutual obligation
requirements. The May 2005 announcement passed unnoticed by the mainstream
media. In its response to the announcement, the NFF continued to use the
language of the NDP, noting that ‘Australian farmers acknowledged the
importance of preparing for, and managing, business climatic risks such as severe
drought’. After welcoming the increased level of drought support, the
organisation stated:
EC [exceptional circumstances] assistance is not about handouts or
propping up marginal farmers, it is a responsible policy that aims to
support viable farm businesses to preserve their natural and productive
resource base during periods of severe climatic stress, so that they are
in a position to rapidly recover and contribute to Australia’s export
economy. (National Farmers Federation 2005)
This type of apparent contradiction is not uncommon in rural policy
debate—using the neo-liberal language of the NDP while welcoming an
inequitable increase in support to farmers that is unrelated to economic outcomes.
The privatisation of the statutory Australian Wheat Board provides a further
example of rural policy development that has occurred apparently without
reference to broader policy approaches. Deregulation of the wheat market began
in 1989 with the removal of the Australian Wheat Board’s monopoly over the
domestic wheat trade. This change occurred in a climate of general industry
deregulation, which had been pursued by the Hawke Labor government from
1984. From 1990, the grains industry started a process of strategic planning that
included consideration of the future of export marketing arrangements for wheat.
The level of urgency associated with this consideration was increased from 1993
when the report into national competition policy (Hilmer et al. 1993) was
published, which included a section on the anti-competitive nature of agricultural
statutory marketing arrangements and a chapter on monopolies. In 1995, debate
within the grains industry became focused on the future structure of the
Australian Wheat Board, with a particular focus on the board’s export
monopoly—the so-called ‘single desk’. Discussions and debate about the structure
took place largely independently of government with the main players being
the peak industry body, the Grains Council of Australia, and the Australian
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Wheat Board. The Department of Primary Industries and Energy had a place in
the discussions but did not advocate a strong position. This was consistent with
the approach taken by consecutive Ministers for Primary Industries and Energy,
Senator Bob Collins (Labor) and John Anderson (National). The final model was
developed by industry and implemented through two tranches of legislation in
1997 and 1998. The outcome was a privatised body, AWB Limited, which
essentially retained the single desk. The government did not drive the
privatisation process, the Department of Finance did not have a central role in
the process and the objectives for the privatisation were set by the grains
industry, not by government. There is little indication that the government took
strong action to protect the public asset associated with the export monopoly,
marking the process as a ‘very peculiar privatisation’ (Aulich and Botterill 2007).
The grains industry continued to be treated differently when the legislation that
embodied the export monopoly, the Wheat Marketing Act 1989, came due for
review under the National Competition Policy (NCP). While the usual practice
for NCP reviews was for the Productivity Commission to undertake the review,
the Wheat Marketing Act was reviewed by a committee that included the former
president of the Grains Council of Australia (Irving et al. 2000). The Productivity
Commission made two submissions to the review (Productivity Commission
2000a, 2000b) in which it argued the case for the repeal of the export monopoly.
The NCP review, in contrast, recommended that ‘the “single desk” be retained
until a scheduled review in 2004 by the Wheat Export Authority of the privatised
AWB’s operation of the “single desk” arrangement’ (Irving et al. 2000:8),
although it also stated that ‘the main purpose and implementation of this
scheduled review should be changed so that it provides one final opportunity
for a compelling case to be compiled that the “single desk” delivers a net benefit
to the Australian community’ (Irving et al. 2000:8). The Commonwealth
Government rejected this last recommendation. The National Competition Council
subsequently found that ‘the Government’s review of the Wheat Marketing Act
was open, independent and rigorous’, however, it concluded that ‘the
Commonwealth Government had not met its [competition principles agreement]
clause 4 and 5 obligations1  arising from the Wheat Marketing Act’ (National
Competition Council 2003:1.8).
The single-desk arrangements for the wheat industry have come under more
general public scrutiny since the Cole Inquiry into the Oil for Food Program and
the revelations of AWB Limited’s bypassing of the Iraqi sanctions regime (Cole
2006). It is, however, arguable that the interest in this scandal by the mainstream
media and commentators was prompted by the possibility that senior ministers
were aware of the behaviour rather than a considered critique of the rural policy




Agrarianism, politics, policy and the National Party
An important beneficiary of agrarianism is the National Party of Australia, which
first entered Australian politics in the early 1920s as the Country Party of
Australia. Set up as a voice for rural Australians, the party grew out of farm
interest groups that had been established from the mid nineteenth century.
Richmond (1978:104) argues that ‘[m]any country people objected to the Labor
Party and its talk of socialisation of land; but they also objected to the city
domination of the larger non-Labor parties’.
The early Country Party therefore set out to establish itself as a third force in
Australian politics. This position was clearly illustrated by the words of the first
Country Party leader in the Commonwealth Parliament, W. J. McWilliams, on
10 March 1920:
The Country Party is an independent body quite separate from the
Nationalists and the Labor Party. We occupy our own rooms. We have
appointed our own leader and other officers. We take no part in the
deliberations of the Ministerialists or of the Opposition. We intend to
support measures of which we approve and hold ourselves absolutely
free to criticize or reject proposals with which we do not agree. Having
put our hands to the wheel we set the course of our voyage. There has
been no collusion; we crave no alliance; we spurn no support; we have
no desire to harass the government, nor do we wish to humiliate the
opposition. (McWilliams 1920:250)
In spite of these protestations of independence, the party was, by 1922, in
coalition with the Nationalists and it used its role in subsequent coalitions very
effectively to gain cabinet positions and policy influence out of all proportion
to its electoral performance. With dominance of the agriculture and trade
portfolios, the National Party has managed to pursue farmers’ interests effectively.
Through the interventionist years, agrarian objectives were pursued openly.
More recently, these values have been protected less transparently while still
being drawn on rhetorically to retain National Party support. Apart from a
general inclination to look after rural interests, specific National Party policies
are not easy to identify. Woodward (1985:61) has described National Party policy
as ‘a strange blend of conservatism coupled with support for radical government
intervention in certain economic and social areas’. In recent years, the dominance
of the neo-liberal paradigm across government policy has blunted the party’s
capacity to deliver largesse to its constituency, however, it has achieved some
expensive concessions to buffer the impact of these policies. For example,
deregulation of the dairy industry in 2000 was accompanied by a $1.74 billion
structural adjustment package, funded by a levy on milk, which provided
‘substantial adjustment payments’ to dairy farmers (Truss 2000). This was
augmented with packages to assist communities in dairy-farming areas. A further
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$159 million was added to the package in 2001. The Australian National Audit
Office (2004:14) reports that ‘some 30 000 farmers were granted [Dairy Structural
Adjustment Program] payment rights, with an average payment right of $54
300’. A further $100 million was allocated to 7735 farmers (Australian National
Audit Office 2004:16) under a Supplementary Dairy Assistance Package. This
supplementary package was introduced to provide ‘an additional one-off payment
to eligible dairy producers who were severely affected by deregulation, and
whose eligibility for DSAP was unintentionally limited’ (Australian National
Audit Office 2004:26).
While the National Party’s rhetoric continues to present its objectives in terms
of being the sole true representative of farmers and rural people, in recent years
that claim has become less convincing. Verrall et al. (1985:9) observe that ‘the
National Party has by no means a monopoly of the conservative rural vote’ and
they suggest that ‘National Party seats are not typically rural and indeed…there
is no typical National Party electorate’ (p. 11). Nevertheless, the National Party’s
web site (<http://www.nationals.org.au/About/values.asp>) makes the claim
that ‘[w]ithout [t]he Nationals, government policy would be determined by a
substantial majority of city-based parliamentarians’. The implication is the very
agrarian notion that city folk do not understand the ‘bush’ and cannot be trusted
to protect rural interests. As has been argued elsewhere (Botterill 2006), while
farmers and their representatives are not reticent about engaging in debates
about non-farm policy, they are quick to cast doubts on the views of rural policy
commentators who do not have direct ties to the bush. The Nationals also reflect
the idea expressed in Aitkin’s view of country-mindedness that what is good
for the bush is good for the country. As Jaensch (1997:299) has argued:
As populists, the members of the party believe fundamentally in the
virtue of rural people, rural interests and rural morality, not only for
rural areas, but as a model for the whole country. It logically follows,
then, that any actions which will protect, support and bolster rural
people and interests are justified for the good of the nation.
The National Party taps into these sentiments very effectively. Nelson and Garst
(2005) have looked at the role of values-based communication ‘as a means to
signify political identity and establish community with audience members’.
They describe this as a ‘social purpose of values-based language’ and explore
the impact this language has on the listening audience. They argue that ‘values,
like political parties, serve as important foundations for a citizen’s political
identity’ (Nelson and Garst 2005:490). Brewer (2001) has also examined the issue
of value framing in political communication and the links between value-based
political messages and core values. He argues that:
value frames…share a feature that sets them apart from other sorts of
messages: [t]hey associate an issue with a core value. Thus, a value frame
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may shape opinion in a more subtle way as well: [i]t may encourage
audience members to form opinions on the basis of the specific value
invoked by the frame. (Brewer 2001:45)
In his study of parties and party systems, Sartori (1976:329) described the use
of imagery in party promotion, noting that ‘parties communicate to mass
electorates via party images and…much of their electoral strategy is concerned
with building up the appropriate image for the public from which they expect
votes’. While the effectiveness of the National Party at engaging its supporters
is not surprising, this chapter argues that the broader community shares the
values being drawn on—thus generating support from a wider constituency
than the party’s small electoral base would suggest. The National Party is very
effective at using images in its political messages that tap into agrarian values,
among its own supporters and across the wider community. In Parliament,
National Party representatives play up the urban–rural divide. Verrall et al.
(1985:8) see this rural–urban cleavage as ‘an essential and key notion in
understanding Australian politics’ and it has been used regularly as a basis for
attack on the Nationals’ political opponents. In a press release, Agriculture
Minister, Peter McGauran (2006b), began his attack on the opposition spokesman
with ‘[t]he Shadow Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry has today
reminded rural and regional Australia how little the Labor Party knows about
drought’. Later in the same release, he again made the point that Labor was
ignorant about rural Australia, stating: ‘If Mr O’Connor had any idea of rural
and regional Australia, he would know only too well that this region is part of
the South West Slopes and Plains EC declaration’ (McGauran 2006b). In apparent
contradiction to this statement, but still playing on the city–rural divide, the
minister had responded earlier in the year to the failure of O’Connor to win
preselection for his seat with the following statement:
The forced exit of Labor’s Agriculture spokesman, Gavan O’Connor,
from Federal Parliament will be a serious loss to rural and regional
Australia, the Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry, Peter
McGauran, said today.
Mr McGauran said that, as a former dairy farmer, Mr O’Connor was the
only member of the Labor Opposition to have a practical understanding
of farming.
‘Mr O’Connor has been a lone voice for farming inside a city-centric and
union-dominated Labor Party,’ he said.
‘His dumping at the hands of factional bosses will rob Labor of the only
practical understanding of farming and regional policy it has.
‘It highlights Labor’s disregard for farmers by so unceremoniously
sending its only ally into the political wilderness.’ (McGauran 2006a)
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Another National Party Senator described O’Connor as ‘the quintessential city
slicker. He rarely gets out of Melbourne, unless he is coming to Canberra, and
he is trying to tell this place that he cares about rural and regional Australia!’
(Nash 2005:97). Consistency of argument is clearly not important but appeal to
the agrarian value frame is.
Although the long-term future of the National Party has been the subject of
continuing speculation and discussion (see, for example, Aitkin 1973; Green
2001; Jaensch 1997; Malcolm 1989; Richmond 1978), the adoption of agrarian
imagery by other political parties would not be a simple undertaking. Although
the Liberal and Labor Parties have held and continue to hold rural-based
electorates, they cannot simply pick up the National Party’s mantle as the
representatives of rural interests. Research by Nelson and Garst (2005) suggests
that it is risky for a party to appeal to values with which it is not generally
associated. They suggest that values-based political messages are persuasive but
these messages are not well received if they come from an unexpected quarter.
The research found that ‘[r]ival party speakers…were punished when they used
unexpected language’ (Nelson and Garst 2005:510). Brewer (2001:59) also cites
research that finds that ‘citizens may reject a frame when they perceive that it
originates from the “wrong” side of the ideological or partisan fence’. This
suggests that Labor Party politicians who use agrarian language are more likely
to evoke suspicion and hostility than a positive response. The Coalition has
tapped into this on occasion. For example, in a parliamentary debate in 1996, a
Liberal member of the newly elected Howard Government stated:
I am pleased to see that the [M]ember for Hotham [Simon Crean] is here
too, because he had a time as the Minister for Primary Industries and
Energy, as some of you may well remember. They bought him a pair of
moleskins and some elastic sided boots, and got him a Driza-Bone, with
the tag still hanging off the back of it after six months. (Ronaldson
1996:669)
This imagery is effective at closing down debate. If you are not a farmer, you
don’t understand farming; ergo you are unqualified to comment on farm policy.
When this is coupled with a general sympathy for farmers anchored in a residual
agrarianism in the broader community, it creates an environment in which there
is no political advantage to be gained from criticising farm policy and thus policy
settings receive little analysis.
Conclusions
Williams (1979:26–7) argues:
To be able to infer causal sequences from values to other items, we need
some evidence that the value or value system was present prior to or
simultaneously with the explicandum, that its presence is associated
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with a heightened frequency of the phenomena to be explained, and
that there is a theoretically compelling connection.
The existence of agrarian values in Western culture is well established. These
values have a long history and, although they have been used flexibly to support
different objectives, their basic components are well documented. More research
is needed on the causal link between agrarianism and policy outcomes,
particularly in Australia, where the link is not explicit; however, the frequent
reference to agrarian imagery by the National Party suggests the values are
influential and, as Hutcheon (1972:184) suggests, deeply held values might ‘not
[be] themselves amenable to direct observation and measurement’ and might be
identifiable only by inference. A plausible explanation of the inconsistencies
between rural policy and other analogous areas of government policy is the lack
of analytical attention given to the former, which allows some areas of farm
policy to develop with limited reference to broader government policy
approaches. This chapter provides the examples of the provision of income
support to farmers on a more generous basis than to other groups in the
community and the unusual privatisation and subsequent National Competition
Policy Review of the AWB. There is scope for further theoretical consideration
to be given to the influence of deep socio-cultural values on policy.
This chapter has argued that Australian rural policy is influenced by agrarian
sentiments that are common to many Western societies. At times in Australia’s
history, this agrarianism has been explicit. In recent years, as other paradigms
have dominated policymaking, agrarian influence has been less obvious; however,
it remains evident. Agrarian imagery is used in political debate and is important
in differentiating the National Party from its electoral competitors, including its
coalition partners. It is also effective in limiting critical analysis of policy settings.
The public policy literature discusses the policy process as a balancing act, with
decision makers confronting conflicting values that they must weigh up in
arriving at policy positions. This literature generally assumes that values are
explicit and that they are represented in the process by advocates such as interest
groups or political parties. It is argued that this interpretation is too limited and
does not recognise the influence of deep socio-cultural values that are so
embedded in the community that their existence is not necessarily recognised.
Agrarianism in Australia is such a value.
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1  Clause 4 of the competition principles agreement refers to structural reform of public monopolies and









As long-established (settler) farming practices become increasingly unviable in
Australia’s marginal areas, it is widely argued in governmental and other circles
that the extension of wilderness areas that are then populated with native wildlife
should be actively encouraged. From a developmentalist perspective, this policy
is considered to offer up a number of seemingly incontestable benefits: alleviating
the pressure on environmentally marginal areas, creating new employment
opportunities, consolidating national biodiversity, and so on. From an
anthropological vantage point, however, the prospects generated by this kind
of development are by no means so clear cut. In the past five years or so, a
state-supported initiative to reintroduce a particular species of wallaby to Innes
National Park at the foot of Yorke Peninsula, South Australia, has generated a
political conflict that raises a number of salient questions about this kind of
alternative rural development and its relation to conventional agriculture. This
chapter is based on ethnographic research conducted in 2005 and explores the
significance of the conflict from academic and policy vantage points.
Introduction
The review and reorganisation of long-established settler land-use practices is
going to be one of the more urgent and positive outcomes of the current
Australian drought and the wider climatic changes of which it is a significant
part. While it has taken not just an agricultural crisis but a societal one to bring
the situation about, even the short to mid-term prospects of intensive farming
in marginal locations are already under review from agricultural organisations,
governmental bodies, environmental agencies and related policy-oriented
institutions. Inasmuch as the sheer sustainability of settler agriculture in marginal
areas is the subject of review and debate, a range of future land-use practices
will increasingly become the focus of regional and national political discourse.
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The proposal of this chapter is that anthropology’s contribution to this debate
is to spell out to decision makers and, more importantly, to those who have
decisions imposed on them what are the likely difficulties and hazards of
embarking on certain types of rural reform by detailing relevant case studies of
recent provenance. I argue that anthropology can provide salutary warnings
about rural reforms that appear, at first sight, to be heading in the right kind of
environmental direction, but, in the event, encounter a number of hidden and
substantial obstacles that are best explored through the tightly focused
ethnographic work that still characterises the discipline. In this regard, a major
initiative in the past five years to reintroduce an extinct wallaby subspecies to
a national park in South Australia becomes an instructive case study.
As settler agriculture in marginal rural areas becomes increasingly non-viable,
so the prospect of private land being bought up by the State and transformed
or incorporated into national parks and wilderness areas is increasingly mooted,
not least because there are many wholesale and piecemeal precedents for doing
so in most Australian states. From a diversity of policy-oriented institutions and
agencies, the idea that such areas be allowed to ‘revert to nature’, to ‘let nature
take its course’ or to ‘become wilderness once again’, seems by many to be an
attractive prospect. It is variously argued that it will lead to reduced pressure
on scarce water resources, greater landscape diversity, a stay on excessive
fertiliser usage and new employment opportunities through tourism. Above all,
the strategy can be sold on the strength of preserving and enhancing regional
biodiversity since the reintroduction of original flora and fauna is always integral
to this kind of rural reform. Bringing back trees and shrubs to places where they
once were and restoring mammals and birds to localities from which they have
long been extinct become appealing prospects to politicians and public servants,
to conservation scientists and environmental advisors, who are variously able
to acquire political kudos and cultural capital from their public implementation.
In Australia, we can expect a proliferation of proposals on these lines in the near
future. The mantra of biodiversification alone will ensure this to be the case as
formal reactions to climate change are promulgated by the political elite before
elections, by industrial managers as they spruce up their environmental
credentials and by state-based environmental agencies as they consolidate their
command over official environmental discourse. It is the response from below
that promises to be more unpredictable, for local populations weigh up a wide
range of economic and social factors when specific proposals for the rural future
are imposed on them from above. It is this array of folk considerations—by no
means all of them specifically about land use—that can be detailed by
ethnographic inquiry. This is the prospect in principle that is open to
anthropological research. In practice, how local farmers and their families respond
to a conservation initiative to restore an extinct wallaby species to their rural
area is what we are immediately concerned with.
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The proposal from above
It was the conservationist concern with the promotion of biodiversification that
ensured that the tammar wallaby relocation project had a lot going for it from
the outset. Especially in South Australian conservation circles, it was well known
that the mainland tammar subspecies had been eradicated sometime during the
1930s when farmers and government officials had designated it a rural pest.
What was not known until their presence there was rediscovered by a research
team of CSIRO scientists in Canberra was that the same subspecies had thrived
on a small island in New Zealand, to which a small number had been transported
in the 1860s.
The publication of a research paper (Poole et al. 1991, later detailed by Taylor
and Cooper 1999 and Taylor et al. 1999) on this unexpected finding more or less
coincided with protection of the continent’s biodiversity becoming central to
the Commonwealth’s environmental policy. Designated wilderness areas were
specified as appropriate locations for the protection of biodiversity to be
established and managed, and this emphatically included the reintroduction of
lost species. It became part of the Federal 1996 Action Plan for Australian
Marsupials and Monotremes to relocate the tammar wallaby back in its original
habitat (Maxwell et al. 1996). From there, the proposal progressed to being
enshrined in the Commonwealth’s Environment Protection and Biodiversity
Conservation Act 1999 (EPBC Act).
The mainland tammar wallaby was the only animal subspecies specified for
salvage under the EPBC Act and so, not all that surprisingly, not only the
conservation scientists in South Australia’s Department of Environment and
Heritage (DEH) but the state’s leading politicians, including the Minister for the
Environment and the Premier, saw substantial opportunities and benefits in this
potentially high-profile contribution to preserving the continent’s biodiversity.
There was an immediate downside that had to be addressed with some urgency.
For a second time in its recent history, the tammar had been officially declared
a pest due to be eradicated, but on this occasion it was to be exterminated from
Kawau Island at the behest of New Zealand’s leading environmental authority.
It was therefore necessary to transport a breeding population to South Australia
as soon as possible. This was to be executed by a small and dedicated network
of government scientists in the DEH’s Science and Conservation Directorate.
Before the tammars’ return home, as it was increasingly referred to, conservation
scientists had chosen the relatively small Innes National Park (9322 hectares) at
the foot of Yorke Peninsula as their final destination. It was a location that more
than lived up to the stereotype of a wilderness area; it seemed particularly suited
to the reintroduction of its original wildlife after more than half a century’s
absence. Since it was known to be part of the subspecies’ mainland habitat on
the lower Yorke Peninsula—albeit a habitat greatly transformed in the
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intervening period, of course—this was where the tammars would be considered
properly in place once again. It was also especially appropriate, at least on paper,
to the larger ambitions of the conservation scientists who proposed to eventually
spread the subspecies across the peninsula, because the tammars would be able
to migrate north and east from the national park through ‘natural corridors’ of
parcels of privately owned land already set aside for conservation. Additionally,
a second release site would be established elsewhere on the peninsula so that a
minimum of two 500-strong tammar colonies would be achieved. At this point,
under the EPBC Act, the tammar wallaby subspecies would be relieved of its
current status of ‘extinct in the wild’ and considered a viable population that
had returned to its natural habitat.
This conservation project was therefore an ambitious one aimed at making a
significant contribution to regional biodiversity, not least because it would
generate a good deal of new scientific knowledge over a number of years. From
the moment they arrived in South Australia, the breeding population was to be
closely monitored; the animals were to be kept in captivity in the regional
zoological pack for quarantine and veterinary purposes. They were then to be
subject to a strictly controlled breeding program that would maximise their
reproductive capacity by using a different subspecies of readily available wallaby
as surrogate mothers. Once released in Innes National Park, all animals were to
be fitted with radio collars emitting signals that would be picked up by mobile
tracking towers built specifically for use in park conditions. Finally, from time
to time, tammars released from captivity into the wild, or born in it, would be
captured in order to monitor their weight, determine their gender, assess their
health and reproductive condition, and so on, along with the prime considerations
of detailing where they were migrating to and in what numbers.
Since the relocation project was going to be a costly endeavour, the conservation
science behind it was carefully spelled out from the beginning in submissions
for financial support; to some of this, I will return below. What was not addressed
in anything like the same detail were its social and cultural aspects, despite the
obvious fact that the project’s success hinged on the tammars moving out of the
park wilderness and onto the intensely cultivated agricultural land that
dominated the whole peninsula. It would be fair to say that, because the
biodiversity credentials of the relocation project were so compelling, it was
assumed that if any major questions were raised by the local people, they could
be dealt with. At the least, the social and cultural impacts of the project were
sparsely attended to in contrast with the depth of the scientific investment.
It therefore came as something of a surprise when, as soon as information about
the project leaked out, the DEH officials found they had a major problem on
their hands. Despite having intended a careful, public relations-controlled release
of information to the general public, word got out as a result of a park ranger
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ill-advisedly mentioning the project to a young local farmer whose family
property shared a long boundary with Innes National Park and would likely be
the tammars’ first staging point once they moved off-park. The farmer and his
father were instantly alarmed at the prospect of ‘the wallaby pest’ among their
grain crops and, as news spread through customary gossip channels, so too were
their immediate neighbours and other farm families further afield. Before too
long, the media also picked up on the story, and the first headline on the
wallabies’ return from New Zealand in South Australia’s sole daily newspaper
read: ‘We’ll take the “pest” nobody else wants’ (The Advertiser, 13 September
2003).
Conservation science versus commonsense knowledge
For the next 18 months or so, the conflict that developed between the DEH and
its conservation scientists on the one hand, and the local people of lower Yorke
Peninsula on the other, turned on the plausibility of the former’s natural science
versus the validity of the latter’s local knowledge. Although there were multiple
aspects to the relocation, the critical issue became to what extent the size and
the spread of the wallaby population once established could be controlled by a
scientifically modelled manipulation of the fox population, which was already
in place. From this point onwards, the state government scientists from the city
aimed to persuade the farm population on the peninsula that their worst fears
of a wildlife invasion, which could threaten their rural way of life, were ill
founded.
To say that this official pitch would prove an uphill struggle would be an
understatement because: first, this exercise in persuasion emanated from the
state capital; second, it came from a government body; and third, it was parlayed
to the periphery by professional scientists. On all three counts, local farmers
and their families were inclined from the outset to be circumspect and cynical
at best, suspicious and dismissive at worst. The idea of a shifting boundary of
foxes, a pest with which they were extremely familiar, being able to control an
encroaching invasion of tammars, a pest with which they had no prior
acquaintance, consistently ran counter to the local knowledge and commonsense
on which rural folk prided themselves.
The central focus of debate quickly became the Draft Translocation Proposal:
Reintroduction of mainland SA tammar wallabies to Innes National Park, a
substantial document on which the conservation scientists had spent a great
deal of time and effort. One of the more intriguing (and never quite explained)
aspects of this and similar projects was that it did not have to be subject to an
environmental impact statement. In lieu of this, the draft proposal could almost
pass muster, since it provided a reasonably thorough introduction to the project’s
background, the selection of the release site, the acquisition, transportation and
quarantining of the breeding population, through to the circumstances under
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which the tammars would be released, monitored and managed in the wild. It
also specified the criteria for the project’s success, as well as its short-term budget.
Undoubtedly the key section of the draft proposal was entitled ‘Population
management’ and it was replete with scientific detail. The section was devoted
to demonstrating how it was possible to scientifically model the rate at which
the tammar population could be expected to increase, once it gained a foothold
in the park wilderness. Superimposed on these data was the likely pattern of
fox predation on the tammars, which could be manipulated through baiting
practices undertaken by local farmers and/or contract pest controllers with
experience of the region. Five possible scenarios were detailed in intricate graphs,
which, at least to a layman, were not immediately comprehensible—but the
major claims being made were clear enough. As the tammar population increased,
fox baiting would be reduced, with the result that more foxes would be in place
to pick off the wallabies: as the tammar population fell away, fox baiting would
be intensified, and the wallaby population would then be able to increase and
spread further. The distribution of the tammars could thus be effectively
regulated through the manipulation of fox numbers: the farmers’ long-established
pest could be deployed in order to keep control over a potential one. This would
be all the more effective, evidently enough, if farmers who were resident on the
physical boundary between national park and agricultural land cooperated with
the conservation scientists and the park rangers who would implement the
science on the ground. A number of additional variables that might affect the
rate of wallaby expansion beyond Innes National Park were factored into the
scientific modelling. Again, however, the general point being made was that the
local population’s fears of an uncontrolled and destructive invasion of their grain
fields were found to be at odds with the scientific evidence.
As is usually the case with such documents, the draft proposal was meticulously
presented and systematically argued. The most likely counterarguments
concerning the possibilities of risk and threat from the relocation project were
anticipated and headed off by the welter of scientific discourse. It was a very
thorough presentation, which was precisely what made all the more conspicuous
the document’s imbalances; the proposal ran to 66 printed pages, but only two
of these were given over to ‘Social and economic considerations’. What merits
emphasis is that this kind of imbalance reflected the modus vivendi of the wider
institutional body of the DEH. In addition to the practice of natural science being
the everyday business of the DEH, its leadership was devoted to spreading its
commitment to a pervasive scientism among the general public. Inasmuch as it
did this with fervour and zeal, any kind of critical response from below that
was not conspicuously informed by the culture of natural science was given
short shrift, or remorselessly contested by yet another body of scientific evidence.
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The view from below
The local people who made up the frontline of opposition to the relocation
proposal were, in contrast, deeply imbued with the culture of rural life that
predominated throughout Yorke Peninsula. They were long established,
moderately well off and organised in such a way as to maximise the profitability
of the family farm, and the codes of self-help and self-reliance were ones that
fully informed the practice of their everyday life. The only consideration to
qualify the emphasis on family self-reliance was a sense of responsibility to the
wider community, but there was never much prospect that the integrity of the
former might be compromised by the demands of the latter, which was regularly
translated into such contributions as membership of the community fire service,
the township association and representing the region in agricultural, fishing,
commercial and sports organisations. To be known simply as a good neighbour
or stalwart community member was quite sufficient public recognition for most
people.
Well before the relocation project was imposed on the community at Innes and
its environs, the DEH, in contrast, was considered a poor neighbour with little
regard for the collective interests of local folk. The Parks and Wildlife Service,
the branch of the department responsible for its national parks, was widely
considered deleterious in the maintenance of the Innes National Park boundary:
it failed to prevent invasive weeds from spreading to the surrounding farmland
or to curb the movement of large wildlife from park terrain into land under
wheat and barley. One subject of constant complaint was the rising population
of kangaroos that thrived in the national park while regularly feeding outside
its limits. Another was that Parks and Wildlife officers were too reliant on the
‘book learning’ acquired at city-based colleges and were loathe to augment the
formal information they had with local knowledge hard won through extracting
a living from the soil.
Above all other differences, though, it was the dispute about the part to be
played by fox predation in controlling wallaby numbers that symbolised the
cultural divide between the conservation scientists and the region’s farmers.
For while the scientists were assured and confident about their ability to
manipulate the fox population, the farmers scoffed at such inflated and hubristic
claims, and counterpoised against them their own local knowledge and
commonsense.
The fox problem was undoubtedly a major one for all farmers in this area who
combined the production of grain with raising cattle and sheep. They spoke
uncompromisingly about the toll that fox predation took annually. It was,
however, generally taken to be ‘a fact of life’ that could never be greatly changed
but rather had to be rendered tolerable or manageable. If a farmer believed that
the fox problem was out of control on his land and adjacent properties, a handful
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of young men would go out spotlighting for a few nights and kill several
score—more if the effort and expense were felt to be worthwhile. A ‘big hit’,
which combined intense baiting and shooting, was usually organised in the
weeks before the lambing season, and for a while fox sightings would be
negligible. It was, however, still recognised that throughout the year the fox
problem was one to be lived with instead of somehow resolved.
It was to be expected, then, that farmers and their dependents were generally
sceptical when the conservation scientists from the city or park rangers at Innes
claimed that the fox population could be carefully modulated, and even that
this could be represented diagrammatically. The cleverness and conceit thus
being displayed were symptomatic of the cultural divide that local people had
encountered in previous circumstances when city-based bureaucrats steeped in
‘book learning’ attempted to impose their schemes at the rural periphery.
I emphasise here that the local men and women at the forefront of opposition
were well versed in the interpretation of tables, charts and the texts of documents
from government sources. As representatives of the local community on a range
of regional committees and boards, they were used to perusing and picking up
on policy details that would impact on them most. Their critique of the Draft
Translocation Proposal was no knee-jerk reaction. Further, they clearly
acknowledged that one of their major problems was that the full impact of the
wallabies’ return to the mainland would not be felt for several years, even
decades; no one, themselves included, could accurately predict such a distant
prospect. In this light, there was one section of the proposal that especially
concerned them. For the foreseeable future, the reintroduced tammar would be
classified as an ‘endangered species’ and therefore protected by law from any
kind of aggressive response from local farmers and others. In the draft proposal,
however, it was acknowledged that where the tammar population was not
effectively controlled by fox predation as scientifically predicted, permits might
be issued ‘to reduce tammar abundance’. This would, however, be allowed only
where their adverse impact on farmers’ valuable crops had been clearly
established. This open admission was taken to epitomise the indifference of the
DEH and its scientists to the circumstances of local agriculturalists. In addition
to it here being acknowledged that ‘tammar abundance’ was a real possibility,
the wallabies would have to seriously impact on local crops before the farmers
could legally cull them.
Opposition to the project drew on much more than local knowledge specific to
production on the peninsula and the problem with foxes. It drew also on regional
knowledge relating to the disastrous environmental situation prevailing on
Kangaroo Island, a mere 60 kilometres to the south-east and across Investigator
Strait. On this island, a different but closely related species of tammar wallaby
had long ago attained pest status; especially for farmers with agricultural land
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proximate to the island’s national parks, the economic consequences were dire.
Not only had successive state governments failed to tackle the tammar problem,
the island’s koala population had expanded to the point at which eucalypt stocks
were exhausted and, despite a considerable body of scientific research that called
for a severe reduction in koala numbers, no serious government response had
ensued for fear of adverse publicity that might impact on the profitable tourist
trade from Japan (see, for example, Lunney and Mathews 1997; Stratford et al.
1999).
In the estimation of the farmers closest to Innes National Park, there was a real
prospect of the relocated tammar wallabies likewise becoming a significant pest,
but then being protected by the ‘cute and pretty’ image that, before too long,
would be traded on by the tourist industry. In order to explore these evident
parallels and turn them to political advantage, the most vocal critic of the
proposal, a middle-aged farmer resident in Warooka, spent a few days on
Kangaroo Island making a video in which several beleaguered landowners and
their wives detailed their travails, ranging from the loss of valuable sweet crops
(lucerne, lupins and cereals) through to the gruesome task of shooting the tammar
pest in large numbers. Armed with his home video, the farmer then arranged a
public meeting at Warooka (the main settlement closest to Innes National Park)
under the auspices of the South Australian Farmers’ Federation in order to
mobilise public support for the cause. Some 55 members turned up, evidently
representing a substantial proportion of agriculturalists in the area. The response
to several motions from the floor indicated the depth of regional support for
concerted opposition to the relocation project. At much the same time, letters
to regional newspapers and The Stock Journal signalled much the same strength
and depth of community opinion.
From late 2003 and throughout 2004, the local folk who had taken the lead from
the outset maintained their strident public opposition, but at the same time they
had little option but to be drawn into the bureaucratic process of cooptation
that the rituals of community consultation were designed to effect. The rituals
of consultation are precisely that in situations in which the incomparable
resources of the modern State are arraigned against a numerically insignificant
grassroots population. Unless they are able to mount a substantial and
well-resourced grassroots movement that can not only seriously contest but
present viable alternatives to proposals emanating from state institutions, local
populations are relatively powerless in these modern times. Ordinary folk have
little alternative but to accept the rhetoric, engage with the mechanics of
democratic consultation and thereby work for minor changes that necessarily
leave the significant parameters of any proposal intact. Faced with the
overwhelming resources of the DEH and the unqualified commitment to the
project from the government in power, the grassroots network had no option
but to try to wrest whatever they could from the consultative committee.
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In the event, their success on this score was negligible, despite the enormous
energy and time they invested in it. The main demand they put forward was
the provision by the State of financial compensation should the tammar wallaby
population take off and invade the grain fields belonging to themselves and
their neighbours, a threat that might eventuate only in the long-term but
nevertheless had to be prepared for. Particularly in the light of what had
happened on Kangaroo Island and elsewhere in the country where wallaby
populations had run out of control, and since various government bodies had
proved quite incapable of dealing with such situations, an appropriate
compensation scheme became their main concern. The response from above to
this and related issues, however, was emphatically negative. The representatives
from DEH on the consultative committee were adamant from the outset that any
question of compensation arrangements lay well outside the committee’s brief.
Nor was there any mechanism in place for the issue to be raised at higher levels.
In light of this recalcitrance, a delegation of Innes farmers eventually forced a
meeting with the head of the DEH. He did no more, however, than reinforce the
blanket refusal with which the proposal had been received lower down the
institutional hierarchy. He was adamant that neither the DEH nor the government
to which it was responsible would have a bar of compensation arrangements
that would establish a precedent with far-reaching consequences for many other
spheres of economic life.
Conclusion
It was to be expected, then, that a forced engagement with the rituals of
community consultation eventually reinforced local people’s view of the DEH
and the politicians behind it as distanced, arrogant and uncompromising. At
best, the consultation process was considered a waste of time and effort; at worst,
it was a sham and a deceit.
The most significant outcome of this intense and protracted politicking was that
when the first batch of tammar wallabies was finally released inside the park,
the farm families who had a boundary with it were as hostile as ever to the
project. Further afield, it was regarded with circumspection and concern for the
long-term consequences. Subsequently, when the rangers put on a small
celebration to signal the achievement of the tammar relocation inside the national
park, the still stridently opposed farmers and their families were conspicuous
by their absence. This stand-off meant that precisely the local folk who could
have been of most use to the project were the ones most alienated from it. In no
sense was this a fatal setback to the overall project. It will be recalled, however,
that the close cooperation of neighbouring farmers, wherever the tammar
wallabies were to be introduced, was written into the proposal from the outset
as a highly desirable, if not imperative, requirement if the exercise was to be
given the best chance of success.
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The point that has to be reinforced at this juncture is that the tammar wallaby
relocation scheme was, from the outset, an important and innovative prospect.
For the dedicated team of conservation scientists, it was a major challenge to
their scientific professionalism and one from which they could gain extensive
and unique experience. For the upper echelons of the DEH, the project held out
a good deal of prestige and publicity in that the return of extinct wildlife to its
original wilderness would create an extremely favourable public image. For the
state’s politicians, especially the Minister for the Environment and the Premier,
the return of the tammars could be presented as a highly symbolic contribution
to the preservation of Australia’s biodiversity, and therefore well indicative of
the state government’s increasingly important environmental credentials.
Inasmuch as it seems likely that the preservation and enhancement of biodiversity
on the Australian continent are going to be central to the way in which rural
futures are thought about, there are some salutary lessons to be gleaned from
this case study. The first is that a range of social and cultural considerations can
influence, if not determine, how grassroots populations respond to initiatives
from above—and by no means are these entirely dependent on the intrinsic
significance of the policy or proposal. The people of lower Yorke Peninsula had
no problems with the overall goal of preserving and enhancing their region’s
biodiversity, and thus contributing to the national scene. As with so many other
rural occupations, the region’s agriculturalists considered themselves true
environmentalists whose credentials easily outstripped the membership of any
city-based green group. These same local folk were, however, frequently
cautious, circumspect and pessimistic when external institutions bore down on
them with preconceived policies and programs that would impact on their rural
way of life. And the more external agencies supplemented their arguments in
the same discursive terms with which they began, the more intransigent local
people were likely to become.
Circumspection and suspicion about the motives of government institutions and
their associated agencies are in no sense restricted to the people of lower Yorke
Peninsula. They are considered judgments that are commonplace in the cultures
of rural Australia, which is why any official policy or program for the rural
future ignores them at their peril. It is not appropriate, therefore, for a major
institution such as the DEH to approach ‘social and economic considerations’ as
if they are of secondary or minor consequence, for the straightforward reason
that to do so stores up further problems for the future rather than according
them proper consideration from the outset. To many people, and certainly to an
anthropological audience, this point might be self-evident. As I hope is evident
from the above account, however, that was by no means the case with the tammar
relocation project, and although the consequences were not disastrous, they
would assuredly have been best avoided, if at all possible.
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The second cautionary point is that institutions such as departments of the
environment cannot be left to determine on their own account the extent and
the degree of community involvement in such major areas as the protection and
advancement of biodiversity, for their institutionalised scientism means that
they respond with outright indifference or heavily qualified attention to
non-scientific knowledge claims. Broadly speaking, departments of the
environment approach community consultation as a problem to be dealt with
and, if necessary, to be circumvented altogether, rather than the source of an
alternative, valid and relevant body of knowledge. They function as if their
stock definition and body of knowledge are the only ones to be consistently
prioritised, yet this occurs at precisely the time at which more and more people
in societies such as Australia become increasingly aware of the limitations of
natural science and the wide-ranging problems that a previously uncritical
dependence on it has generated and compounded. Circumspection towards
science, and cynicism towards institutions that privilege it as a source of
knowledge above all others, are by no means restricted to the local population
of lower Yorke Peninsula. They are significant political developments in
Australian society at large, and therefore ones that departments of the
environment ignore at their peril.
The third point is that, notwithstanding points one and two, as an anthropologist,
I am less convinced than most that continuing dialogue and exchange of views
between conservation scientists and local populations are the ways in which
differences can be resolved and productive ways forward generated. In the
comparative literature, mainly drawn from experience in the United States,
where the aims of conservation science and the concerns of local landowners
have come into open conflict, sociological analysis generally concludes that the
different parties have to continue their dialogue, they have to persist with their
continuing exchange of views, and so eventually arrive at a working compromise
(for example, James 2002; Norton 2000; Peterson and Horton 1995; Wondolleck
and Yaffee 2000).
The main problem with this kind of conclusion is that it fails to address the
uneven distribution of power, which not only characterises such relations, it
generates the conflict between them in the first place. An emphasis on continuing
dialogue and exchange of ideas infers a degree of equivalence and equality
between partners to the conversation that is, in reality, quite mythical. In the
South Australian case, as in comparable others, the discourse of conservation
science was informed and backed by an institutional and political structure of
enormous influence and power. Whatever the credibility and legitimacy of those
who opposed the tammar relocation project from below, the conservation
scientists from the DEH had only to persevere with their major ambitions in
order to finally realise them. This is, more or less, the current situation. The
project was somewhat delayed by local community opposition, a number of
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costs were incurred that would otherwise not have materialised and the local
support from farm families that would have been far preferable was not
forthcoming. None of these costs, however, was overwhelming for the elementary
reason that institutional resources provisioned by the State far outweighed
anything that the local opposition could possibly muster. As Australia’s rural
future becomes increasingly linked to major environmental goals such as the
preservation of biodiversity and therefore the politics of conservation science,
a major requirement will be how to accord proper recognition and authority to
those who privilege and build on non-institutionalised, even commonsensical,
bodies of knowledge and the folk discourse that gives public voice to them.
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People and places are mutually constitutive, and so the particular ways in which
people attach and are attached to place have implications for both. A significant
aspect of attachment is mode of tenure, with different forms of land tenure
allowing for very different imaginaries and practices of self and land. As such,
transformations in tenure will have significant implications for land use and
subjectivity.
Until recently, farmers leased 2.37 million hectares of pastoral land in the South
Island from the Crown and, since 1948, leaseholders have had the right of
perpetual renewal. In the mid 1990s, the Crown (with the broad support of
farmers, environmental and recreation interests) moved to reorder its relationship
with farmers and a process of tenure review was initiated. As a result of tenure
review, land with significant conservation and landscape values is being
transferred to the Department of Conservation, in return for which farmers are
gaining freehold title of lower land, land with production potential. For the
people of the high country, relationships to the land are central to the formation
of subjectivity, and it is the highest and most remote land, the very land that
farmers stand to lose under tenure review, that has the greatest significance for
identity. As one informant said, ‘Tenure review means that we would become
valley farmers’, no longer high country farmers. With tenure review in process,
the matrix that produces high country farmer identity has been disrupted. As
such, it provides a moment in which the simultaneous processes of production
of person and place are revealed as differently positioned actors struggle to
control the future of the high country.
Introduction
In many of the so-called developed countries, rural places and conceptions of
ruralism appear to be undergoing radical transformation. Historically, in Anglo
traditions, high moral value has been attributed to ruralism, and notions of the
rural idyll have deep histories (Williams 1973; Schama 1995), an enduring aspect
of which is the idea that rural regions are sites for the production of national
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goods—economic and cultural. In these traditions, ruralism and agrarianism
have been often considered synonymous (suppressing the brute realities of
agricultural life), but in recent decades this link has begun to be uncoupled. In
many European countries, in America and in Australia, the number of people
involved in farming has declined and rural production forms an ever-smaller
part of national economies. The decline in the economic importance of rural
areas, however, has not necessarily resulted in a concurrent diminishment of
cultural significance. Instead, the notion of the rural idyll has been reconfigured,
in this iteration divorced from agricultural production: rural areas are more and
more becoming sites and objects of consumption (for example, Ching and Creed
1997).
The effects of these broad transformations are significant. Transformations of
ruralism are simultaneously transformations of landscape, of lived lives in place,
of imaginaries and of subjectivities. What we see, as the idea of ruralism is
reworked, is a transformation of the place of ruralism in imaginings of place,
community, the nation and the self. Though the general trajectory of change
might be common across nations, as anthropological approaches to globalisation
commonly demonstrate, such processes manifest differently in different places
and the outcome of any trajectory of change is always contingent (for example,
Inda and Rosaldo 2002). As such, to understand rural change it is necessary to
explore particular types of ruralism. As Bourdieu (1998:2) writes, ‘the deepest
logic of the social world can be grasped only if one plunges into the particularity
of an empirical reality, historically located and dated’.
New Zealand presents an unusual case of rural change. In New Zealand, as in
other developed nations with strong Anglo heritages, ruralism has loomed large
in the national imagination and is understood as the fount of the country’s
identity, the reservoir of national morality (Bell 1996). On the other hand, though
allegedly a developed country, New Zealand’s economy is unusual in its
continued reliance on primary production: ‘agricultural and forestry products
earn more than half of New Zealand’s export income’ and ‘farming and forestry
employed about 8.5 percent of employed people aged over 15 years in 2001’
(Statistics New Zealand 2002). Despite this, however, and in contrast with policies
of subsidising agricultural production and supporting farmers regardless of their
waning economic significance in other developed nations, since the mid 1980s
and the implementation of wide-ranging neo-liberal reforms, the agricultural
sector in New Zealand has received no government support or subsidy
whatsoever (Sandrey and Reynolds 1990; Gouin et al. 1994). Notwithstanding
the centrality of primary production to the economy, in New Zealand as
elsewhere, we see a process whereby consumption values have come to trump
production values in relation to ruralism, and the ‘natural’ link between
agrarianism and rurality is being severed.
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Just as there are significant differences between nations with regard to the place
of ruralism, so there are differences within nations. Recent decades have seen
profound alterations in the agricultural sector in New Zealand: ‘with fewer sheep,
more dairy cows, more trees, burgeoning vineyards and spreading avocado
orchards and olive groves’ (Statistics New Zealand 2002), New Zealand no longer
lives on the sheep’s back. Between 1994 and 2002, there was a 20 per cent decline
in sheep numbers to 39.5 million and an increase in dairy cow numbers, from
3.9 million to 5.2 million. There were dramatic increases in grape plantings in
the same period, rising from 7200 hectares in 1994 to 17 400ha in 2002 (Statistics
New Zealand 2002). These changes have radically reordered life in particular
localities, with profound impacts on ruralism as symbol, landscape and
community, and on possible rural futures. This chapter considers one particular
case of rural change in New Zealand: pastoral sheep farming in the South Island
high country. Because of the symbolic stature of the high country, this case also
speaks to the place of ruralism in New Zealand’s imagining of itself as a nation.
As such, I simultaneously address rural futures and the future of ruralism.
Cohen (1985) argues that when communities perceive themselves to be under
threat, they mobilise to assert their distinction from others, drawing from a
collective repertoire of discourses and symbols to articulate who they are in
order to achieve certain ends. The situation I will describe is just such a case. It
is very much in flux, with outcomes uncertain. As such, this analysis attempts
to capture a particular moment in what is a continuing process. In such instances
of disruption to the previously taken for granted order of things, the effects and
processes of rural change become visible, as social actors struggle to secure their
land, their communities and their selves.
Place and subjectivity
The link between place and subjectivity has been established theoretically and
empirically by a number of authors (for example, Altman and Low 1992; Hirsch
and O’Hanlon 1995; Feld and Basso 1996; Low and Lawrence-Zúñiga 2003), and
in relation to farming has been explored in most detail by Gray (2000, 2003) in
Scotland and Dominy (1992, 1993, 2001) in the New Zealand high country. The
ethnographies of Dominy and Gray focus on the ways in which farmers come
to selfhood through an experiential and embodied knowledge of the land they
farm. There has, however, been less attention paid to other aspects of the
formation of farmer subjectivity. Things such as policy and regulation, legal
structures and politics tend to be constituted as context, as shaping what farmers
might do, but essentially as external to their selves. In this chapter, I focus on
land tenure. Rather than thinking of tenure as an element of context, however,
I will argue that tenure is in fact one of the building blocks of farmer subjectivity.
As McNay (2000:76) writes, ‘individuals do not passively absorb external
determinations, but are actively engaged in the interpretation of experience,
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and therefore, in a process of self-formation’. Different forms of tenure attach
people to land in different ways, providing different understandings of the
relationship between land and people and producing different forms of being
in those worlds. As such, changes in mode of tenure will necessarily result in
alterations in identity. I explore the ways in which the legal matrix of land
tenure is productive of high country farmer identity. Currently, land tenure in
the high country is changing from leasehold to freehold. With tenure review, a
previous identity, grounded in place and legitimated through a particular
relationship with the Crown, is under threat (or is at least being destabilised),
as one of the key modes through which that identity has been authenticated is
being removed. Changing land tenure, in reordering the connection between
farmers and the State, is producing a new form of farmer subjectivity, and an
oppositional subjectivity. Farmers are reimagining themselves in relation to the
State and to the nation. In turn, this change in tenure is part of a transformation
of the place of high country farmers in the polity and the nation.
High country pastoral farming
The high country is land above 600 metres in altitude that runs the length of
the South Island. High country farming is characterised by the extensive grazing
of merino sheep on large properties, ranging from approximately 2500ha to 180
000ha, with wool as the major commodity. The high country is a vast area: 6
million of the 27 million hectares of New Zealand’s land mass is high country
land. About 2.5 million hectares is farmed; the rest is part of the conservation
estate (<http://www.highcountryaccord.co.nz/>). Pastoral land, then, constitutes
almost 10 per cent of the land of New Zealand. Very little of this land is held
under freehold title. Until the late 1990s, 2.37 million hectares were held in
Crown ownership, let to 304 farmers as Crown Pastoral Lease. The Land Act 1948
created leases that were perpetually renewable for a term of 33 years, though
there was no right to freehold. Rents were set at between 1.5 and 2 per cent of
land value exclusive of improvements. The lessee had many of the same rights
as freeholders: trespass rights, rights of exclusive occupation and the ownership
of improvements. These leases were, however, pastoral leases only, meaning
that leaseholders had only the right to graze the land and had to apply to the
Crown agency responsible if they wished to undertake any other activities. This
provision of the act thus ensured that the extensive grazing of sheep and cattle
remained the dominant land use in the high country. The security of tenure
granted by the 1948 act promoted the investment of money, time and self in
high country properties and a strong sense of belonging to the high country
developed in run-holders. From the perspective of high country farmers
themselves, and for writers such as Dominy (2001), a unique high country
‘culture’ emerged, based on the practices of farming that land. As one high
country farmwoman put it: ‘We’re only second generation, but we still have a
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firm cultural attachment to the land. We have cultural, spiritual and historical
connections’ (Karen Simpson, The Christchurch Press, 22 November 2003).
The 1948 act made possible a particular mode of attachment to the high country.
As the land remained in Crown ownership, a relationship of stewardship was
available—the idea of the leaseholder as guardian and caretaker of the land. As
one farmer said: ‘We’re custodians. Nobody ever owns it, we’re just passing
through and trying to enhance it for the next generation’ (Andrew Simpson,
The Christchurch Press, 22 November 2003). This imagining of the relationship
between farmer and land differs from that of other farmers, because the land is
leased. And it was, in part, through the 1948 act that the potential for stewardship
subjectivity, rather than ownership subjectivity, was generated.
Expressions of belonging and attachment to place are mobilised by particular
groups at particular times for particular reasons. At the Ngai Tahu Claim hearings
before the Waitangi Tribunal in the late 1980s,1  anthropologist Michele Dominy
(1990:13–14), presenting evidence of run-holder attachment to place, stated:
‘Material affinity is expressed in the value runholders place on their sense of
ownership in the land they farm and inhabit. It is also expressed in the value
placed on long term security of tenure.’ In this context, when control of the
leases was at stake, a discourse of ownership rather than stewardship was
deployed. Current assertions of attachment must, then, be viewed in the same
light: as strategic deployments by interested actors.
The tenure review process
In the mid 1990s, the Crown instituted a process of tenure review, considering
that the system of pastoral leases had outlasted its usefulness as a means of
protecting land and promoting agricultural development (Clayton 1982:65).
Tenure review aimed to ‘achieve…productive economic land-use and
conservation outcomes in the South Island high country’
(<http://www.linz.govt.nz/home/index.html>). Tenure review was widely
supported by farmers, recreation and environmental groups (Brower 2006:27).
Farmers and environmentalists had different reasons for wanting tenure review,
but there was general agreement that it was required:
High country lessees wanted to have the management and investment
flexibility that comes from freehold title. The Crown wanted to get out
of the uneconomic business of being a landlord. And the Environmental
pressure groups, along with the Crown, wanted land with significant
inherent values (SIVs) to go into the conservation estate.
(<http://www.highcountryaccord.co.nz/>)
Under the terms of the 1998 Crown Pastoral Lands Act, leaseholders have the
opportunity to convert to freehold part of their land—that considered to have
economic values—in return for which land with significant historic, scientific,
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ecological or cultural characteristics is restored to full Crown ownership, and,
in reality, to Department of Conservation (DoC) management
(<http://www.linz.govt.nz/home/index.html>).
Tenure review is initiated by individual leaseholders and, through consultation
with the Department of Conservation, Fish and Game,2 iwi 3  and the general
public, individual properties are divided into freehold and conservation land.
Tenure review is a voluntary process and leaseholders or the Crown can withdraw
at any time (<http://www.linz.govt.nz/home/index.html>). The results of tenure
review will vary by property. In some cases, all of the land of a particular lease
might go to conservation and, in others, all of the land might be converted to
freehold (<http://www.linz.govt.nz/home/index.html>). As of August 2007, 47
lessees had settled with the Crown, with another 13 in the final stages, and 115
properties had not entered the process (<http://www.linz.govt.nz/
home/index.html>). To date, about 162 000ha of land have been converted to
freehold and about 117 500ha have been added to the conservation estate, with
an additional 45 500ha being bought outright from lessees
(<http://www.highcountryaccord.co.nz/>). Officials estimate that, by the end
of the tenure review program, 50 per cent of pastoral lease land will become
freehold and 50 per cent will become conservation land
(<http://www.linz.govt.nz/home/index.html>). To date, the split has been closer
to 60/40 in favour of farmers (Brower 2006:3).
At present, tenure review seems to be stalling. Farming, conservation and
recreation groups have begun to voice serious doubts about the outcomes of
tenure review and are lobbying hard to change the outcome. Tenure review has
become contentious because what is at stake is not just ownership of land, or
even conservation, but control over the way in which the high country and
New Zealand as a nation is imagined. Two web sites, produced by farmer lobby
group High Country Accord (<http://www.highcountryaccord.co.nz/>) and
conservation/recreation lobby group Stop Tenure Review
(<http://www.stoptenurereview.co.nz/>), give insight into how the different
groups understand the issues and the discourses they deploy to make their
respective cases.
The high country and New Zealand identity
Ruralities and nature are central elements in New Zealand’s imagining of itself
as a nation (for example, Bell 1996; Sturm 1998; King 1999; Dominy 2001:68;
Jutel 2004) and in the construction of the New Zealand national subject. Despite
a very high degree of urbanisation (85.7 per cent of the population was classified
as urban, according to the 2002 census),4  a ‘[n]ational identity based on physical
geography, and on idealisation of lifestyles within nature, is persistently used
as our claim to fame’ (Bell 1996:34). According to Jutel (2004:54–5), three
landscapes have particular significance: ‘dramatic volcanic topography, the
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pastoral farmland, and the exotic “otherness” of the native bush are located at
the centre of New Zealand national identity constructs’. These landscapes are
iconic and stand for the nation. Such imaginings are widely disseminated and
have continuing salience. For example, White (2006), writing in North and South,
a monthly magazine for, in the words of the magazine’s web site, ‘thinking New
Zealand’, wrote of the high country:
The empty inner expanse has been the backdrop of pioneer legend and
in inspiration to everyone from Samuel Butler, to Brian Turner, Grahame
Sydney to Speight’s marketers. Autumn musters; the desiccated Otago
tors; the Mackenzie Country’s tawny tussock carpet; the remote
corrugated iron huts with names of sheltering shepherds scratched in
their rafters; the ‘red-gold cirrus/Over snow mountain shine’ of James
K. Baxter are part of a cultural heritage we all share and celebrate, no
matter how deep in suburbia we dwell. (White 2006:42)
Not only does the land of the high country carry immense symbolic weight, so
does (or perhaps so has) the high country farmer, because of his intimate
connection with the high country landscape. In the popular (and farmer)
imagination, this iconic land has forged an iconic subject, a subject who embodies
all that is best in the national character. The high country farmer subject position
is constituted through discourses of pioneering. As McAloon (2002:109) noted,
the pioneer subject position was established from the early days of the colony:
as early as 1890, ‘the pioneer myth…was becoming increasingly evident in the
account rich settlers gave of themselves’. High country farmers continue to
constitute themselves through this discourse: ‘in many respects the “high country
farmer” is an image of yesteryear, a portrayal of the early settler battling against
the elements to earn a living’ (Cushen 1997:78). Pioneering people are
hardworking, thrifty, resilient, flexible, independent and self-reliant; they are
possessed of what Wevers (1980:244) calls the stoic virtues. These are the
characteristics of the New Zealand national subject, embodied in national heroes
such as the late Sir Edmund Hillary (conqueror of Mount Everest), Charles Upham
and Bill Apiata (winners of the Victoria Cross) and countless All Blacks captains.
Likewise, they are possessed by the high country farmer. Moreover, high country
farmers have played a significant role in building the nation’s wealth (Gardner
1981; Bremer and Brooking 1993).
It is because of the place of the pioneering high country farmer in the foundation
myths of the nation, the iconic stature of the land they farm and their economic
contribution that high country farmers have become established as central to
New Zealand’s national identity and as guardians of the nation’s physical and
cultural heritage. Farmers considered that their interests paralleled the nation’s
interests because of the natural moral superiority of ruralism and because they
produced the wealth of the nation: ‘[m]ost other groups seemed parasitic in
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comparison with family farmers who constituted the “backbone of the economy”’
(Bremer and Brooking 1993:108). This status translated into a dominant cultural
and political position in the affairs of the State, with successive governments
supporting agriculture: ‘[t]he history of New Zealand farming is in a real sense
the history of New Zealand. Until the Second World War all life here was
powerfully conditioned by what happened in the country’ (McLauchlan 1981:11).
Also, until the 1980s, ‘[s]tate economic policies exhibited a clear bias in favour
of the farming community’ (Bremer and Brooking 1993:108). Considerable rewards
accrued to farmers as a result. Brooking argues that ‘the image fostered of the
pastoralist as a “natural” part of a romantic high country, as the guardian of a
way of life, has helped legitimise their claim to control huge tracts of land leased
from the state at peppercorn rentals’ (Brooking in Cushen 1997:74–5).
The place of high country farming and farmers in the national imaginary,
however, is being transformed. What I suggest is happening through tenure
review is that farmers are being dislodged from their position of national subject
and are being replaced by the environmentalist (understood as urban greenie),
and an unspoiled nature is replacing a productive ruralism as the morally correct
relationship to the high country.
High country farmer identity
High country farmer subjectivity is, as all research and all of the writings by
high country farmers themselves indicate, inextricably bound up with the land.
Dominy’s work demonstrates in most detail the ‘mutuality of spatiality and
cultural identity’ in the high country, how land is a site of ‘intense cultural
activity and imagination—of memory, of affectivity, of work, of sociality, of
identity’ (Dominy 2001:3). Not all of the land, however, on a high country station
carries the same symbolic weight. It is the land that is the highest, the most
remote—the tops, the back country—that bears the greatest symbolic load. It
is the possession of this land that forms the foundation of high country farmer
subjectivity, and farmers are aware that its loss will necessarily transform
identity.
In interviews conducted in 2003 about the impact of tenure review (Akers 2004;
Morris and Akers 2004), interviewees expressed concern about what tenure
review would mean for the future of the high country. High country people
articulated a deep sense of attachment to high country farming as a way of life,
as in the words of one young woman: ‘[I]t’s just everything to me. It’s just
absolutely everything, it’s my whole life. It’s more important than boys, school
[university] and everything’ (see also Dominy 2001; Morris 2002). Whether they
had entered the process or not, and whether they considered that they would
personally do well out of tenure review, farmers expressed deep concern about
the impact of changing land tenure on being in the high country. They were
concerned that there was a desire for the removal of farmers from the high
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country altogether: ‘We’re the thorn in their side, the greenies. They want home
[the station]…they would love to get their hands on everything’ (Morris and
Akers 2004). This, farmers say, would result in the destruction of the high
country, physically and culturally:
In the worst case scenario the high country will still be there but the
high country will transform because the vegetation type, the land use
type, it’ll revert back to where it came from. The local, indigenous5
people will disappear because it will become uneconomic to live in these
environments, so they’ll disappear. (Morris and Akers 2004)
Though it is unlikely that farming will disappear entirely from the high country,
with the transfer of the highest country from farmer to DoC control, high country
farming could do so. True high country farming requires particular kinds of
country (extensive, rugged, isolated, high-altitude tussocks with snow risk;
Dominy 2001:42), and the loss of such land will mean that particular properties
might no longer qualify. In response to a question about what tenure review
would mean for their property, one farmer responded:
Yeah, it’s still high country, it’s still a high country place. A lot of places
aren’t probably. We still will be ’cause we’ll still have some high bits of
land, real tussock, you know, real rugged stuff. But a lot of places won’t
be, I suppose, when they [DoC] cut what they want out. (Morris and
Akers 2004)
This farmer will remain a high country farmer because he will retain real high
country land, but is not likely to be the case for everybody. For those who lose
the highest country, the high country farmer subject position will no longer be
available. In the words of one woman: ‘We are an endangered species.’ High
country farmers will become instead ‘valley farmers’, sheep farmers like any
others, no longer unique.
Significantly, it is the possession of the very same land that is the goal of
environmental and recreation groups. The high country is central to their identity
projects as well, projects they increasingly successfully constitute as New
Zealand’s project, just as farmers, until recently, have been able to do.
Recreation and environmental interests in the high country
People who do not live in the high country consider that they have rights in
relation to it because of its iconic nature and because it remains in Crown, and
therefore in some sense public, ownership. Farmers are not the only group
interested in the outcome of tenure review. As the process evolved and a number
of reviews were completed, environmental and recreation interests became
increasingly vocal in their criticism, resulting in the formation of a lobby group
called Stop Tenure Review.
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From the perspective of this group, and others such as Forest and Bird, tenure
review will result in the privatisation of the high country, with negative
implications for conservation, recreation and landscape. They argue that too
much land is being converted to freehold, land with significant natural and
recreation values that should be included in the conservation estate, and that
farmers are benefiting from tenure review at the expense of the New Zealand
public. Eugenie Sage of Forest and Bird, for example, says the high country is
being given away in ‘the biggest wave of privatisation…since Roger Douglas’.
She says she fears that iconic landscapes will pass into private hands to become
‘McMansion subdivision sprawls’ (<http://www.highcountryaccord.co.nz/>).
These groups note that under tenure review farmers give up their least productive
land and in return receive land of much greater value, and in some cases cash
settlements as well: ‘So far high country farmers have received agricultural and
real estate development rights worth tens of millions of dollars from the Crown
AND an average of $186,000 extra compensation per deal’
(<http://www.stoptenurereview.co.nz/>). Like the farmers, Stop Tenure Review
argues that what is being lost is not just land, but ‘identity’:
Ever since European settlement, 150 years ago, the South Island high
country has been owned by the Crown. But we are not concerned just
about land ownership. It’s also about protecting a spiritual landscape
and an environment that is an indelible part of our collective heritage.
It’s more than just our land, it’s part of who we are as New Zealanders.
So while the government is handing over Crown land and taxpayers’
money to a small group of high country farmers, it is also alienating our
identity. (<http://www.stoptenurereview.co.nz/>)
These groups draw attention in particular to the privatisation of lakefront land:
under the Mt Burke review, 35km of Wanaka shore was converted to freehold
and 9km of Lake Tekapo frontage was converted to freehold under the Richmond
review (<http://www.stoptenurereview.co.nz/>). The group cited cases in which
land converted to freehold under tenure review was subsequently subdivided
and sold by farmers for massive profits. For example, the Closeburn lessee paid
$158 000 for 930ha of land on the shores of Lake Wakatipu, close to the tourist
hub of Queenstown; in 2006, a 1.2ha section of Closeburn Station land was on
the market for $3.9 million (White 2006:46–7). In 2006, Fulbright Scholar Anne
Brower published the results of her research into tenure review in a report called
Interest Groups, Vested Interests, and the Myth of Apolitical Administration: The
politics of land tenure reform on the South Island of New Zealand. In this report,
Brower argues that the Crown is being exploited by farmers who are making
massive financial gains at the expense of the Crown and the New Zealand public.
This report, and the furious response from farmers, brought tenure review to
the public’s attention. In November 2006, the magazine North and South
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published an article titled ‘High country hijack’. This article leads with the
Brower and environmentalist perspective and suggests a conspiracy:
It’s a process whereby 10 percent of New Zealand’s most remote but
most beautiful country, owned by the Crown, is being divided up, with
much of it effectively given away to farmers, who until now have only
leased this land. It’s called tenure review and it’s been going on for 15
years but it’s only now people seem to be understanding what’s really
happening, how many iconic landscapes are under threat—and what’s
already been lost. Warning. This is a complex story. It’s been made
complex—or nobody involved with it has tried to make it
simple—perhaps so that people like you won’t become interested in it,
let alone get involved. (White 2006:42)
Farmers’ perspectives
It is not only environmental groups who are unhappy with the outcomes of
tenure review; so, increasingly, are farmers. In 2003, a high country lobby group
called the High Country Accord was established, aiming ‘to seek a change in
government policy relating to the Land Tenure Reform Process’
(<http://www.highcountryaccord.co.nz/>).
In opposition to Stop Tenure Review, the High Country Accord denies claims
that farmers are the beneficiaries of tenure review:
Forest and Bird has been creating a perception that the public is somehow
being ripped off. There is a clear implication that individual farming
families are somehow guilty parties. It has all become very unfair and
unpleasant…By ignoring [the] facts and playing to an old prejudice that
high country farmers are unfairly privileged people, Forest and Bird
have finally managed to attract the urban media to take an interest in
what has been happening in the high country.
(<http://www.highcountryaccord.co.nz/>)
Rather, they argue, it is farmers who are doing badly. From the perspective of
the High Country Accord, tenure review is unsatisfactory because too much
land will be lost from production. Farmers argue that much of the land that is
earmarked for conservation is necessary for the viability of stations and high
country community life:
Most of this land is suitable for long-term sustainable economic use. But
it is going to be locked away in [the] conservation estate forever. As high
country farmers we are particularly concerned, because we will lose
most of the tussock rangeland which we need for summer grazing.
Without access to this land, most high country farms will not be
viable…The creation of government-owned parks and reserves should
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not be at the expense of the families who farm this land sustainably.
(<http://www.highcountryaccord.co.nz/>)
Indeed, the impact on the merino industry is likely to be significant. A report
by Lincoln agricultural economist Glenn Greer estimates that tenure review will
result in the ‘loss of 663,000 stock units from the high country—a 31% reduction
on current numbers. The estimated loss of gross economic output at the farm
gate per year will be $33 million’ (<http://www.highcountryaccord.co.nz/>).
The accord estimates that one in five properties will become economically
unviable, with the loss of 70 to 80 families from high country farming
(<http://www.highcountryaccord.co.nz/>). The accord argues that this will
destroy farming as a way of life and, in doing so, will destroy New Zealand’s
heritage:
In seeking to nationalise 60 per cent or more of pastoral lease land, the
Crown has failed to recognise the value to the nation of the productive
effort and commitment to these lands by existing farming families for
over 150 years…we are a self-reliant community in which concern for
the safety of neighbours and visitors is part of the culture…We live in
this landscape 24 hours, 7 days a week and we understand the risks and
how to manage them. It’s a very different culture from that which the
government would have us replaced with—that of the transitory visitor,
supported by a seasonal and possibly itinerant workforce. As high
country farmers we are managers of the landscape and part of it. We are
part of a living heritage which most New Zealanders and tourists value.
(<http://www.highcountryaccord.co.nz/>)
Although, as in this statement, farmers position themselves as the rightful
guardians of the high country, a delicate discursive strategy is needed here,
because it is the deployment of the discourse of guardianship rather than
ownership that is one of the things that has allowed other New Zealanders to
mount compelling claims to participate in decision making about the future of
the high country. As a result, the High Country Accord has begun to argue that
leasehold tenure almost amounts to freehold:
[L]eases give farmers exclusive occupancy rights to their property, as
well as a perpetual right of renewal. In these respects, the leases have a
status which is very similar to freehold title…The lessee’s financial
interest in a typical High Country farm is 85 per cent of the capital value.
The Crown’s interest is the remaining 15 per cent…we are not talking




The High Country Accord argues that farming and conservation are not
incompatible. Indeed, they suggest, farmers are better able than the State to be
environmental managers:
[M]ost of the land being targeted by the Crown could be protected while
still remaining in private hands. There is no evidence to show that the
Crown is a better land manager than farmers. In fact, there are many
examples of land in Crown ownership which is poorly managed. Scientific
research shows that most tussock rangeland is being sustainably managed
by farmers. The fact that the land still has conservation values after 150
years of grazing is a testimony to their stewardship.
(<http://www.highcountryaccord.co.nz/>)
In arguing their case, the accord positions farmers in opposition to the State but
as having parallel interests with the New Zealand public (that is, the nation):
‘Accord members are privileged to farm some of New Zealand’s most magnificent
landscapes. We accept that our fellow New Zealanders want the right to enjoy
these landscapes too’ (<http://www.highcountryaccord.co.nz/>). What they
object to is the extent of the proposed conservation estate, which they constitute
as the aim of the government, not, by implication, the aim of the public:
Our objection is to the scale of the government’s plans. Basically, we
think the government is going overboard. Instead of establishing a
handful of parks in key areas, it plans to set up 22. About 1.3 million
hectares will be involved. That’s a huge area—it’s more than Fiordland
National Park. (<http://www.highcountryaccord.co.nz/>)
Again, they position themselves and their interests with the public and against
the government:
Ultimately New Zealanders need to ask whether they want more than
half the land area of the South Island locked into Crown ownership and
management indefinitely. The techniques used by the government to
acquire this land amount to an abuse of property rights. Every New
Zealander who owns land, shares or other investments should be
concerned that such a precedent is being set.
(<http://www.highcountryaccord.co.nz/>)
The accord suspects that the ultimate aim of the Crown is to remove farmers
from the land in the name of the retention of a ‘natural’ landscape, which farmers
assert is in fact produced (and sustained) through their farming practices.
Farmers, the State and subjectivity
Two kinds of transformations in farmer subjectivity are being produced through
tenure review. First, a steward subjectivity—in which the interests of the State
and farmers coincide, and through which farmers are positioned as guardians
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of the nation—is no longer easily sustainable. Farmers attempt to deploy this
discourse at times, but it has lost the power it once had. Second, as farmers find
themselves in opposition to the policies of the State, a resistant subjectivity is
produced. This represents a radical change from times when farmers were
considered to be the economic and symbolic backbone of the nation. Farmers
and farming are no longer understood in this way. Increasingly, they are regarded
as an ecological threat to the nation (their gas-emitting cows are contributing to
global warming, fertiliser run-off is polluting rivers and lakes and so on) or as
simply businessmen, motivated purely by profits, with discourses about farming
as a morally superior way of life increasingly ringing untrue.
The unravelling of the close relationship between farmers, the State and the
nation has its roots in the 1980s and the neo-liberal policies of the fourth Labour
Government. In the 1980s, in a very short time, all supports for farming were
removed and the sector was deregulated, exposing New Zealand agriculture to
the full brunt of market forces (Sandrey and Reynolds 1990; Johnsen 2003). This
resulted in profound crisis for farmers—economic and symbolic. If the historical
extent of government support for agriculture signalled farmer’s iconic status,
the removal of that support signalled its loss. Farmer power was further
undermined with the 1996 electoral system change to MMP, a system of
proportional representation. Under the new system, smaller parties have a greater
voice, and one of the new parties in Parliament is the Green Party. Greenies are
the traditional enemy of farmers, representing interference from outside and the
imposition of alien values. Farmers are concerned that the power of such interests
(constituted as urban) will increase (Cushen 1997:5). And, it seems, their worries
have some foundation. In June 2007, David Parker, the minister responsible for
tenure review, announced the withdrawal of the Crown from some 40 tenure
reviews to, in his words, ‘protect important high country landscapes and
diversity values’ (‘High country tenure review decision welcomed’, Scoop
Independent News, 22 June 2007). These properties are those with lakeside
frontages—precisely the kind of land that farmers have the most to gain from
converting to freehold. This effectively means that this land will remain in Crown
ownership, though whether it will continue to be farmed or become conservation
estate is not clear. Stop Tenure Review welcomed the decision, farmers deplored
it: ‘[o]ptions for High Country farmers are becoming increasingly limited by a
government which seems determined to force them from their leasehold land’,
said Donald Aubrey, chair of the High Country group of Federated Farmers
(‘Another blow for the high country’, Scoop Independent News, June 2007).
Though high country farmers continue to assert that their interests are the
nation’s interests, this claim is no longer persuasive. No longer guardians of the
nation’s heritage, high country farmers are being dislodged from their position
as national subject and keeper of a national morality; they are being replaced




Tenure review, it seems clear, will lead to fundamental changes in the high
country, in terms of land use, landscape and social system. Some possible futures
are indicated in areas where reviews have been completed. Central Otago, for
instance, is now known for pinot, not merino, and for adventure tourism, and
sheep farming and farmers no longer dominate. This is a new high country,
increasingly a site, and object, of consumption. Tenure review is also
fundamentally challenging farmer subjectivity. Some have embraced the change,
constituting themselves as businessmen, while others hold on to the ideal of
stewardship. The sense of loss and anger among farmers evoked by the loss of
the high country, the loss of their place as guardians of the nation and their
inability to control the outcomes of tenure review can be understood as a version
of what Hage (1998:218ff.) calls the ‘discourse of Anglo decline’. As Park et al.
(2002:527) write of farmers in Northland, ‘[p]akeha [European] pastoral farmers,
key protagonists in a white managerial fantasy, are experiencing themselves as
no longer in control of, or as central to, national life as they were’.
These rural transformations also signify a shift in the place of ruralism in the
imagining of New Zealand. The land of the high country remains an important
feature of the national imaginary, but it is now imagined as a landscape to be
viewed or a space of leisure; pastoral farming and pastoral farmers are no longer
automatically synonymous with the high country.
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Endnotes
1 The Waitangi Tribunal was established under the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975 as a forum for hearing
Maori grievances in relation to violations of the Treaty of Waitangi. In 1986, Ngai Tahu, the dominant
South Island tribe, lodged a claim. As partial remedy, they sought ownership of high country pastoral
leases. High country farmers, arguing that pastoral leases should not constitute part of any remedy,
asked anthropologist Michele Dominy, who was working in the area at the time, to make a submission
on their behalf to the tribunal about their economic, cultural, spiritual and historical links to the land.
In their submissions, they drew parallels between their attachment and Maori attachment to land: ‘Kevin
O’Connor, Professor of Range Management at Lincoln College, has called this affinity [with the land]
“landship” and compares it with turangawaewae, in Maoridom’ (Dominy 1990:14). They also asserted
that they were the indigenous people of the high country: ‘A committee member in writing to me said
that in their evidence high country people would stress the historical importance of the land to them
and “how we feel as though we are the indigenous people of the high country”’ (Dominy 1990:14).
Indigenous status and a strong spiritual attachment are central to Maori claims of attachment to place
and to their claims before the Waitangi Tribunal. In this context, farmers drew on parallel discourses
to assert their own claims.
2  Fish and Game represents hunting and fishing interests and has ‘a statutory mandate to manage New
Zealand’s fresh water sportsfish fisheries and gamebird hunting’ (<http://www.fishandgame.org.nz>).
3 Iwi are Maori tribes.
4  Settlements with a population of 1000 people or more are classified as urban for census purposes
(Statistics New Zealand 2008).









It is assumed that anything to do with ‘the rural’ is in decline but no account
has been made of the flow of ‘older’ people into the countryside—those people
who after successful careers elsewhere are moving to rural locations to set up
new, supposedly less stressful working lives. In this chapter, I explore the way
in which some couples in New Zealand are creating new and meaningful lives
by growing kiwifruit, an activity that fits well with those who seek an active
and graduated retirement.
These people saw orchards as actors capable of a moral exchange: ‘if we make
an orchard like this then it will reward us by giving us indications of our care’.
Two different orchards were constructed. One was an orchard that was so wild
that it needed to be made tidy and productive and the other was an orchard that
was so needy it required nurturing. Are these ‘new’ orchardists really creating
new lives or are they creating orchards that represent their old identities but in
a different medium? What are the implications of their practices for the resilience
of the environment, the countryside and the kiwifruit industry?
Introduction
We see a lot on television and in books (for example, Mayle 1992) about baby
boomers starting a new life in the country, people, who, after stressful but
successful professional careers in the city, are able to use their accumulated
wealth to buy land. There they are, talking or writing enthusiastically about
producing their own wine, olives, avocados or whatever, and about the merits
of getting out of the rat race to live the idyllic life that the country provides. As
one of the women in the research reported on here said: ‘Other trees
around—yeah, we’ve got persimmons, avocados, tamarillos, fejoas, guavas—bits
and pieces. I like trees. I like space. I like the space. I love this. I’ve always
wanted more than a quarter acre, so now I’ve got it’ (Woman, organic).1
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In New Zealand, it is not only wealthy people who have lived in the cities who
are moving to more intensive, smaller landholdings. Some dairy farmers are
doing it too as they escape from the early morning milking routine and being
tied to the farm seven days of the week for much of the year. One of the popular
options for ageing New Zealanders is to become a kiwifruit orchardist. In practice,
the people I interviewed who had moved into kiwifruit after a career elsewhere
were rather more ‘ordinary’ than those seen on TV and in books! Taking on a
kiwifruit orchard could be as much of a risk as they are prepared to take, as
earning a living is still important to them. They might not have amassed a lot
of capital and might require a mortgage to start their new manner of living.
Growing kiwifruit is a way of life very suited to people who wish to move
towards retirement in a graduated way:
[T]he vision for me, for my future? Spending the rest of my days here.
I’m now sixty-two but I would see us staying in this home. We have no
plan to move or downsize to a retirement village…and the beauty of
orcharding is that you can do as much or as little as you choose…[With]
us getting older, we are stepping back—like I’ve got contractors…[to]
come in this winter and do two blocks of pruning for us. [My wife] won’t
be pruning anymore. She’ll just do some of the tying down which is a
lighter job and I’ll continue to do the pruning while I can and then I
would say a few years down the line, the contractors’ll be doing more
than what I’m doing, and if I’m not able to do too much at all I may just
sit on the tractor and mow the orchard, and I might lease the orchard
out to one of the packhouse facilities to run the orchard. So my business
can continue to operate, I can oversee it. Probably I wouldn’t be too
popular with the lessees but—keep an eye on things and just step back.
So it’s a lifestyle that we’re deliberately aiming for—yes. And being
relatively mortgage free these days we can take that luxury I suppose
and if there’s [sic] downturns in the industry, we’re not too exposed.
(Man, organic)
As the orchardist above has described, the kiwifruit industry is well structured
to support a lifestyle that involves as much work as a person is prepared to do,
with it being possible to do the rest on contract, by leasing the orchard or
handing its management over to someone else. This distinguishes these people
from ‘lifestylers’ who wish to move to the country for its lifestyle while
commuting to the city to earn their ‘real’ incomes. Kiwifruit grow well in
locations that are very desirable places to live. They thrive in a temperate climate
with cool winters and warm summers. In New Zealand, this means that the main
growing areas are in the lush and beautiful Bay of Plenty, situated on the east
coast of the North Island, close to stunning beaches. This contrasts with the
iconic landscape of high country farming in Chapter 5 of this volume. The
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identities of those who grow kiwifruit, a symbolic New Zealand product, are
associated with their landscapes in quite different ways from those of farmers
as described by Carolyn Morris. Kiwifruit orchardists are able to create their
landscapes whereas high country farmer identity is attached to the more ‘natural’
landscape of mountains.
Macnaghten and Urry (1998:4) have observed that ‘the “social” dimensions of
nature have been significantly under-examined’, and Shucksmith and Hermann
(2002:39) advocate the importance of studying ‘farmers’ own ways of seeing the
world’. Burton (2004:212) goes further, saying it is important to investigate
farmers’ behaviour when thinking about future change by taking greater account
of social and cultural factors—especially identity and symbolic meaning. He is
critical of quantitatively based research that finds attitudes but does not explore
the real meaning behind the adoption or rejection of what are assumed to be
friendly, environmental practices.
This chapter takes up the challenge posed by these writers to examine a largely
unexamined phenomenon: the movement of older people into the horticultural
industry. There is an increasing amount being written about the intensification
of land use, biodiversity, sustainability and resilience, but no-one has thought
about the values and motivations of this particular group and how they could
impact on the countryside of the future. To do this, I draw together two strands
of thinking to explain how these people, through their relationships with their
orchards, construct identities of ‘good’ selves, living meaningful lives. They do
this by conferring agency on non-human actors (orchards) and then developing
a moral economy of exchange relationships with these non-human actors. This
is not, however, the only dimension of this chapter. It also explains how
relationships constructed in this way can determine the nature of production
landscapes and the implications for the future of older people taking up rural
lives.
A kiwifruit orchard can be seen as a rural space, ‘lovingly cultivated and
controlled nature’ (Macnaghten and Urry 1998:179). It could be considered a
‘careful and long-term construction of the tame, which includes domesticating
and commodifying nature’ (Buller 2004:132) in order to produce kiwifruit for
the global market. How do kiwifruit orchardists relate to their orchards in order
to do this and to make their lives meaningful? I observed an ‘embedded and
implicit’ (Gray 1998:342) relationship between an orchardist and their orchard
in the talk of orchardists about their practices. No particular theoretical
positioning informed my gaze in this matter—that came later, as I grappled with
making sense of what I was observing.
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A moral economy of exchange between orchardists and
their orchards
Agency and orchards
At first, I was interested in orchardists’ representations of a ‘good’ or ideal
orchard as implied in their response to interview questions. I found that many
described their orchard as pushing or encouraging them to interact with it in
certain ways. Orchardists can develop an intimate relationship with their
orchard—caring for it by mowing, pruning, controlling weeds, protecting it
from frosts and fertilising the soil. These practices embed orchardists in the place
of the orchard through the embodiment that arises from really doing something
rather than gazing on it as an observer. As a result, the idea that an orchard
could be thought of as an ‘active’ participant by orchardists evolved, just in the
way that Jones and Cloke (2002) through the medium of ANT write about trees
as actors in the landscape in their book Tree Cultures: The place of trees and trees
in their place. They describe how practices to do with trees in different situations,
such as on farms, in cemeteries and in orchards, have developed over time
through relationships between people and trees.
Social exchange
Mauss (1990:83) makes the case that exchange relationships are a universal
characteristic of any society: ‘There is no other morality, nor any other form of
economy, nor any other social practices save these.’ Accordingly, there is no
such thing as a free gift. A ‘free’ gift is one that supposedly does not entail a
response from the recipient. As far as Mauss is concerned, however, any gift
incorporates within it a moral implication of, a commitment to, a response of an
equivalent nature: ‘the unreciprocated gift makes the person who has accepted
it inferior’ (Mauss 1990:65). A gift is relational. It establishes a relationship and
a commitment between the giver and the receiver (Douglas 1990:ix). There are
no independent individuals, only social beings with connections (Douglas 1990:x).
Social exchanges do not operate just in the economic dimension. Exchange for
work or goods is usually expressed in economic returns in our society, but
exchange also operates in the legal, moral, religious, aesthetic and other domains
(Mauss 1990:79). Therefore, orchardists who see themselves in an exchange
relationship with their orchard are acknowledging their continuing commitment
to their orchard: a continuing relationship of giving and receiving on the part
of each. Every exchange can be assumed to have a moral dimension; there is an
expected reciprocity. Although the relationship of orchard and orchardist
encompasses a relationship with nature and with the land, it is not seen purely
in those terms because the relationship is also an economic one: an orchard is a
workplace (Clark and Lowe 1992).
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An orchard acts primarily as an enabler, an intermediary or a provider. In a
manner similar to other forms of paid employment, orchardists are able to obtain
what they want through their orchard: ‘If I do this and this then the orchard
will enable me to get this and this.’ Hence, by responding to their orchard in a
particular way, orchardists expect to get certain rewards.
The nature of the rewards of exchange
In Bourdieu’s (1998, 1990) notion of capital in his theory of practice, a theory
of social exchange (Bourdieu 1998:vii–viii), rewards can be viewed as capital of
a symbolic nature through other people’s recognition and acknowledgment of
particular symbols that give people status in their eyes. Through their habitus,
or ‘disposition to act’, people have learned from their life experiences the ‘right
thing to do’ (Bourdieu 1998:8), thus habitus becomes embodied through the
practices of everyday lives (Adams 2006:514–16; Lau 2004:374–6; Thompson
1992:12–17). Actions in the world are structured around fields that have
particular rules that structure the game that must be played to increase or
exchange capital. Capital comes in three basic forms—economic, social and
cultural—and it is the cultural I wish to concentrate on. Cultural capital can be
seen as having three components: the capital acquired through education,
possession of ‘things’ that give status and the acquisition of qualities associated
with habitus (Burton et al. 2008). The last two are of relevance here. The way
in which an orchard is physically presented can provide status, but ‘for a
symbolic exchange to function, the two parties must have identical categories
of perception and appreciation’ (Bourdieu 1998:100). In other words, in order
to comprehend what these physical aspects mean, orchardists must share a
common understanding of the symbolic significance they have within the fields
of the kiwifruit industry and the local and wider communities in which they
live. I posit that alongside status, meaning could also be acquired as an
orchardist’s identity is reinforced and maintained.
A moral economy
Out of these insights emerged the realisation that what I was noticing was a
‘moral economy’ (Tanaka 2005; Robbins and Sharp 2003; Park et al. 2002). If an
orchardist behaved in a particular way towards their orchard, they believed the
orchard would not only reciprocate but was obliged to reciprocate because of
the mutuality of exchange relationships. It would do this by producing a product
that would enable the orchardist to have a livelihood and a lifestyle according
to their hopes and expectations (apart from the constraints of the market).
Any action is usually associated with a moral judgment. Someone or some group
is doing something that is considered good or bad from the perspective of some
other person or group. As Matless (2001:522) has said, ‘the conduct of particular
groups or individuals in particular spaces may be judged appropriate or
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inappropriate, and the ways in which assumptions about the relationship between
people and their environments may both reflect and produce moral judgments’.
Many actions aim to make something ‘better’ than it was before, such as in
assisting a plant to bear ‘better’ fruit or making the land ‘better’ by making it
productive, as these orchardists in this study said:
[I]f I could leave them [farms/orchards/land] in a better condition than
I found it then I was improving the land. And that didn’t necessarily
mean spraying the hell out of it. (Man, green)
We have to make things better. (Man, organic)
Obviously being organic we do more…than a lot of people towards the
environment, and we’re aware of it more. (Woman, organic)
I think it has made us more aware of the environment and looking after
it, really. We’re really only caretakers of it, you know, while we’ve got
it, and the idea is that you leave it better than you found it. (Man,
organic)
Some explanations for real farming practices are described in terms of the ‘good
farmer’ or ‘good farming’ (Setten 2004; Burton 2004; Silvasti 2003). The particular
model of concern to many is that of the ‘productivist’ approach to farming in
which farm practices are oriented to producing more of a farm product such as
meat or a crop rather than practices that care for the environment or produce
so-called ‘environmental goods’.
The kiwifruit industry in New Zealand
In New Zealand, the kiwifruit industry is dominated by ZESPRI, the single-desk
marketer and exporter of New Zealand’s kiwifruit. Rather than rewarding high
productivity, the Taste Zespri program rewards high dry-matter fruit. It is very
consumer focused. All export fruit from the more than 2000 kiwifruit growers
has to meet the requirements of the GlobalGAP (formerly EurepGAP) audit
system (in which GAP stands for good agricultural practices) and growers of
organic fruit are certified by BioGro. To quote from the GlobalGAP web site
(<www.globalgap.org>): ‘The GlobalGAP standard is primarily designed to
reassure consumers about how food is produced on the farm by minimising
detrimental environmental impacts of farming operations, reducing the use of
chemical inputs and ensuring a responsible approach to worker health and
safety.’
GlobalGAP and BioGro carry out a process of certification of a product from
farm inputs and all on-farm practices until it leaves the farm. Once certified, a
farm is audited annually.
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To indicate the degree of the issue this chapter is describing, I provide here some
of the relevant demographic details of kiwifruit orchardists in New Zealand. The
average age of green orchardists was fifty-nine years, fifty-six for gold and
fifty-eight for organic in 2006 (Fairweather et al. 2007:18); about 80 per cent
lived on their orchard (Fairweather et al. 2007:18; Colmar Brunton 2007); 65 per
cent were in households with no children; 72 per cent of orchards were owned
and operated by the orchardist and his/her partner; and 83 per cent of orchardists
were male (Colmar Brunton 2007). In 2006, 23 per cent said that they would be
retired or have the orchard leased or managed within the next five years
(Fairweather et al. 2007:21). All of these figures demonstrate the predominance
of older orchardists in the kiwifruit industry.
Method: the ARGOS program and this research
This research has been carried out under the auspices of the Agricultural Research
Group on Sustainability (ARGOS). It has a mandate from the Foundation for
Research Science and Technology (FRST)2  to examine the environmental, social
and economic sustainability of New Zealand farming systems through studies
comparing organic systems with conventional (and sometimes integrated) systems
in the kiwifruit, sheep/beef and dairying sectors (see <www.argos.org.nz>).
For the research program, I conducted interviews with 35 kiwifruit participants
from May to November 2004. For the purposes of this chapter, however, only
those orchardists who have come into orcharding after other careers and who
live on their orchard have become subjects of interest. This whittles the number
used as a resource for this work to six ZESPRI green, six certified organic green
and three ZESPRI gold orchardists. Four of the green and two of the gold
orchardists had been dairy farmers, while five of the organic orchardists had
formerly lived and worked in towns or cities. The interviews consisted of
semi-structured questions in which orchardists were asked about their visions
for themselves and their orchard; what they thought would be possible indicators
for the measurement of economic, environmental and social wellbeing; and what
was going well and what was difficult for them in their management of the
orchard (see Hunt et al. 2005). I also observed the orchards and have photographs
of them.
The interviews were transcribed and the transcripts analysed using qualitative
research methods (for example, Tolich and Davidson 1999) to understand what
meaning orchardists gave to their lives in order for me as interviewer and
researcher to ‘abandon all previous judgements about what is objective, factual,
natural or scientific, against what is subjective, historical, cultural or religious
in order…to conceptualize the view…held by each farmer, not only as spoken
in words, but also as interpreted in daily practice’ (Kaltoft 1999:41).
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According to Morris (2004:281): ‘A key contribution of ethnography to the study
of processes often glossed as globalisation, is the attention such work pays to
the micro-practices of the constitution and reproduction of identities in everyday
life, for it is here that people work to achieve subjective stability.’
I will now outline the things that I found were important to the orchardists
studied. This leads into a description of the sort of orchards that resulted from
the expectations of the exchange between orchardists and their orchards.
The importance of ‘doing’
It was ‘unthinkable’ (Bourdieu 1990:52–65) for these orchardists not to be ‘doing’
something for the rest of their lives. One green orchardist who used to be a dairy
farmer said it was a ‘lifestyle choice’. He and his wife used to work ‘seven days
a week for 23 odd years…we’re both still working full-time. I can’t see us
ever…stop doing completely. You gotta retire to something you can’t retire
from—that’s my belief anyway’ (Man, green).
An exchange between an orchardist and myself on this subject went like this:
Interviewer: And when you say you like doing things, what do you
mean by doing?
Orchardist: Well just mowing and repairing and…Well, just maintenance
really. Instead of sitting around doing nothing, you’ve gotta do
something. (Man, green)
A former teacher spoke of his desire for his future: ‘It’s lifestyle, it’s wanting
something that will carry us from teaching through to a productive
retirement…and we don’t imagine that we will retire and do nothing’ (Man,
gold).
Another spoke of his orchard in this way: ‘It’s an asset that can earn…a
reasonable sort of income for us when we retire, and even perhaps…semi-retire,
as I can’t see myself staying here till sixty-five and stop working. I’ll be needing
to be doing something, and both physically and mentally’ (Man, green).
An element of ‘doing’ is that it is an indication that these orchardists will still
be working hard. They made comments about how their city friends had the
idea that kiwifruit orcharding would provide a nice lifestyle in which the
orchardist did very little and sat around sipping wine, but ‘a relatively small
block of land can mean an awful lot of work’ (Man, gold). Another spoke of his
first impressions and how wrong they were:
I’m an ex-engineer—[from] Auckland. I came down in ’91 to visit my
partner’s father who’s got [an] orchard down at Pangaroa. [I] [l]iked the
place. And saw these old boys sitting on their backsides and all the fruit
was growing and I thought, that’s a good life. And they sucked me in
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nicely, didn’t they? I haven’t worked so many hours, for such a long
time, in my life. (Man, organic)
The rewards of doing
These are orchardists who are serious about what they ‘do’. It is not a ‘game’ or
a hobby. They still feel that they have a need for income: ‘You’ve got to have
an interest…keeps you occupied…but at the end of the day it’s what you get,
the bottom line, the net figure’ (Man, green). Or, as another person said, ‘You’ve
got to be realistic, you’ve got to make a dollar’ (Woman, organic).
Other rewards come in the form of the symbolic capital gained from the
appreciation of visitors to the orchard—and some of them are unexpected, as
this orchardist described:
And I guess it’s the response of people that visit. They come here and I
don’t want to be bragging in any way but people that come and visit
the orchard, in their own way they are expressing the ambience of the
place and if we get them sitting outside here, and it’s just a nice
atmosphere—even the tradespeople that we’ve had currently working
on the house, the plumber and the pretty rough stone man that was in
here, remarked how lovely it was and how nice and it was unusual to
get that sort of response from people that I didn’t think were sensitive
to environmental type things. (Man, organic)
For some, the observation and protection of wildlife brings pleasure:
[I]n our four canopy hectares we’d have well in excess of a hundred
birds’ nests in the spring time out there. So we respect them, and we
give way to them. If there’s pruning to be done near the nest, well it
doesn’t get done…and in return we get the pleasure of seeing the chicks
on the nest. (Man, organic)
For a couple (green), taking up a kiwifruit orchard was returning to a more
carefree lifestyle. They called themselves ‘recycled teenagers’. Another orchardist
reflected on his working life: ‘I’ve fished, I’ve trucked, I’ve owned a bar, and
they’re just nothing compared to this’ (Man, green). The ex-teacher emphasises,
not surprisingly perhaps, the fun of learning new things:
So, it’s quite multi-skilled multi-tasked and, very interesting. Hell of a
lot of fun…There’s always the…financial side of things—you
know—budgeting, record keeping, coming to terms with things like
EurepGAP and…the Future Fed. certification we needed for selling in
the local market, attending workshops and keeping up to date technically
speaking, gaining qualifications for things like the Grow Safe qualification
for doing your own spraying. And yeah, it’s been a thoroughly enjoyable
learning exercise—still is. (Man, gold)
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Another orchardist found growing organically a rewarding challenge:
I think there’s a little bit of scepticism round the place [about being
organic]—they were wondering how long it would be before we’d sort
of bail out. That’s probably still there a little bit but it’s probably one
of the things that makes me dig my toes in…Quite a few of us are proving
that it can be done and it can be done economically…we’ve still got a
long way to go but there’s [sic] things that we’re learning all the
time—new products, new ways of doing things…Those of us that are
in it now, I suppose you could say, are the pioneers of organics in
kiwifruit growing, just because it is relatively new…it’s always a
challenge and just learning more and more about it. (Man, organic)
The orchard also provides a form of continuity, providing possibilities and
meaning for the future and links to the past:
[O]ur vision really—because it’s my wife’s as well—is for it to be…able
to provide a good lifestyle for us through into our retirement years. So
it should provide money. It should also provide a healthy lifestyle. And
we want to do that in the most ecologically friendly fashion we can,
keeping in mind the demands of the markets for our fruit, and our own
philosophies. (Man, gold)
I’m proud of this little place because it may not seem anything very
spectacular to an outsider, but I know what it was eight years ago. So,
it gives me, I suppose, a sense of satisfaction, to live here and be able to
enjoy what I have done so far and plan what I’m going to do next.
(Woman, green)
[T]he last two years we’ve been going up in crop…when you see that’s
happening you feel like you’re doing, enjoying it—you know? And I
enjoy doing something, so, yeah, the trays have gone from 14 800 the
first year; the second year we got 28 700; and this year—we haven’t
done a tally—but we should be around 34 this year. But we should be
able to do 40. (Man, green)
Linking the doing and the rewards
There is an indication the reward from the orchard is in exchange for the ‘doing’
and that this is not just a monetary exchange. It is also an expectation of a moral
exchange, a social contract between the orchard and the orchardist, as the two
following quotes demonstrate:
[I]t’s what you put into the orchard you get out type thing…I mean, you
can go to orchards and you can tell that people don’t do much on them
because they’re blinkin’ terrible. And they’ve got terrible fruit. The
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pruners don’t like them, the pickers don’t like them, nobody likes
working for them. (Man, green)
[W]e’ve worked really hard all our…working life so far…we have denied
ourselves a lot to bring up a family and we’d like to think that OK, there
will come a time when the income stream from the orchard will support
a nice house, a good car, comfortable living conditions, a healthy work
environment, and the opportunity to go overseas or have really good
holidays. (Man, gold)
The signifiers of the rewards of doing and caring
There were two basic ways in which these orchardists saw their relationship
with their orchard and these were signified by quite contrasting constructed
landscapes. In the first landscape, the degree of care was demonstrated by how
tidy the orchard looked, whereas for the second, care was demonstrated by the
number of living things that were able to take refuge there. These orchards,
however, were landscapes made through the particular way in which the
orchardist thought of the agency of their orchard.
The wild orchard: signified by tidiness and control
The visual feedback provided by the ‘look’ of an orchard gave feedback to an
orchardist that their management practices were correct. Tidiness was equated
with orchard health, as the following two quotes indicate: ‘I’d like to see the
canopy…a pruned canopy…with nicely spaced canes…that certainly looks
tidy…a good orchard looks healthy’ (Man, green). And, ‘I’ve got a vision that
when it’s all up and running, that all the shelter’s nice and trimmed and it’s
even…being tidy is important to me…as well as…performing. And that’s part
of the health of the place, I believe’ (Man, green).
Creating a tidy orchard brings with it the implication of the need for control:
‘[It] became a giant mess with different weeds and stuff getting in there, but it’s
reasonably tidy looking [now]…we keep it under control with the sheep’ (Man,
organic).
Unless the orchard is controlled, it will become wild and out of control. It will
become recalcitrant and not do what an orchard ‘should’ do, which is produce
lots of fruit. As one green orchardist said, ‘There’s [sic] a lot of young five year
olds in there, which still need a bit of training.’ Hence, I have called this a wild
orchard because that is how the orchardist portrays its agency.
In this kind of orchard, the orchardists place an emphasis on production, making
the land useful. This means that all available land is planted with kiwifruit vines,
as this orchardist illustrates when he describes how they decided where to
position their house: ‘we needed a house…so we sort of plonked this one here.
We’ve been here ever since [laughs]. But no, that’s why we’re…in the
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orchard—there’s nowhere else you could put a house—unless we start cutting
vines out and I didn’t really wanna do that’ (Man, green).
When I interviewed this man in his house and looked out the window, I found
myself looking straight into the kiwifruit vines! For this next orchardist, by
drawing on the knowledge he obtained from his experiences as a dairy farmer,
he was able to totally reconstruct his orchard landscape by starting with a large
amount of earth moving. As he explained to me while drawing a map of his
orchard:
[I] did a lot of planning and drawing and whatnot from the dairy farm
development work. This has all been contoured in here. That drain has
actually been shifted…We brought it as close to the existing kiwifruit
as we can. Eventually I’d like to tidy this area up and plant that out. No
point in having that like it is. And some of the ground here we’ll extend
the canopy a wee bit on this row just to make use of the available space
and tidy it up. (Man, green)
For another orchardist, his orchard was ‘basically a wasteland’ (Man, green)
until he came along and made it useful.
The desire that orchardists have to keep their land ‘neat and tidy’ is not restricted
to New Zealand, though it has been documented for farmers rather than those
working in the horticultural sector. Others have drawn attention to this in
England (Burton 2004; Burgess et al. 2000; McEachern 1992), the central plains
of the United States (Nassauer 1997), Austria (Schmitzberger et al. 2005) and
Finland (Silvasti 2003). As Burgess et al. (2000:121) express it, rough land is ‘an
anathema to farmers’ sense of their professional identity and expertise’.
Beyond their practical application, these views contain a moral dimension: it is
‘good’ for an orchard to be helped to produce the best fruit it can, hence plants
need to be guided, controlled or manipulated to produce, to be made
better—more useful, more domestic—by controlling the fertility and growth of
the vines and keeping the weeds and pests away so that all the available resources
from the soil and plant will go into fruit production. It is good that every bit of
available land is used to produce as much as possible.
The wild orchard that has become tidy fits all the descriptions of a ‘good farmer’.
The habitus of these orchardists is acted out on the orchard where a tidy, clean
orchard signifies a good orchardist, the hard work that is needed to keep such
a wild thing under control and in production and a person who cares about their
orchard. Its tidiness, due to the weekly mowing and elimination of weeds, and
its productivity are symbols that the orchardist is doing the ‘right thing’;
‘untamed and untended land represents decline and disarray’ (Silvasti 2003:146).
Tidiness is also a reflection of attitudes towards the land imbued from the days
of New Zealand’s colonisation, when land was broken in and control exercised
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over the ‘wildness’ (Egoz et al. 2001; Brooking 1996). It falls down, however,
on one crucial point, which demonstrates how the moral economy approach
enriches the understanding of orchards and orchardists. While paying attention
to productivity, it is not necessarily the raison d’être for these orchardists. The
reward they expect for attending to their orchard is a transition to a comfortable
retirement lifestyle living alongside their orchard. As this process to a graduated
retirement is worked through, often all an owner will do on their orchard is the
mowing and weed control, hence these might be the only ways in which an
orchardist can stamp their identity on the orchard. Regular mowing and weeding
parallel the care that is taken of a garden. It is an example of an orchardist giving
in to the ‘urge to garden’ (Brook 2003), creating a place where the orchardist
feels ‘at home’. A tidy orchard looks like a well-manicured garden: ‘the economic
as well as the aesthetic status of rural areas is generally predicated upon the
exclusion of the wild’ (Thomas 1983). This orchard is a demonstration of solidity
and reliability and careful stewardship for one’s future and of one’s investment.
‘This is a safe countryside where humanity nurtures and is, in return, nurtured
by an accessible, appropriated and unthreateningly recognisable nature’ (Buller
2004:132).
The needy orchard: creating a haven
The other kind of orchard is constructed by orchardists from their understanding
of their orchards as needy—needing to be cared for, loved and nurtured—as
the following quotes illustrate:
You can soon walk into an orchard and see if it looks stressed or anything
like that…the colour of the leaves, the size of the leaves…same with any
farm. You can work on a farm and soon tell whether it’s lacking
something or hungry. You might not know what [it is]. [If] you
consistently produce…big crops and don’t put the inputs in then
eventually you’re gonna have a reserve system…that you’re gonna
deplete. (Man, green)
Under the organic regime, we try and nurse the soil. (Man, organic)
Man: We do know that the high producing orchards are the ones that
are run by the owners.
Woman: [A]nd they’re out there every day, pruning and titivating.
Man: Doing it for love. (Organic)
In fact, these orchards did not look needy. The orchardists owning needy
orchards responded to their orchards by creating a haven for as many
living things as they could as long as these things did not threaten the
orchard.
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I might mow here three times a year. I give the neighbour this side [a
hard time]. He’s just got a new mower and it’s like a bowling green…got
an hour to spare and he’s out killing the place. But to me, the longer
grass—there’s [sic] creatures in it as well—bugs and birds and bits and
pieces running round out there. (Man, organic)
[W]e could see there are advantages to the neighbours in that…we don’t
have to worry about using aggressive chemicals near to where people
live, and worry about what the wind is doing—that kind of thing…It’s
an organic orchard alongside them…I actually feel happier walking
around this place than I do some other orchards…[In the] HiCane3  season
the neighbours bring over their dog for walks…the neighbour on the
other side quite often brings her horse for a walk and a bit of a chomp
on the grass too…the neighbours have got 65 chooks [chickens]…which
spend most of their time on our orchard. (Woman, organic)
This woman provided a refuge for her neighbour’s hens, which had a practical
side:
We have taken some from [the] neighbour as well, ’cause once they go
off the lay a bit he just chops their head off. But we’ll put them into the
pension box over there…and we use the poo and I go down the orchard
with a barrow load and just scatter it round the orchard—it’s a little bit
of nutrient for the plants as well. (Woman, organic)
The orchard was regarded as a haven that was an escape from suburbia. For
example, one orchardist (Man, organic) criticised his neighbour for building a
metal driveway the full length of his orchard. He said, ‘That’s bad—it’s
suburban…commercial industrialisation.’ For some, this attitude extended to
creating a less industrial space by making the orchard look like a garden:
Woman: The orchard’s an extension of our garden…[at] the end of the
rows and corners we’ve got various other shrubs and bits and
pieces…just to make it look a bit sort of less clinical…it just breaks up
the monocultures in there.
Man: And [it] keeps the bees in the [orchard all the time] and the bumble
bees are lovely too—such gentle giants in the bee world and yeah—I
haven’t been stung by one yet.
Woman: Bumble bees work in the rain. (Organic)
The way in which all the things in the orchard worked together was
expressed often, as in the quotes above and in the following. There is
an essence that such orchardists are working with nature rather than
seeking to control it.
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[In] October and November, the bees come in and do their bit. So in my
case, four hectares, I have a million workers come on site and pollinate
the crop. That’s critical to getting both [the] size of kiwifruit and the
yield as well. So the weather at that time is really important, the bees
only fly in the good weather. And then we move into three months of
summer pruning intensive work again, which I find quite enjoyable.
And because of the nature of the canopy that we’ve organised for our
convenience the vines start leafing up as the summer weather comes on,
and working under the vines in the summertime, I say it’s a large
airconditioner, because the plants are transpiring moisture. Ah, they’re
taking the latent heat away from the canopy and underneath the canopy
is actually cooler—not just because it’s in the shade—but it’s actually
the latent heat is being extracted by the vines so we work in a
wonderfully comfortable environment. The height’s right—we don’t
have to reach unduly or bend over—it’s designed at six feet and it’s a
good working environment there for us, so when the hot sun is out we’ve
got the umbrella up. (Man, organic)
Overall, however, the orchard is performing a much higher purpose: by creating
such a haven, the orchardist has contributed to making the world a better place:
‘Oh it’s just, I guess, being very satisfied [that] what we’re doing is good for the
world…and that we are not destroying the environment—we’re actually
contributing to it’ (Man, organic).
The needy orchardist runs the risk of being called lazy by wild orchardists
because for them tidiness implies hard work (Nassauer 1997; Burgess et al. 2000;
Oresczyn and Land 2000; Egoz et al. 2001). Some ‘needy’ orchardists
demonstrated an awareness of this risk by comparing themselves with wild
orchardists. As Burton (2004:209) points out, however, ‘an untidy farm is not
necessarily an unprofitable farm…Therefore, “untidy” farmers may not be lazy
farmers from an economic perspective’. Needy orchards are also viable businesses.
Thus, all orchardists described here have constructed orchards that represent
their response to the agency they have attributed to their orchard and the care
that they are taking of it. This care, however, is indicated in two different ways,
resulting in tidy orchards and orchards that are teeming with life.
Discussion and implications
I now wish to examine what I have written thus far in two different ways: one
rather more esoteric, the other pragmatic. First, I will consider the framework
I have used: that of a constructed moral economy of exchange between two
agents. How does this contribute to our understanding of how this group of
people is constructing new and meaningful lives as kiwifruit orchardists making
their way to retirement? Are they really forming new identities? Second, I will
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ponder the implications for the future of this movement of older people into
rural life.
Creating identity: living meaningful lives
It is clear from the illustrations I have used that this group of people has come
from an upbringing and life experience in which it is deeply ingrained that you
do not get something for nothing and so it is important to be ‘doing’. By
implication, retirement, as in ‘doing nothing of consequence’, is not an option.
This identity related to the work ethic becomes one of the values of the field of
the communities in which these people live or have their friends, and has to be
demonstrated by their orchard for themselves and other people to see. The
orchard has to be a symbol of hard work and disciplined caring for the wild/tidy
orchardists and of extravagant ‘caring’ and nurturance for the needy orchardist.
There are, however, three moral issues also implied here. First, to be a good
person one has to be working/doing, living a ‘useful’ life. Second, each orchardist
in their own way is striving to make the orchard ‘better’. For the wild orchardist,
the orchard is better because it is under control, domesticated and no longer
‘wild’; it is doing what an orchard should be doing: producing good fruit. For
the needy orchardist, the orchard is no longer needy because the orchardist has
fed it and made it into a haven where everything is welcome, creating an
environment that not only produces wholesome fruit but is an example of care
for the environment. Finally, there is reciprocity involved. If one ‘does’, there
is the expectation of a return. As a reward for making it better, the orchard has
to demonstrate its response to the actions of the orchardist. By attributing agency
to their orchards, orchardists are able to accept as rightfully theirs the rewards
the orchards produce because the rewards are in exchange for what they have
done, thus reinforcing their identities as good people living meaningful lives.
This could be very important to people on the way to retirement as they
supposedly exchange an old identity maintained by work in another place and
context to a new one. Otherwise, who would they be?
Are these people just creating a landscape like home (Brook 2003) and/or an
identity that really is the same as it was in the past but just in a new setting?
Bourdieu’s theory of practice (1998) is usually seen as a theory of continuity (for
example, Shucksmith and Hermann 2002; Setten 2004), but it can also help in
the understanding of change (Raedeke et al. 2003:79) and identity (Adams 2006).
Critics of Bourdieu consider his notion of habitus deterministic and restrictive
(for example, Silber 2003), claiming that it limits an individual’s capacity to act
(Widick 2003:688; Jenkins 1992:77, 272). On the other hand, proponents of
Bourdieu’s approach argue that while habitus reduces possibilities for action
through its deeply instilled ways of ‘practising’, many possibilities remain
(Adams 2006:515). All of the orchardists in this study come from somewhere
other than where they are now living. Therefore one has to ask how their past
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working experiences are affecting their expectations of and practices in their
orchards. It is apparent that those in the ARGOS program taking up kiwifruit
growing after experience in the primary sector in dairying are more likely to
have a wild/tidy orchard than those from ‘the city’, who are more likely to have
a needy orchard and are also more likely to take up organics. Ex-dairy farmers
and some of the city folk might be happy to create an ‘industrial’ ordered
environment—reflected by one of the quotes in which one person is rebelling
against this concept. The kiwifruit is an exotic species—it has moved out of
orchards to become classified by the Department of Conservation as a noxious
weed—so it has an alien nature that people might wish to domesticate or keep
suppressed and one way of doing so is to impose tidiness in a ruthless fashion.
In contrast, those with urban backgrounds might be creating a less-ordered
garden—for example, the same woman who is planting garden plants and shrubs
in the kiwifruit orchard will encourage biodiversity but it will not look like a
monoculture orchard, growing only kiwifruit.
There also appears to be a gender influence. I interviewed whoever chose to be
interviewed, so in some instances there were couples and in others a single
person, usually a male. Wherever there was a woman involved in the orchard
work, she usually participated in the interview. Hence it seems more likely to
be a couple involved in the needy orchard, whereas on the tidy orchard the
woman is more likely to lead her own life and not participate in on-orchard
work. Also, the emphasis placed on mowing the orchard is reflected in the
literature. Some writers think there is an association between men and lawns,
particularly between men and lawnmowers. In a book called The Grass is Greener:
Our love affair with the lawn, Fort (2000) asserts that keeping a lawn ‘right’ is
all about ‘one-upmanship: how national pride, social status, even sexual identity
can be bound up in the greenness and smoothness of the grass’. He shares the
view that ‘men love lawns because, like dogs, they repay love and attention’
(Woolfrey 2000). One person he consulted thought the impulse to mow lawns
‘sprang from a deeply imprinted desire to control and domesticate nature’ (cited
in Woolfrey 2000). The orchardists who are planning their retirement paths see
mowing the grass in the orchard as the last thing they will give up. As stated
earlier, this would then be the only way in which an orchardist could stamp
their identity on the orchard.
What role does meeting the audit requirements of the GlobalGAP system play
in the life of these orchardists? Tidy orchardists were more likely to complain
about the book work associated with this. ‘Doing’ book work was not associated
with on-orchard work, whereas the needy orchardists were more likely to accept
the requirements—often already associated with BioGro if they were using
organic practices—but they would complain about where this paperwork
doubled up. (This has since been dealt with by making this information-providing
process more streamlined with less redundancy.) Perhaps book work is more
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acceptable to people who formerly worked in offices. Meeting audit requirements
is something that everyone in the kiwifruit industry has to do so it cannot be a
distinguishing feature that differentiates one orchardist from another. Hence it
is less likely to have much currency except in the way that it separates out New
Zealand kiwifruit in the international marketplace, which can be a source of
pride for all kiwifruit growers.
So, are these people changing their identities? I suggest that these people are
using kiwifruit orcharding as a medium to maintain the continuity of their
identity from past lives. For example, the teacher who values learning is still
able to learn, and for all, the need to do something useful is still fulfilled. The
orchard (and its economic return) provides further evidence and support for
this identity. The orchard also provides a form of differentiation from other
orchardists. In spite of the many constraints experienced by orchardists and the
fact that they all grow a similar product, there are many ways in which their
orchards can differ. In other words, the constraints of ZESPRI, meeting audit
scheme requirements and meeting the expectations of neighbours and
communities have not limited the choices of kiwifruit orchardists in the way
they relate to their orchards and the influence of this on the orchard landscape.
Issues for rural futures
What are the implications of this movement of older people into the countryside,
a place usually assumed to be the best for bringing up children? The demographic
implications of countryside with an increasing proportion of older couples are
intriguing. It raises questions about the impact of a very mobile, reasonably
wealthy group of people on the local rural communities. I raise this as an issue
for thought. I do not have any answers here except that it will obviously not
do anything to increase the decline in the numbers of rural schools. Also, this
is a group without long experience in orchards, therefore they will have greater
needs for knowledge pertinent to this work. This leads nicely into the next issue.
Burton and Wilson (2006) have scrutinised the farming styles literature to develop
themes which they say cover all the identified ‘types’. They came up with four:
(1) ‘Traditional’—a conservative productivist farmer who maintains
cultural notions of stewardship; (2) ‘Agribusiness person’—a farmer who
concentrates on agricultural production to the extent that the profit
motive dominates and stewardship concerns are lessened; (3)
‘Conservationist’—a farmer who focuses on environmental and lifestyle
concerns; and (4) ‘Entrepreneur’—a farmer who is shifting the focus
away from standard agriculture towards non-agricultural sources of
income. (Burton and Wilson 2006:101)
It can be seen that the orchardists of a wild orchard are a mix of Burton and
Wilson’s first and second theme and the orchardists of needy orchards fit their
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conservationist theme. In other work, I have identified a challenging orchard
whose orchardist is entrepreneurial and likes to take risks and try new things
while staying within the orchard (see Hunt and Rosin 2007). This sort of
orchardist, however, is not present in this study of ‘older’, ‘new’ orchardists
and this could be a source of concern. Every industry needs its
entrepreneurs—the people who try things out and introduce successful practices
to the mainstream. They play an important part in the resilience of the system
by introducing change and being prepared to try things even if they fail. In the
future, the industry will need to make sure it continues to be attractive to such
people. In the meantime, the needy orchardists add resilience to the kiwifruit
industry by providing ways of growing kiwifruit without chemicals and with
a greater care for environmental biodiversity, and the wild/tidy orchardists are
guarantors of a steady and reliable supply of quality kiwifruit. As these people
are new to the industry, however, and are ready to become more knowledgeable
about it, when they learn they will be learning the latest practices. As the
kiwifruit industry is renowned for how quickly it is able to change, this aspect
will only enhance this ability, as long as it is not in conflict with the attributes
of orchards and of themselves that this group values.
Maintaining a productive orchard requires periods of intensive seasonal labour.
Winter pruning, which can be carried out over a longer period than summer
pruning, is often able to be done by the owners. Summer pruning needs to be
done quite quickly and more frequently and fruit picking requires only a day
or two at the instant when the fruit is deemed to be ready. Contractors can do
the spraying. Finding labour, especially skilled labour, is already a big issue in
the horticultural industry and, as working orchardists such as those described
here give up more and more manual work, this will be exacerbated, particularly
as the New Zealand population ages. It also, however, provides a group of people
who are likely to continue working after the age of 65 so there are pluses and
minuses here.
Conclusion
Information such as that presented in this chapter could contribute to more
resilient and sustainable orchard practices by developing a greater understanding
that orchardists do not set out solely to gain materially, nor are all orchardists
aiming for the same kind of orchard. Thus, this has demonstrated that the way
in which an orchardist relates to their orchard is contested. As Setten (2004:391)
states:
Notions of what is natural and unnatural are notions of morality, and
notions of morality surface frequently because different people and
groups know and conceive of landscape and nature in differing
ways…The cultural meanings of nature shaped by individuals and groups
are hence contested, because inherent in shaping the meanings of nature
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are powerful moral judgements as to who is ‘right’ or ‘wrong’, ‘good’ or
‘bad’, ‘natural’ or ‘unnatural’.
This is a particularly interesting conclusion because for many forms of farming
(for example, dairying; Jay 2005) only a single kind of productivist farm is
rewarded with symbolic as well as economic capital. Jay indicates that such a
farming structure reduces the chance of farmers taking up environmentally
sustainable practices. If the land-use practices are to be sustainable and resilient
there is a need for diverse models of potential practices so that choices are
available to people. This poses less risk to the environment than a singular
normative practice model. It also reveals for New Zealand, as in other places,
the ways in which nature (as seen here in kiwifruit orchards) and ‘social practices
and values are inextricably interlinked and…[are] co-constitutive’ (Buller
2004:139).
This chapter has explored how the people who have taken up kiwifruit growing
as a progression to retirement adapt their orchard landscape so that things
important to their identity in their former working lives are maintained. Such
people contribute to the stability of the kiwifruit industry but will need to be
balanced by the risk takers and supported by the encouragement of seasonal
workers.
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Endnotes
1 These are quotes taken from interviews with orchardists as described later in the ‘method’ section.
Eighty-six per cent of kiwifruit orchardists grow the green-fleshed Hayward variety of kiwifruit, 21
per cent grow the gold-fleshed variety and 5 per cent grow fruit organically (Colmar Brunton 2007).
(These figures do not add to 100 per cent because some orchardists grow gold and green kiwifruit.)
Hereafter, the orchardists will be referred to as green, organic and gold.
2 The government organisation assigned the task of allocating funding to research that meets government
goals.
3  A bud break spray.
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7
Intergenerational transitions in rural




Towards the end of the past decade, signs were emerging as to future challenges
associated with impending intersections between the ageing of global rural
populations and their impacts on agricultural production and food safety. In a
landmark paper for the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), Iaquinta et
al. (1999) made a strong plea for additional research in the field and developed
a schematic highlighting the linkages between ageing, land tenure,
intergenerational change and agricultural production for developing countries.
The link to sustainability within this schematic was implied rather than
highlighted and the importance of the issue for the developed world was glossed
over. This chapter argues that this is a vital challenge for Australia now at the
end of the first decade of the twenty-first century, as the country ages and the
transition of knowledge from the ‘baby boom’ generation impacts at all levels
of Australian society. It draws on continuing research being undertaken in
Western Australia as part of an international research group focusing on
sustainability and conservation. It takes up the schematic as designed by Iaquinta
et al. and highlights the key issues for land tenure, the impact on rural values,
natural resource management and future sustainability with specific focus on
the south coast region of the state.
Introduction
Rapid transition from rural to peri-urban settlement in coastal southern Western
Australia, combined with the potential changes in climate, demographic growth
and intergenerational transitions, are creating potential future policy challenges.
This has emerged as an issue for research within the context of the natural
resource management (NRM) sector in the region and the concept of ‘transitions’
of knowledge and capital as Australia ages.
In a discussion about ‘rural futures’ for the developed world, a landmark paper
written in 1999, which focuses on the issue for the developing world, offers
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some frameworks for discussion. This chapter draws on this framework to
highlight key issues. It begins with a statement of the issue and some reflections
from the literature; it then gives a snapshot of the region in question and of the
evidence gathered to date, summarising some aspects of the framework and
concluding with some questions for future research.
Statement of the issue
There has been recognition for more than a decade of the ageing of the farm
workforce in Australia. As most reports point out, this is not simply because of
an increased number of older farmers, but, importantly to our discussion, it is
a result of decreased numbers of younger people entering or remaining in
agriculture. The transition of farms and land management has a long history—for
example, Foskey (n.d.:3) found evidence of intergenerational arrangements
among landholders dating back to the Middle Ages. Barr et al. (2005), in their
report to Land and Water Australia, point to the ‘pattern of agricultural
adjustment for many generations’. This chapter suggests that the issue has a
more powerful difference as the whole Australian population ages.
There is also the important link with NRM policy in Australia.1 While risk
assessments might highlight the NRM environment risks, they ignore risks
associated with demography. For example, the major NRM regional strategy on
the south coast of Western Australia (see below) identifies population decline
and ageing as a threat on one page (p. 48) and it is never mentioned again.
This chapter is based not on empirical research (which has yet to be undertaken
in detail in the region) but on personal involvement in NRM governance and
on a close reading of policy documents for the region’s future strategic planning.
In other words, what I am highlighting here are preliminary signposts for the
future, and I am calling for more detailed research. As a nation, we can no longer
ignore the demographic trends, nor can we just hope that things will turn out
for the best. While there has been a variety of risk assessments undertaken in
rural Australia, at the time of writing, a risk assessment as to the impact of the
ageing of the rural workforce2  on rural futures, or to the imminent
intergenerational transfers of knowledge and power that are essential to enable
a sustainable future, is not under way.
By transition here I am not so focused on the land transfer (this is where Voyce’s
1999, 1996 work on inheritance sits), but rather on the experience, knowledge,
social and cultural capital associated with the passing of one generation and the
taking up of future challenges by other generations. Nowhere is this more evident
that in the NRM ‘sector’. Governance of NRM remains essentially in the hands
of the older generation (very evident in my own region) and there is no evidence
yet from a detailed literature review that any strategic thinking has taken this
matter up as a key issue. There has, however, been much discussion about farm
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transfers, succession planning that focuses on the transition of the business,
technology, stock, equipment and housing—in other words, an instrumental
approach as follows:
Inheritance—legal transfer of ownership of the business assets
Succession—transfer for managerial control over the use of these assets
Retirement—the withdrawal of the present manager from active
managerial control. (<http://www.management.edu.ru/images/pubs/
2003/11/29/0000135240/075-067-errington.pdf>)
Such a typology captures the essence of the literature to date, specifically the
practical and productive nature of any transition. My current research is
highlighting a little-explored aspect of the intergenerational shift—the transition
of knowledge in governance—an aspect that is crucial for our deeper
understanding of rural futures, and the potential impact of the ageing of
Australia’s population on NRM and food safety into the future.
Four years ago, in its submission to the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries
and Forestry (DAFF) on ‘Agriculture Advancing Australia’ (AAA), the National
Farmers Federation (NFF) stated that as the average age of farmers was now close
to sixty years, to ensure the long-term prosperity and sustainability of Australian
agriculture, effective intergenerational transfer was essential. The report,
Australia’s Farmers: Past, present and future (Barr et al. 2005), examines trends
in the demographic structure of Australia’s farmer population throughout the
period 1976 to 2001 and concludes that there is no looming crisis with Australia’s
food production capacity, despite the expected continued decline of farmers in
broadacre farming regions. The report conceptualises intergenerational transfer
as related to farm size and this is explored from the perspective of farm
development, innovation and how technology can impact on levels of production.
The report argues that protection of the rural environment through farming
practices is anticipated to be continued as long as the activities are labour efficient
and profitable or if they are required by regulation.
Argent (1999) suggests that the established gender order within Australian
farming households is undergoing gradual and uneven change as a familial
ideology—in which the maintenance of family living standards is considered
more important than the preservation of the family’s ties with the land—assumes
importance in some young families’ adjustment responses. Voyce (1999) explores
issues of farming succession with particular reference to the Social Security and
Veterans’ Affairs Legislation Amendment (Retirement Assistance for Farmers) Act
1998.He outlines that this legislation seeks to: 1) maintain political and social
control in the rural sector; and 2) foster intergenerational continuity of family
farms. He argues that the State’s involvement is in ‘facilitated and ordered
controlled successions’ tending to be through the establishment of rural norms
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or ‘responsibilities’ between an inheriting son and father (Voyce 1999:22). Foskey
(n.d.) discusses two main but opposing trends within agriculture in
Australia—farming as a lifestyle and farming as a business—both of which are
linked to rural ideology.3 The ageing of farm populations is a worldwide trend,
with the highest rates in the United States, Canada, Europe and Japan. Foskey
concludes by highlighting the need to support ageing farmers as they make the
transition into retirement and the challenges they face in this, as well as utilising
their skills and experience to further enable younger farmers. Errington’s 2002
review of the topic in the United Kingdom, France and Canada concludes that
there is a sequencing of transition, including major decision making along the
process, although in France this seems to be more rapid than in the United
Kingdom (<http://www.management.edu.ru/images/pubs/2003/11/29/
0000135240/075-067-errington.pdf>).
A region in context
The chapter now turns to the site of analysis. The south coast region of Western
Australia4  has some of the world’s most endangered flora and fauna, is recognised
as one of 25 world biodiversity ‘hot spots’, covers a land mass of some 5.4 million
hectares in what is arguably a high-amenity area and is now experiencing rapid
change. This is one of the oldest areas of human settlement in Australia, with
Aboriginal settlement dated to 40 000 years and European settlement (around
the Albany area) to the 1820s. Unlike the Margaret River (south-west) region of
Western Australia, it is not yet as well known internationally, although this is
changing.
It is the state’s second-largest agricultural production region. Despite the
historical records showing a 30 per cent decrease in average rainfall for
south-west Western Australia, the region had relatively positive rainfall in the
2006–07 season. About 70 per cent of the region’s 5.4 million terrestrial hectares
is under some form of primary production, the majority being cropped (including
wheat, canola, and so on) or under pasture, but with more than 125 000ha under
timber plantations and about 4000ha under viticulture and various forms of
horticulture (SCRIPT 2005:76). This intensive agriculture has resulted in four
identified major environmental challenges for agricultural production:
• soil acidity
• salinity
• excess phosphorous (excess fertiliser usage)
• invasion of weeds and feral animals.
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To provide a brief snapshot of the costs associated with such threats, land
salinisation offers a salutary lesson. By the late 1990s, 9 per cent of Western
Australia’s agricultural land was affected by salinity and predictions identified
a doubling in the next 15–25 years, with a further doubling in the next decades.
The WA State of the Environment Report (Government of Western Australia
1998:56) detailed that ‘up to 80 per cent of susceptible remnants of native
vegetation of forms and 50 per cent on public lands (including nature reserves)
could be lost in the agricultural regions of W.A. within the next century’. It has
been estimated that the current loss of capital value of WA land to dryland
salinity is in the order of $1.445 billion, with a prediction to an escalation of a
further $64 million per annum in the next five decades. It is not, however, just
the land value that is decreasing; estimates of tourism potential are also impacted,
as are the livability and amenity capacities of small rural centres and the potential
production of agricultural products.
The south coast region of Western Australia is one of 58 NRM regions in Australia
and it is being managed through the South Coast NRM Incorporated. It is also
the site of a five-year research project by Curtin University, Sustaining
Gondwana, funded through a grant from the Alcoa Foundation (United States).
The site was chosen for this research because the region provided an example
of the complex interrelationships between place, environment, production and
sustainability.
In the 18 months since the start of our project, the pace of change has increased
exponentially. For example, in the major western centre of the region, Albany,
there has been a 37 per cent increase in the price of housing, with a projected
release of more than 2000 new blocks in the next five years. The pressure of
demographic change (see Stehlik 2007; Government of Western Australia n.d.)
is now recognised as a key issue for future sustainability.
This chapter examines questions of change through what is termed the Albany
hinterland, a broad arc surrounding the City of Albany and including the Shire
of Denmark. Many of my comments apply to the region as a whole. The Albany
hinterland subregion takes in the city of Albany and the towns of Denmark,
Mount Barker, Manypeaks and Wellstead. It contains all of the Denmark, Hay
and Kalgan River catchments flowing south from the Stirling Range and
discharging into Wilson Inlet and Oyster Harbour.
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Figure 7.1 South coast of Western Australia
Source: ANU Cartography.
ABS Census data highlight the trend towards the urbanisation of the south coast
region, with nearly three-quarters of the population living in the two key urban
centres of Albany and Esperance. Consequently, the population in the smaller
rural villages—such as Tambellup, Gnowangerup, Jerramungup and
Cranbrook—are decreasing (Figure 7.2).
The proportion of the population in the Albany Hinterland of the region as a
whole is 62.6 per cent and growing. In this sense, the urban centre of Albany
can be seen as acting as a ‘sponge city’—pulling services and residents into the
urban space, at the cost of the rural outlying communities. There was a reduction
of some 7–10 per cent in the populations of the smaller rural centres in the south
coast region in the 2001 census and this pattern was expected to be repeated
despite some early indications of a ‘tree change’ housing boom in some centres
such as Mount Barker.
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Figure 7.2 Population change, 1996–2006, Albany and Denmark
Source: Derived from ABS (2007).
Figure 7.3 Population aged 55–64 years, 1996–2006, by shire (Jerramungup,
Gnowangerup, Tambellup and Cranbrook—Albany hinterland)
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Figure 7.4 Population aged over 65 years, 1996–2006, by shire (Jerramungup,
Gnowangerup, Tambellup and Cranbrook—Albany hinterland)
There have been many predictions by the City of Albany that the population
will continue to increase at 3 per cent per annum in the foreseeable future, and
this in turn is placing increasing pressure on the demand for the release of land.
The latest data from the 2006 census have, however, challenged such predictions.
Nevertheless, the perception of demographic pressure has in fact changed the
land usage in the immediate periphery of Albany: peri-urban land is becoming
more urban and less rural.
The other important aspect of our brief demographic analysis is the proportion
of those in the population aged more than fifty-five years (see above). In a state
that is experiencing an unprecedented resources boom, we are also seeing the
direct impact on skills shortages and, in the case of agriculture, even less interest
in the sector as a long-term career opportunity. Young people are being led away
from the sector and into another sector, which appears to offer more future
opportunities as well as more immediate income. The latest ABS data put the
proportion of the population aged more than fifty-five in the City of Albany at
27.8 per cent and in the Shire of Denmark at 33.4 per cent—which is high
compared with the 24 per cent overall for Australia. In their analysis of the
whole Australian population, Barr et al. (2005:1) suggest that ‘since the 1991
census the rate of exit of older farmers (aged over 60) has been slowly declining.
Retirement is being delayed,5  possibly in response to the fewer numbers of
young persons seeking to take over family farms.’
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In the same report, Barr et al. also highlighted that the rate of exit of older farmers
(aged over sixty) fell during the 1990s. They make the point that farmers ‘are
retiring later. This appears to be counterbalancing the continued higher rates
of exits of younger farmers, causing the median age of exit to again rise towards
58 years of age’ (Barr et al. 2005:17).
Land use
The south coast region of Western Australia has traditionally been viewed as a
‘rural’ area. In Australian terms, this means that the majority of economic
production has been agricultural. As I will explain shortly, this balance is shifting
rapidly. Among other important trends in the past decade, in
the north-eastern part of the subregion, there is a trend towards fewer,
larger broad acre farms focusing on traditional and diversified cropping
and livestock industries. In the south-western part of the subregion,
landholdings are becoming smaller with more focus on intensive and
diverse agricultural systems. New industries that have been established
or are evolving in the subregion include viticulture, timber production,
farm forestry, olives and fishing. The subregion is also renowned for its
tourism, recreational and nature conservation values. (SCRIPT 2005:14)
Table 7.1 provides an explanation of current land use.
Table 7.1 Albany hinterland land use
Source: Derived from SCRIPT (2005:78).
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The establishment of tree crops in the past decade, particularly in the higher
rainfall areas, has marked a significant change in the region’s land uses. By far
the largest areas have been planted to blue gums. A woodchip plant at
Mirambeena, north of Albany, and export facilities at the Port of Albany are
now significant contributors to the region’s economy (SCRIPT 2005:76).
Some 354 867ha of a total of 617 155ha (57.5 per cent) are in production. It should
be noted that in real terms the value of agricultural land has remained stable.
There has, however, been a shift, not only in production, but in off-farm activity.
In line with the rest of Australia, farmers in the south coast region need to
supplement their income, as highlighted in Figure 7.6.
Figure 7.6 Farm income/off-farm income, south coast region
Source: Stehlik (2007).
A framework for analysis
Having laid out the context, I now turn to an explanation of the framework as
proposed by Iaquinta et al. (1999) in their paper for the Sustainable Development
Department and the FAO of the United Nations. The purpose of this paper was
to establish the effects of demographic ageing on intergenerational transfers of
land. It also focuses largely on the developing world, where land tenure is often
fragile and not systematised. This framework could assist us in our discussions
here and I am therefore going to explain the framework, then use it to discuss
the south coast Albany hinterland. Iaquinta et al. (1999) identify six aspects of






• duration of arrangement
• nature of entitlement
• specification of use.
Importantly for our discussion, however, they also identify other types of
intergenerational transfers: other ‘goods’, not just property, which can be
transferred between generations. These are important in our intersecting
discussion of rural futures, NRM and sustainability. The other types of transfers
are:
• ownership and control of non-land resources (such as money, financial
investments, water rights, stock, and so on)
• control of information and membership of information networks (social,
trade, political, and so on)
• formal and quasi-formal positions in a community.
In regard to the last category, the framework highlights the ‘relevant privileges
and rights, as far as control over the transfer [of this capital] rests with the current
occupant and is not subject to a formal authorisation mechanism [such as
elections, and so on]’ (Iaquinta et al. 1999:4). I will return to these issues again
in the discussion. The authors then discuss the mechanisms through which
intergenerational transfers can be affected by the ageing of the population. They
have identified 10 categories, and then asked some questions to enable analysis
as follows:
• change the timing of the transfer
• change the duration of the transfer
• change the mix of assets transferred
• change the completeness of the transfer
• change the generations involved in the transfer
• change in who makes the decision to transfer
• change the usual recipient of the transfer
• change the value of the goods to be transferred
• change the relevance of the transfer to the intended recipient
• changes in settings where communal lands dominate.
Intergenerational transitions
I want to highlight a couple of these points for more detailed discussion within
the context of the south coast region: changing the timing of the transfer and
changing the mix of assets transferred.
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Change the timing of the transfer
Both points are relevant to my argument that it is more than the land itself that
is transferred. Iaquinta et al. (1999) point out that as life expectancy increases,
the transition time changes. In addition, in developed countries, the ‘empty
nest’ and the fluctuations of agricultural production also mean that, in many
cases, the next generation has already left the farm well before there is any
serious contemplation of transfer. It is often difficult to entice the younger
generation to return to the property and, in many cases, current farmers are
often reluctant to pass on the stress and uncertainty. Research in Queensland
and New South Wales in the mid 1990s highlighted the dilemma that many
farmers felt about their role as ‘stewards’ for their children on the one hand,
and the demands and stresses they were themselves experiencing on the other,
which they felt reluctant to ‘pass on’ as an inheritance (Stehlik et al. 1999).
We are already well aware that rural land management tends not to be able to
afford employed labour. In the WA south coast region, evidence suggests that
any instrumental ‘transfer’ of property is therefore more likely to be a sale—often
to a neighbour6 —who of course is usually also within the age range that we
are considering. This is linked to a trend towards larger properties in the
north-western part of the Albany hinterland. The other aspect of timing is that
changes in agricultural production—evident in the south coast particularly in
relation to plantation timber, grape production for wine and smaller properties
with more ‘boutique’-style horticulture—appear to be more attractive than
traditional broadacre systems, and can, of course, be carried out closer to the
regional centres (thus enabling a combining of lifestyle with off-farm income
potential). Across the Great Southern region itself, the median size of properties
has reduced by about 16 per cent in the past five years. The pressure is on those
who are currently on the property to remain there.
Iaquinta et al. (1999) ask: ‘[H]ow does population ageing influence the ages of
donors and recipients? Do the family life stages of persons involve change with
population ageing? Is the recipients’ life cycle situation important in relation to
agricultural production?’
Change the mix of assets to be transferred
This aspect is of importance if we are considering ‘rural futures’. The transfer
by the older generation of social and cultural capital—other than financial capital
(that is, the farm)—is very important in relation to any sustainability of the rural
sector. As we are all now well aware, social and cultural capital are essential to
the integration of networks, trust relationships, mutuality and the essential
health of any community. This has become an overt issue for those who are
focusing on research of increased production:
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[A] major challenge in the agricultural industry is maintaining a positive
social fabric. Tensions between the achievement of financial and social
goals will prompt some farmers to leave the industry while others will
adapt in an attempt to achieve both ends, for example fly-in/fly-out farm
management. (Professor D. Pannell, cited in the Great Southern Farmer,
28 March – 3 April 2007:7)
One of the positive advantages of the Albany hinterland is that it is relatively
accessible to Albany and Denmark and the ‘drive-in/drive-out’ opportunities
could well encourage more intergenerational transitions. Nevertheless, at present,
the transition is a fragile one, with there being no strategic planning either within
agriculture or within the NRM sectors, while the governance of both sectors
remains essentially in the hands of the older generation, and the younger
generation does not demand its place at the table. Iaquinta et al. (1999:5) ask (in
relation to the developing world), ‘[W]hat could the elderly gain from such
protracted transfers?…[Perhaps] to create intergenerational exchanges while
keeping back enough to assure that the process will continue and that the quality
of life in their own ageing period will not suffer.’
Is there a similar trend in the Albany hinterland? We do not know and will not
know unless detailed empirical research is undertaken. We need to ensure that
any discussions about rural futures and NRM start taking a good hard look at
who is involved and how the transition of knowledge and power between the
generations is being promoted and encouraged. This is not only at the level of
government policy, but practically at the level of service delivery, extension
and research.
Iaquinta et al. (1999) ask: ‘Does population ageing influence the composition of
assets that are being transferred between generations? Do the exchange
relationships change? Does population ageing affect the gender aspect? What is
the impact of these on agricultural production?’
Some preliminary reflections
How does this present us with possible rural futures?
1. The increasing demand within NRM for ‘social sustainability/social
indicators’—indeed, social anything—is in large part due to the fact that
we have tended to ignore the obvious and focus on what appears more
‘simple’, namely, the environment. As I mentioned earlier, while there have
been any number of risk assessments, and by latest count the south coast
NRM has funded many millions of dollars into this activity, they are all
limited in scope. The human dimensions associated with NRM and rural
Australia, while on the agenda, have yet to receive the comparative funding
essential to undertake the empirical detailed work that Iaquinta et al. (1999)
called for.
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2. It remains unclear where the responsibility for this should lie. Demographic
change—like climate change—is difficult to ‘box in’ or ‘silo’ into one
department or one agency. While the WA Department of Agriculture and
Food has always taken primary agency responsibility for farmers, it has
tended not to focus on their ageing, but rather on their capacity for
production. Its main activity therefore remains extension. Once farmers
‘retire’ they are no longer included. Linkages at the local level between
health, community services, local government, and so on regarding
intergenerational transitions are very much in the early stages—and
everyone is looking for leadership. Where should it come from? The related
issue is how can we continue to capture the expertise, experience and
knowledge from the older generation?
3. The transitions from broadacre to boutique farming evident in the Albany
hinterland are being promoted through activities such as the ‘slow food’
movement and farmers’ markets, as well as through tourism and the
hospitality industry. Could this be indicative of a developing differentiation
of ‘trendy’ agriculture and ‘non-trendy’ agriculture? If so, what does this
mean for food safety?
4. The increasing incorporation of off-farm income into farm families’
budgeting does not appear to be slowing. Despite the Albany hinterland
doing somewhat better than the rest of Western Australia in terms of rainfall,
in the period we saw that off-farm income has increased. The proximity of
farms to regional centres becomes doubly important—not just for such
employment opportunities, but to enable the work/life balance so essential
for future social cohesion and social capital. It appears that the increasing
sponge-like impact of larger centres will continue.
5. Will the baby boomers ever give up power? What kind of intergenerational
transitions will Australia experience in the next 25 years? How will these
be played out? What is the importance of ‘place’ in such transitions? We
simply do not know yet.
6. Finally, what impact will these intergenerational shifts have on the
assumptions we have made about the governance of NRM in the future?
So much of south coast NRM governance is in the hands of the older
generation now. We need to be thinking about what transitions will take
place.
Conclusions
Iaquinta et al. (1999), while focusing on the developing world, offer some
questions pertinent to our contemplation of rural futures in Australia. From the
time of presenting this paper to the seminar to its publication, a new Federal
Government has taken office and rural Australia waits anxiously to see what
impact the new Labor Government will have on rural policy, NRM governance
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and the general ageing of the population. In the meantime, the drought along
the eastern seaboard has eased after widespread flooding, while drought
continues to be declared in the northern half of the West Australian wheatbelt.
Western Australia’s rural futures are still dependent on the current and
continuing resources boom as the skills shortage in the agricultural sector
becomes more acute. Australia’s rural futures remain unpredictable and
vulnerable to the vagaries not only of climate variability, but to rural policies
and demographic change.
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Endnotes
1  NRM implies the legislative and institutional governance of natural resource management activities
in Australia.
2  In the context of the discussion at the symposium, the ‘workforce’ is predicated on a definition of
work as paid and unpaid.
3  Further discussion of Australian rural ideologies can be found in companion chapters.
4  All details are drawn from SCRIPT (2005).
5  Confirmed by a recent University of Tasmania study reported in The Australian (12 July 2007).





Under the regulatory radar?
Nanotechnologies and their impacts for
rural Australia
Kristen Lyons and Gyorgy Scrinis
Abstract
Nanotechnology is the latest platform technology to capture the imagination of
the agricultural and food industries, with applications being adopted across
these entire sectors. With companies such as Kraft Foods and H. J. Heinz investing
heavily in nanotechnology research and development, industry commentators
have suggested that the global nano-agri-food sector will, by 2010, be worth in
excess of US$20 billion. While the nano-revolution is well under way, however,
the entry of nanotechnologies into paddocks and onto our plates has occurred
largely beneath the policy and regulatory radars. As such, agricultural inputs
and food items that contain nano-materials are unlabelled, thereby preventing
consumers from differentiating between nano-products and their non-nano
counterparts. This situation persists, despite a mounting body of scientific
evidence pointing to potential health and environmental risks associated with
the manufacture of, and exposure to, nano-materials.
While proponents of nanotechnology promise a range of benefits across the
agri-food sector, this chapter considers the potential impact of the unfettered
introduction of agriculture and food-related nanotechnologies on Australian
rural communities. To date, this issue has received little recognition in the
emerging debates. Our chapter contributes to these critical discussions by
highlighting a range of social issues associated with the introduction of
nanotechnology for rural Australia within the context of the development and
application of nanotechnologies across the agri-food sector. The chapter also
identifies potential human and environmental risks for these communities. We
argue that a lack of nano-specific regulations could exacerbate a number of these
risks.
Introduction
Nanotechnologies are a panacea for global social and environmental problems—or
so industry and governments proclaim. At the same time, critics argue that
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nanotechnologies could present a range of new risks to human and environmental
health and safety (Friends of the Earth 2006a; ETC Group 2003; International
Centre for Technology Assessment 2006). Despite these conflicting views, research
and development of nanotechnologies are occurring at a rapid pace, with total
global investment in 2005 estimated to be worth US$9.6 billion (Lux Research
Incorporated 2005). As a result, products derived from nano-techniques or
containing nano-materials are already on the market, despite the absence of
nano-specific regulations or labelling requirements. The agricultural and food
industries are among those to have embraced nanotechnologies, with leading
industry commentators suggesting that the nano-agri-food industry will be
worth in excess of US$20 billion by 2010 (Helmut Kaiser 2004).
Even at this early stage, nanotechnologies are being developed for applications
from paddock to the plate and promise to bring profound impacts for people
and the environment. It is anticipated, for example, that within the short to
medium term, farmers will have access to a new range of ‘smart’ inputs and
products, including nano-seed varieties with in-built pesticides that will release
by remote control or under specific environmental conditions (ETC Group 2003a).
It is anticipated that nano-cochleates and nano-encapsulation techniques1  will
enable consumers to select foods that match their personal tastes and
physiological requirements. These applications of nanotechnologies across the
agri-food sector will have specific impacts for rural communities. People living
in rural communities are, and will increasingly be, directly exposed to
nano-agri-food applications, as food producers, residents and consumers.
Despite the potential human and environmental health and safety issues for the
whole society, including rural communities, there is an absence of federal
nano-specific regulations to oversee research through to the commercial
application of nanotechnologies, including those relating directly to the agri-food
sector (Marchant and Sylvester 2006; Bowman and Hodge 2007a). As explored
in this chapter, however, nanotechnology poses a number of regulatory
challenges for rural Australians—challenges that are similarly faced by rural
communities globally. In this chapter, we examine the current and projected
social, health and environmental impacts associated with the emerging
nano-agri-food industry. It is argued that the current regulatory gaps in relation
to nanotechnology have the potential to exacerbate potential risks and adverse
impacts. Our chapter concludes that there is a clear need for governments,
including the Australian Government, to implement nano-specific regulations,
which minimise the potential adverse impacts of nanotechnology to humans and
the environment, including rural communities, while also taking into account
the views and concerns of citizens.
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Technological change in rural Australia
There is a history of technological innovation in agriculture and agri-food
production. The latest of these technological innovations include the new genetic
and cellular plant and animal breeding and reproduction techniques, information
and satellite technologies and the continued evolution of chemical inputs and
mechanical technologies. The products of these technological innovations have
been diverse: novel seed and animal varieties, new varieties of chemical
pesticides, fertilisers and veterinary drugs, the ability to manage ever larger
scale farming operations and the reduced dependence on farm labourers for
specific tasks (Bonanno et al. 1994; Busch et al. 1991; Goodman et al. 1987). Many
new technologies have been promoted with promises of increased productivity,
improved efficiency, greater precision, reduced costs for industry and consumers
alike, economies of scale and, ultimately, increased profitability for industry.
New technologies have also been promoted by some in terms of their claimed
environmental benefits, such as the reduction in the use of chemical inputs and
water, alongside growing concerns about some specific environmental problems
in recent years (Huang et al. 2003). In short, agri-food technological innovations
have been continually proclaimed as a social and environmental panacea for
rural communities.
Successive waves of technological development have been the primary drivers
of change in not only the technical means and practices of production, but in
the structures and cultures of production. The increasing scale of production
and size of farms, the decline in the number of farm families and rural
communities and the increasing control that agri-food input suppliers exercise
over farmers have all been facilitated by technological innovation (Lawrence
1987; McMichael 1999). One of the characteristics of this technology-driven
mode of production is the technological treadmill that farmers have been on for
the past century—whereby farmers and other food producers are compelled to
quickly adopt the latest tools and products of innovation to remain
competitive—from the mechanical and chemical treadmills, to the genetic and
information technology treadmills, and now the nano-treadmill.
While it is claimed that modern biotechnology has been to date the ‘latest and
perhaps most fundamental innovative technology to be applied to the agri-food
sector’ (Phillips 2002:504), the convergence of nanotechnology with the food
and food-processing sectors is anticipated to further revolutionise agricultural
production. Nanotechnology represents a new techno-scientific platform that
will potentially facilitate technological innovation across all agricultural inputs,
practices and products of the agri-food system.
Nanotechnology commonly refers to any engineered materials, structures and
systems that operate at a scale of 100 nanometres or less (one nanometre is
one-billionth of a metre, or 10-9). At this scale, nano-materials, relative to the
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same material at a larger size, have significantly different chemical reactivity,
electrical conductivity, strength, mobility, solubility and magnetic and optical
properties (Royal Society and Royal Academy of Engineering 2004). In order to
exploit these novel properties, nano-scale techniques, equipment and products
are being developed and applied across a range of scientific disciplines and
technological forms, including chemistry, physics, biotechnology, information
technology and engineering. The production of a range of engineered
nanoparticles, including tubes, dots and fullerenes, has dominated the first wave
of nanotechnology applications, offering aesthetical and functional improvements
to conventional products. Nanoparticles have been incorporated into a wide
range of everyday products, ranging from paints and cosmetics to electronics
and car tyres (Woodrow Wilson 2007). It is anticipated that this ‘first generation’
will be followed by second, third and fourth generations of manipulating and
reconstituting materials and living organisms at the nano-scale, and the
construction of objects and systems from the ‘bottom up’.
Nanotechnology has captured the imagination of the agri-food sector, with
leading food and agri-chemical companies such as Kraft Foods, H. J. Heinz and
Syngenta all racing to get a slice of the nano-pie. Established in 2000, Kraft’s
global research consortium of 15 university and private laboratories, ‘NanoteK’,
reflects the corporate drive behind the nano-agri-food sector (Kuzma and VerHage
2006; Rowan 2004). The ETC Group (2004a) reports that nanotech materials and
products being researched and commercialised include seed and animal breeding
applications, nano-pesticides, remote sensing and precision farming technologies,
as well as food processing, packaging and retailing applications.
A commercially available example of nanotechnology being used in the agri-food
sector is a new generation of chemical pesticides or ‘nano-pesticides’. These
include nano-scale chemical pesticide emulsions and nano-encapsulation
techniques. One strategy for producing nano-pesticides is to take an existing
chemical pesticide—particularly one that already has received regulatory
approval for environmental release—and to reduce the size of the active molecules
to the nano-scale. This reduction in scale can give the pesticide new and beneficial
properties for pest control, such as increased dissolvability in water, increased
stability, the capacity for absorption into plants or increased toxicity to pests.
The global agribusiness company Syngenta—with global sales of more than
US$8.05 billion in 2006—already retails a number of pesticides with emulsions
containing nanoparticles, including Primo MAXX Plant Growth Regulator and
Banner MAXX Fungicide (ETC 2004b).
In contrast, nano-encapsulation techniques are utilised to create nano-scale
capsules, which are designed to transport chemical substances such as toxins.
The nano-scale capsules can be designed to release in specific environmental or
physiological environments, such as inside the stomach of an insect. These ‘smart’
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pesticides could provide more precise, controlled and effective use of pesticides,
and therefore potentially reduce the overall quantities of pesticide used.
Nano-sensors are ‘smart’ nano-scale particles that are able to be engineered to
provide real-time monitoring of situations and for gathering information on the
nutrient levels of soils, water availability and the presence of pests and pathogens
affecting plant and animal growth. Nano-sensors will provide information to
computer-controlled, GPS-guided, precision-farming systems. These nano-sensors
could potentially be scattered and distributed widely over farming landscapes.
Approaches to nano-regulation and its limits
As noted earlier, agri-food nanotechnologies are being promoted with promises
of increased productivity, profitability and environmental sustainability. At
this early stage in the development and commercialisation of
nanotechnology-based products, however, considerable uncertainty exists as
to the extent to which these social, economic and environmental claims will be
realised, and over what timelines. Scientific uncertainty also exists over the
potential hazards posed by engineered nanoparticles (Aitken et al. 2004;
Oberdörster et al. 2005), with Maynard (2006:10) noting, for instance, that
‘certain nanoparticles may move easily into sensitive lung tissues after inhalation,
and cause damage that can lead to chronic breathing problems’. Due to these
uncertainties, nanotechnologies must be regulated in such a way that ensures
that the supposed benefits are not overshadowed by the potential risks (Bowman
and Fitzharris 2007). Bearing this balancing act in mind, this chapter now turns
to an examination of how nanotechnologies are currently regulated within
Australia. This approach will be briefly compared with regulatory developments
occurring elsewhere.
As stated by van Calster (2006:360), ‘nanotechnology will never go
“unregulated”. In other words, it will never be a “lawless” technology. Ordinary
principles of law will apply to nanotechnology.’ Accordingly, Marchant and
Sylvester (2006) and Bowman and Hodge (2007b) have pointed to a range of
legislative and regulatory mechanisms for ‘regulating’ nanotechnology across
the various stages of its life cycle, from research and development through to
disposal. With the majority of these frameworks having been in existence for
some time, however, leading commentators have begun to question the suitability
of these regulatory frameworks in relation to nanotechnology. Bowman and
Hodge (2006:1068) argue that ‘while governments have invested heavily in R&D
programs they have been noticeably unenthusiastic about implementing new
[nano-specific] regulatory frameworks for risk minimisation’.
The increasing use of the nanotechnology label in commercially available
products—resulting in increasing public curiosity about the technology,
increased media coverage and greater public debate about associated risks and
benefits—would appear to have played an important role in stimulating policy
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action within the Australian Government about the future of nanotechnology
in Australia. As discussed by Bowman and Hodge (2007c), these activities are
probably best illustrated by the establishment of the National Nanotechnology
Strategy Taskforce (NNST) in mid 2005, in order to devise ‘a national strategy
for development and regulation of the emerging field of nanotechnology’
(Macfarlane 2006). The public release of the NNST’s report, Options for a national
nanotechnology strategy, in September 2006 articulated a nine-point plan designed
to secure Australia’s future role in nanotechnology. Despite the rapidly expanding
nano-agri-food industries as outlined above, the report did not address
applications of nanotechnology within the agri-food sector or the specific
concerns for rural communities alongside the extension of nanotechnologies
across rural landscapes. While it has been suggested that the report ‘will help
to establish a regulatory framework for the development of nanotechnology
applications’ (Macfarlane 2006), the report explicitly states that ‘there is currently
no case for establishing any new, nanotechnology specific regulations, but rather,
existing regulations may need some adjustments’ (NNST 2006:32). The NNST’s
emphatic rejection of new, nanotechnology-specific regulations can be contrasted
with regulatory approaches that have been adopted by Australian governments
in respect to other, earlier ‘revolutionary’ advances, including genetically
modified organisms (GMOs). Since 2001, dealings with GMOs have been regulated
through a national regulatory scheme, the Gene Technology Regulator, in
coordination with other federal regulatory agencies, and supplemented further
by state and territory regulations (Ludlow 2004, 2005). As such, the development
of specific regulation for new technologies in Australia is clearly not without
precedent. The development of such a scheme for nanotechnology, however,
could be somewhat more challenging given the potential scope of the technology.
While the NNST did not articulate which regulatory frameworks or how these
current provisions could be adjusted, the Australian Government has
subsequently published a request for tender for the ‘review of the capacity of
Australia’s regulatory frameworks to manage any potential impacts of
nanotechnology’ (DITR 2006:4). As noted in the tender document, the focus of
the review will be on the health, safety and environmental (HSE) implications
of nanotechnologies for Australia in the next 10 years (DITR 2006). Importantly,
it would appear that this review will not be limited to Australia’s chemical
regulatory framework, but will also include consideration of quarantine,
agricultural and veterinary chemicals and environmental regulatory frameworks.
While it is unclear whether the findings of the review will be made public, it is
anticipated that the final report will provide a basis for deciding how best to
govern nanotechnology within the Australian context.
Looking further afield, commentators such as Wardark (2003), Davies (2006),
Kimbrell (2006) and Taylor (2006) have highlighted the limitations within existing
US regulatory frameworks in relation to nanotechnologies, specifically industrial
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chemicals (as regulated by the Environmental Protection Agency) and cosmetics
and foods (as regulated by the Food and Drug Administration). Across the
Atlantic, Chaudhry et al. (2006, 2007) have observed a number of gaps in relation
to a range of nanotechnology products and applications in respect to the current
UK environmental regulations. As observed by Bowman and Hodge (2007b),
commentators including Balbus et al. (2006) and Kimbrell (2006) have suggested
that one way in which governments could easily address these gaps is through
the introduction of nano-specific provisions within existing national legislation.
Others believe that more is needed in order to protect human and environmental
health and safety concerns. Bowman and Hodge (2007b) note, for instance, that
leading non-governmental organisation Friends of the Earth (2006b) has advocated
that a new, nano-specific framework is needed to address the current risks,
uncertainties and complexities of nanotechnologies. Others have gone further.
Since as early as 2002, the US-based Action Group on Erosion, Technology and
Concentration (the ETC Group) has repeatedly called for a moratorium on the
commercial production of new nano-materials until an appropriate regulatory
framework is implemented (ETC Group 2002, 2003b, 2004b).
Amid these growing calls for regulatory action, in December 2006, the City of
Berkeley in California took regulatory action into its own hands by amending
the hazardous materials and waste management sections of its municipal code
to explicitly include ‘manufactured nanoparticles’ under its scope (Del Vecchio
2006; Associated Press 2006a, 2006b; Monica et al. 2007). The amendments,
which were reportedly in response to the city council’s concerns about current
occupational practices within two local laboratories, and the potentially hazardous
nature of nanoparticles (Del Vecchio 2006), imposed ‘comprehensive disclosure
requirements on companies that manufacture or use manufactured nanoparticles
within the city’ (Monica et al. 2007:68). These requirements do not extend,
however, to federally funded laboratories within the city’s limits, including, for
example, the University of California at Berkeley. While the effectiveness of
these amendments is unknown at this time, it has been reported that other US
cities are currently in the process of reviewing their own municipal codes in
order to specifically regulate nanoparticles within their own jurisdictions
(Williams 2007; Bowman and Hodge 2007b).
Agri-food nanotechnologies and their social impacts for
rural Australia
While the nano-regulatory debate continues to gather momentum nationally
and internationally, Australian rural communities are already engaging with
agri-food nanotechnologies. Nanotechnology can be found in paddocks and on
plates, exposing rural people to nanotechnologies as producers and consumers.
This exposure is likely to increase as investment in agri-food nanotechnologies
expands. This chapter now turns to an overview of the current and likely social
157
Under the regulatory radar? Nanotechnologies and their impacts for rural Australia
impacts and the potential human and environmental risks associated with the
application of nanotechnologies across agri-food industries. It is argued that
there is a fundamental need for the public to be actively engaged and involved
in shaping nanotechnology policy, including the development of regulatory
responses to address the current limitations within Australia’s regulatory
frameworks.
As with previous technological innovations, the agricultural and food industries
assert sweeping claims about the social benefits that will arise from
nanotechnologies. Proponents present nanotechnology as a miracle cure for
problems as diverse as world hunger, homelessness and protecting national
security. Dunkley (2004:1131), for example, declares that through applications
of nanotechnology, ‘[f]ood could be replicated. Starvation and hunger could be
eliminated from the globe.’ In a less bold approach, Roco and Bainbridge (2005:3)
claim that ‘[n]anotechnology will help ensure that we can produce enough food
by improving inventory storage and the ability to grow at high yield and a
diversity of crops locally’. In the nano-agri-food sector, agricultural producers
have been made a range of promises related to their uptake of nanotechnologies,
including a reduction in the costs of farming and chemical use, alongside an
increase in farm productivity, while the promised benefits to consumers include
safer and more nutritious food (Weiss et al. 2006).
Despite the promises, there is a conspicuous gap in publicly available data to
substantiate these claims. According to Sandler and Kay (2006:679), ‘[w]hile
scientists and industry leaders may be “elite” in their knowledge of the science
and business of nanotechnology, this status does not imply that they are “elite”
with respect to the SEI [social and ethical issues] associated with nanotechnology’.
Research into social and ethical dimensions of nanotechnologies attracts little
resources from government and industry, leaving us with little understanding
of these complex issues. In their evaluation of the National Nanotechnology
Initiative (NNI), Sandler and Kay (2006) found 4 per cent of funding (or US$48
million) was directed towards ethical, legal and social (ELS) research, representing
the minimum legal requirement for ELS research under the 21st Research and
Development Act (Public Law 108-153). They also found that social research that
was funded through the NNI was directed into building public support and
acceptance of nanotechnology, rather than deepening public understanding and
engagement in nanotechnology debates, or directing nanotechnology applications
towards the public good. This mandated funding of ELS research related to
nanotechnologies within the United States could be contrasted with the current
situation in Australia. For instance, while the NNST (2006:33) recognised the
need to ‘support HSE research in Australia and to support involvement in
international HSE studies’, it did not go as far as suggesting that the Federal
Government allocate a specific percentage of all nanotechnology research and
development funding towards such research. While there is clearly support
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within government to support these fundamental areas of research, any such
investment in research related to these fields is more likely to occur in an ad hoc
manner. Accordingly, it is difficult to understand how rural Australians—and
Australians more generally—will be affected by this ‘revolutionary’ technology.
The Australian Government’s inadequate response, including to ELS issues
within the nanotechnology research agenda, is likely to limit the capacity to
identify and/or address the social impacts associated with the application of
agri-food nanotechnologies. The current regulatory arena related to
nanotechnologies also inhibits the capacity to effectively identify the extent to
which farmers are already engaging with nanotechnologies—including
applications in plant and animal breeding, pesticides, precision farming and
animal disease protection. While a search of patent databases might provide
information related to what companies are researching and patenting, this
painstaking process is time consuming and difficult.
Nanotechnologies—including pesticides, seeds and monitoring devices—are
likely to exacerbate the cost of farming, by extending farmers’ dependence on
costly off-farm inputs. Australian farm families frequently suffer financial
hardship, which is accentuated by declining terms of trade, rising oil prices and
long-term drought conditions (Almas and Lawrence 2003). The extension of
nanotechnologies into the agri-input sector has the potential to exacerbate some
farmers’ financial burden. While early adopters of nanotechnologies might
experience a reduction in farming costs, other farmers could suffer increased
costs—in the form of new inputs and technologies. While smaller producers
might struggle to manage these increased input costs, leading multinational
agri-chemical companies such as Syngenta, which has positioned itself at the
forefront of nanotechnology research and development, appear to have already
begun reaping the profits from the burgeoning nano-agri-food industry. For
instance, while current regulatory frameworks do not recognise reformulated
nano-pesticides as ‘new’ products for the purposes of risk evaluation, it would
appear that national intellectual property regimes might consider such products
as ‘new’ for the purposes of patent production. The ETC Group (2004a) has
argued, for instance, that the reformulation of a product to nano-scale could
enable a company to extend the patent protection period for the pesticide,
thereby providing the company with exclusive rights over the product for up
to another 20 years. In short, the uptake of agri-food nanotechnologies is set to
concentrate economic power among corporate actors in the agri-food industry,
while providing new financial burdens for farm families (Scrinis and Lyons
2007).
At the same time, the uptake of nano-agri-inputs—including pesticides and
seeds produced via the convergence of nanotechnologies and genetic engineering2
—appears destined to further entrench chemical and genetic systems of
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agriculture. The nano-treadmill reduces the options for low-input (cost-neutral)
and organic farming systems. At the farm level, the application of
nanotechnologies will appropriate space that could otherwise be cultivated
utilising low external input or organic farming techniques. Farmers could be
constrained from adopting low-input or organic farming by a range of controls,
including patents and licensing fees that could lock them into using
nanotechnologies. This could be similar to genetic engineering (GE), in which
intellectual property rights have locked many farmers into the purchase of GE
seeds each planting season, rather than relying on traditional seed-saving
techniques. In addition, intellectual property rights require farmers to ensure
they do not ‘illegally’ obtain privately owned GE—and now nano—material
through pollen drift, cross-species transfer, and so on; while in terms of research,
investment in nano-agri-food applications will likely occur at the expense of
research into alternative—low-cost and low-input—farming systems (see Jones
2004).
Ownership of nano-agri-inputs by the corporate sector is also privatising new
forms of agricultural and farming knowledge. Nanotechnologies will enable
corporate actors to hold and control new forms of specialist knowledge, including
capabilities to detect pH levels, moisture, pests and disease. This could in turn
displace farmers’ traditional knowledge and techniques (Miller and Kinnear
2007). At the same time that nanotechnologies could marginalise farmers’
knowledge and skills, the transformation of farm work through the uptake of
nano-agri-inputs could also reduce the importance of farmers and farm workers
(Crow and Sarewitz 2001). For example, the integration of nanotechnology with
information technology and geographical positioning systems could enable farm
management to occur off-site. The ETC Group claims that such technologies will
transform the farm into ‘a wide area bio-factory that can be monitored and
managed from a laptop’ (ETC Group 2004a:8). For example, precision-farming
technologies—such as seeds with inbuilt pesticides—could be released via remote
control when remote nano-sensors detect pest infestation. This is likely to
transform the nature of farm work and, with it, the identity of Australian farmers
and farm workers.
The application of nanotechnologies to the Australian agri-food sector is also
likely to pose challenges for farmers wishing to access the international market.
The lack of nano-specific regulations across the world at this stage means that
there are no additional constraints on domestic and international trade of
agricultural goods produced using nanotechnologies. This situation could change,
however, if and when national governments amend their current regulatory
frameworks to specifically address nanotechnologies. As the first wave of
nano-specific amendments to regulatory frameworks are likely to occur at the
national level, rather than at the regional or international levels—despite
harmonisation efforts by a number of multilateral bodies—Australian producers
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wishing to export their agricultural products could be required to conform to
a number of different regulatory standards in order to access different markets.
This could bring additional costs and bureaucratic procedures for Australian
farmers wishing to export.
Consumer concerns regarding the potential risks could be of equal concern to
Australian producers of nano-based agricultural goods. Fears in relation to GM
foods within, for example, the European Union had a devastating effect on the
sector (Bauer and Gaskell 2002). While public awareness of nanotechnology
remains limited in Australia, the European Union and the United States (see, for
example, Market Attitudes Research Services 2004; Mee et al. 2004; Gaskell et
al. 2006; Cobb and Macoubrie 2004; Woodrow Wilson 2006), the prospects of a
backlash against nano-foods would appear to be minimal at the present time. As
consumers become increasingly knowledgeable about the technology, however,
or if a nano-food scare makes its way to the front pages of the daily newspapers,
the prospect of a consumer backlash is likely to increase. These market and
consumer issues exacerbate economic vulnerability in rural communities.
Human health risks from nanotechnologies
Nanotechnology applications in the agri-food sector could also give rise to a
number of potential health problems for rural communities in their roles as
agricultural producers, as rural residents and as food consumers. To begin,
people living and working in rural communities will be exposed to engineered
nanoparticles—including in the form of nano-pesticides and nano-sensors. These
could pose a number of health risks for rural communities. The combination of
nano-pesticides and nano-seeds in rural landscapes further extends the
unpredictability of adverse health impacts. The Royal Society and Royal Academy
of Engineering (2004) has warned of the potential human health risks of
nano-toxicity. Reflecting these concerns, the International Union of Food, Farm
and Hotel Workers has called for a moratorium on nanotechnology until the
effects of human exposure to nano-materials are more thoroughly understood
(Friends of the Earth 2007).
Nanotechnology applications in the agri-food sector could also pose social and
health problems for rural communities in their role as food consumers. As
previously stated, the current lack of nano-specific regulations or labelling
requirements for food containing nano-ingredients enables producers of foods
to replace conventional ingredients in commercial food products with nano-scale
ingredients without triggering regulatory oversight. This poses a plethora of
questions relating to the potential health risks of ingesting nano-materials (see,
for instance, Swiss Re 2004). We know an Australian bakery currently selling
a loaf of bread that contains nano-capsules of Omega 3 that are derived from
tuna-fish oil, which is marketed as ‘Tip Top Up’. The fish oil is encapsulated in
a tasteless calcium and soybean lipid matrix that is made available only when
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the nano-capsules reach the stomach (Tip Top n.d.). Food industries argue that
nano-capsules will improve the delivery of nutrients in processed foods (Kuzma
and VerHage 2006). Similarly, the application of nano-cochleates could enable
the release of encapsulated nutrients in targeted and specific ways, in response
to individual consumers’ needs (Gardener 2002). Proponents of these technologies
argue that nano-capsules and nano-cochleates will increase the nutrient density
of foods and the match between people’s nutrient requirements (for example,
for calcium or iron) and food consumption. Despite the claims, such novel foods
could present a range of health risks to food consumers, the majority of which
researchers are only beginning to examine (Rooker 2006). While it is widely
accepted that materials behave differently and express different character traits
at the nano-scale, experts disagree about what this means for exposure or
ingestion of nano-materials.
As previously stated, the current lack of nano-specific labelling requirements
for food that contains nano-scale ingredients has ensured that the number, or
indeed identity, of commercially available nano-foods in Australia and elsewhere
remains unknown. For consumers, the lack of mandatory labelling has ensured
that consumers are unable to identify food derived from nanotechnologies and
prevents the exercise of informed choice about the food that they consume.
Despite the obvious difficulties therefore in predicting this figure, the Helmut
Kaiser Consultancy Group reported that, by 2005, there were already more than
300 nano-food products in the international food market, and that sales of
nano-food and packaging were valued at US$5.3 billion. The consultants
anticipate that this figure will rise to US$20.4 billion by 2010, alongside the
expansion of the nano-food industry.
The environmental impacts of nanotechnological innovation
for rural Australia
Alongside the social and potential health issues detailed above, there is a range
of environmental issues and concerns associated with expanding nanotech
innovation across the agri-food sector.
With the escalating and imminent problems associated with climate change,
drought and declining water availability, as well as soil erosion and salinity
problems, the need to transform the ecological relations of agricultural production
has never been more pressing. In this context, nanotech applications and products
are being strongly promoted on the basis of their environmental benefits and as
enabling the shift to environmentally sustainable forms of production and
consumption. In the agricultural sector, the general promise is for the
development of more efficient, precise, flexible and adaptable systems of food




Proponents of nano-agricultural innovations state the application of
nanotechnologies will enable agricultural production to adapt to changing
environmental and resource conditions. Proponents promise more efficient and
safer chemical pesticides and fertilisers, and overall a more efficient and
productive system that will minimise the use of pesticides, fertiliser and water
inputs, including the more targeted use of chemical inputs, thereby reducing
chemical pollution of the environment. These outcomes could be achieved by
the introduction of ‘smart’ nano-pesticides able to be released in more controlled
and precise ways; nano-sensors able to detect and inform a precise response to
changing soil, water and pest conditions; and crops better adapted to particular
environments. Among these high-tech visions of a smart, lean, green and efficient
nano-industrial agricultural system, there has been little acknowledgment of or
debate about the prospect of any specifically new environmental hazards that
nano-agricultural innovations pose.
In considering the environmental implications of nanotech innovations in
agricultural production, a distinction can be drawn between the impact on
existing environmental problems on the one hand, and the possible introduction
of a new range of environmental problems on the other. In terms of existing
environmental issues, problems and dynamics—such as pollution from chemical
pesticides and fertilisers, high water usage, soil degradation and diminishing
biodiversity—the question is whether nanotechnology will exacerbate or alleviate
some of these agro-ecological problems. Here we need to consider the case-by-case
impacts of each innovation. There is, however, also the broader question of the
type of agricultural production that nanotech innovation is likely to be used to
support, and what are the environmental consequences of maintaining and
entrenching this type of production. At the same time, nanotechnology
potentially introduces an entirely new set of environmental hazards and risks,
including the prospect of an entirely new form of environmental pollution:
nano-pollution. In particular, there are immediate concerns relating to the release
of nano-scale particles into the environment, such as nano-pesticides and
nano-sensors, as well as concerns about the release of nano-engineered living
organisms into the environment.
In the case of nano-pesticides, it is the very small scale of these nano-pesticidal
compounds, in conjunction with a number of other physiochemical parameters
including shape, particle size, crystalline structure and surface chemistry, that
poses potentially greater toxicity and eco-toxicity risks in comparison with
conventional chemical pesticides. The increased toxicity of some nano-scale
toxins could mean greater harm not only to pests, but to all other living
organisms—animals and humans. The ability for these nano-scale particles to
penetrate the surface of plants could mean that pesticides also penetrate edible
parts of the crop. Their size and dissolvability could mean that they contaminate
soils and waterways across a wide area or travel into and affect other food chains.
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Encapsulated pesticides could similarly be washed away and release their toxins
in other environments, or even in the stomachs of other living organisms.
Despite concerns about the potential risks of nano-pesticides, the reformulation
of a previously approved pesticide through the nano-sizing of active ingredients
is likely to be considered by the regulator as an ‘existing’ product for the
purposes of the regulatory framework. As such, despite the new properties
exhibited by the nano-pesticide when compared with its conventional
counterpart, the nano-pesticide will not have to be evaluated by a regulatory
body on the basis of potential risks before it may be imported or manufactured
in Australia.
Nano-pesticides are one of a number of new strategies being used to address the
problems of the declining efficacy of older-style chemical pesticides, combined
with the inevitable rising price of petrochemical-based inputs. Genetically
engineered, insecticide-producing crops (that is, Bt crops) and genetically
engineered herbicide-tolerant crops are other responses that have been
implemented to create more precise and efficient forms of pesticide delivery. All
these strategies maintain and entrench the toxic chemical approach to the control
of insects, pathogens and weeds. Any efficiency gains and reductions in overall
chemical usage will be portrayed as bringing environmental benefits, but they
can equally be understood as providing ideological legitimation for the
continuation of chemically dependent farming systems.
The large-scale release of nanoparticle-sized nano-sensors also raises a number
of environmental concerns. Will they be biodegradable? What are the
consequences of having these nano-sensors washed into soils, waterways and
throughout the food chain? Their small scale means they could penetrate deeply
into materials or living organisms.. There are also unlikely to be any regulations
covering the release of these nano-sensors on the farm, since they would not fall
under the banner, for example, of chemical inputs or novel living organisms.
Given that nano-sensors are likely to primarily support the growth of very
large-scale, capital-intensive and chemical-intensive farming operations—usually
at the expense of smaller-scale operations—we also need to ask what the
long-term environmental implications of these technology-facilitated structural
changes might be.
Conclusion: developing a nano-regulatory agenda that
engages with social, health and environmental issues
Nanotechnologies are being applied across the entire agri-food system. From
remote nano-sensors and nano-seeds at the farm gate, to nano-packaging and
nano-‘super’ foods on supermarket shelves and kitchen tables, nanotechnologies
have captured the imagination of the agricultural and food industries. Many of
these applications have already found their way onto the market. The scale of
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investment from the agri-food industries suggests the variety and quantity of
nano-food products is set to expand rapidly in the next few years.
The overview of current approaches to the regulation of nanotechnology-based
products and applications within the agri-food sector highlights how many
commercial nanotech applications are falling beneath Australia’s regulatory
radar, and as such, are not adequately covered by the current regulatory
frameworks. The patchwork of non-nano-specific regulations covers some
products and processes to varying degrees, but clear gaps within these regimes
have already emerged. As such, it is reasonable to conclude that there is a lack
of rigorous review before the commercialisation of some nano-products within
the agri-food sector, enabling agri-food nanotechnologies to enter the market
untested and unlabelled.
The limits of current approaches to nano-regulation prohibit effective monitoring
and mitigation of the potential health and environmental impacts of
nanotechnologies. Our chapter demonstrates a diversity of social, health and
environmental risks associated with agri-food nanotechnologies. The health and
safety risks are particularly acute for rural Australians, due to their multiple
roles as food producers, rural residents and food consumers. People living and
working in rural communities will be, for example, directly exposed to
engineered nanoparticles of which little is known about their potential
toxicological effects. At the same time, nanotechnologies could give rise to new
eco-toxicological effects within rural environments, posing new threats to the
health of soils and water, as well as biodiversity. Rural Australians also face
health risks in their role as food consumers—through the ingestion of nano-foods
and food stored in new nanotechnologies (for example, nano-packaging,
nano-fridges, and so on).
Looking more broadly at the social issues, nanotechnology is likely to impact
on many rural producers due to the likely increased costs of purchasing such
inputs. Farmers who adopt nano-seeds, nano-pesticides and other technologies
also face the likelihood that their produce will be rejected in some markets,
similar to the bans imposed on genetically engineered foodstuffs.
Governments and industry are currently portraying agricultural nanotechnologies
as environmentally and socially responsible farming technologies, suggesting
that they will bring financial benefits to the farming community. It is likely
some farmers will choose to adopt nanotechnologies as part of their farming
practices on these grounds, despite the potential health and environmental risks
and the broader societal issues associated with nanotechnology. The current
patchwork of non-nano-specific regulations, however, appears to be ill equipped
to grapple with the complex and challenging array of health and environmental
risks presented by nanotechnologies, along with the broader societal
considerations raised by the technology.
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Australian and other federal governments must begin the process of playing
regulatory catch-up in order to protect the health and safety of their citizens,
including those within the agri-food sectors. This might involve the revision of
current regulatory frameworks, with consideration given to the new complexities
and challenges posed by the nanotechnologies, or the formation of a new
nano-specific regulatory framework. Revision of nanotechnology regulation will
be required to ensure rural communities do not carry a disproportionate level
of risk associated with the emerging agri-food nano-industries.
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Endnotes
1  Nano-cochleates or nano-encapsulation techniques are ‘envelopes’ that act as vehicles for the targeted
delivery of micro-nutrients (including omega-3, antioxidants and polyunsaturated fatty acids).
Nano-capsules ‘protect’ the active ingredient(s) inside and enable the controlled delivery of active
ingredients under certain conditions (ETC Group 2004a; Weiss et al. 2006).
2  Nanotechnology is an enabling technology for genetic engineering and other plant and animal breeding
techniques. Nano-biotechnology refers to the intersection of nano-techniques and genetic and
cellular-level techniques for the purposes of modifying living organisms. The use of nanotechnology
to facilitate the breeding of new varieties of crops and animals is still in its infancy, and there is little
information readily available about the kinds of research and development being undertaken.
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Conclusion
Francesca Merlan and David Raftery
The National Party, a political party that explicitly represents rural interests,
experienced vastly different results on different sides of Australia in a single
weekend of September 2008. In a by-election for the northern NSW federal
electorate of Lyne, a seat formerly held by the National Party leader and Deputy
Prime Minister, Mark Vaile, an independent candidate, himself a former National
Party member, won the seat. In attempting to explain the reasons for this result,
Senator Barnaby Joyce, a federal National Party MP, refused to entertain the
possibility that a ‘rural vote’, one that explicitly recognised agrarian values, had
diminished. Joyce maintained that the National Party vote was extremely strong,
there were still lots of National Party voters, but the ‘wrong net’ (Radio National
Breakfast, Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 8 September 2008.) was being
cast to try to catch them.
In Western Australia, on the same day, a quite different result emerged. There,
the National Party had five of its candidates elected to each house of parliament,
thereby holding the balance of power between the two major parties. Each of
the major parties had no choice but to negotiate with the Nationals so as to be
able to form minority government. In these negotiations, the National Party
eventually sided with the Liberal Party, on the condition that the National Party’s
promise to deliver ‘royalties to the regions’ was honoured. This policy proposal
sought to reallocate funds accruing to the state government from mining royalties
to regional health, infrastructure and community needs.
What can such different results tell us, with the same political party experiencing
such different outcomes? Obviously, they tell us that the agendas of mainstream
political parties have a weak hold in regional Australia. What they also tell us
is that expressions of ‘countrymindedness’ (Aitkin 1985) are a political,
counter-state reflex and one to which the National Party does not have exclusive
rights. It is clearly much easier for the National Party to occupy this counter-state
ground when it is not in coalition with the Liberal Party, a party that either
forms government or is the major opposition.
The contributors to this volume have asked: what are the relationships between
rural communities and policy? Where and what are these rural communities,
these ‘regions’, which there is a moral struggle to legitimately represent? How
would a rural political will be realised? What are the ‘policy effects’, intended
and unintended, of state efforts to define roles for rural areas and people and to
pursue economic and environmental goals in rural locales?
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In terms of efforts to realise a rural political will, let us first take the example of
Stefano Di Pieri, from Mildura on the Murray River. Di Pieri achieved some
profile through his role in an ABC television program that promoted the Mildura
region’s cuisine and the relationship between its agriculture, tourism and social
life. Di Pieri runs a successful restaurant and food business in a revamped Mildura
hotel. Having formerly been an advisor to the Victorian Labor Government, Di
Pieri, in 2006, ran for the Victorian upper house as an independent. Unlike other
politicians, Di Pieri claimed that rural towns and farms in the Sunraysia
region—his region—did face inevitable decline and he opposed sustaining them
indefinitely. He did, however, propose concrete policy solutions: farmers in the
marginal mallee regions would inevitably leave their farms and this departure
would bring new ‘settlers’ into small, ailing rural centres. This increase in
population would help revive these towns and a great deal of local human and
other resources would be dedicated to ‘managing’ these ex-farming lands, which
would be given over to environmental purposes. In effect, Di Pieri sketched out
a concrete rural scenario, in which the productivist values of agriculture were
not paramount. This sketch of a rural future came from the region.
Aitkin (1972) has explored the question of what the National Party stands for
in great depth. Aitkin (1985) identified country-mindedness as the central
political value of the National Party, the very thing that the party was organised
around. Aitkin (1985:35) clearly identified country-mindedness as an ideology,
as a
system of values and ideas that among other things presents a more or
less extensive picture of the good society, and of the policies and
programmes necessary to achieve it; distinguishes goodies from baddies;
accounts for the historical experience of a group; and appears as ‘truth’
to that group while being at least plausible to outsiders. Ideologies, unlike
philosophies, obtain their force very much from social experience; they
cannot be proved wrong, partly because they are sufficiently elastic to
accommodate awkward facts.
The empirical basis of such an ideology, argues Aitkin, can be found in the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. A growing primary sector, the basis
of Australian economic booms, underpinned the development of a
country-minded ethos. The crucial aspects of country-mindedness were, in equal
parts, a distrust of urban and foreign outsiders and a mutual respect between
graziers and farmers across different regions. Monopolistic commodity buyers
allowed farmers and graziers to easily identify ‘baddies’ and to feel affinity with
fellow growers. Railways and communications, in which Australian governments
invested heavily, enhanced the possibility for political communities whose
shared interests were based in the social experience of farming and grazing.
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These conditions that have been the basis of country-mindedness have, Aitkin
contends, been in retreat since the 1870s. The proportion of the population that
is non-urban has steadily declined, farming numbers have fallen and technology
has collapsed the spatial and cultural distances that formerly separated country
and city. Aitkin (1985:40) thinks that country-mindedness is finished as an
ideology, ‘even though its institutional and administrative arrangements will
continue indefinitely’. These institutional and administrative arrangements
mean, presumably, political parties, community organisations and lobby groups.
The foundation of organised rural politics—larger rural populations, farmers
and graziers beholden to single buyers and country people prohibitively
distanced from cities—has collapsed, as has the ideology that framed these
empirical events in cultural terms.
If country-mindedness exists in remnant form only at administrative and
institutional levels, what has taken its place? Is there a rural ideology that is
dominant, a set of ideas and values that appears as ‘truth’ to that group while
being at least plausible to outsiders (Aitkin 1985:35)? If country-mindedness
has been uncoupled from the empirical conditions that gave rise to it initially,
then what relationships between rural communities, rural land use and political
organisation are being reconfigured?
The ‘uncoupling’ thesis, in its simplest form, posits that rural towns are
disconnecting from the trajectories of major agricultural industries (Stayner and
Reeve 1990; Rural Profile 1990; Campbell and Phillips 1993). Instead, the
prosperity of rural towns is enmeshed with other economic activities (Campbell
and Phillips 1993:47). Political parties rarely speak about this uncoupling of the
rural from the agricultural. Moreover, ‘re-coupling’, or the processes by which
rural communities become wedded to the activities of non-agricultural industries,
is seldom a topic of political debate. What also need clear specification are the
different ‘ruralisms’ that are undergoing such transitions. In the introduction
to this volume, we referred to the recognised ambiguity and variability of this
term. In attempting to understand change, it is of little value to collapse all
non-metropolitan regions into a category of ruralism that posits an equal
distribution of resources, development opportunities and social capital.
The space opened up by this uncoupling of the agricultural from the rural is the
ground that contributors to this volume are exploring. Clearly, there has been
no complete de-coupling of agriculture from ruralism. Rather, agriculture’s
position in relation to the rural space and communities is more contested,
qualified and partial.
Modalities of change
This volume has documented different modalities of change in rural Australia,
New Zealand and Europe. We have been concerned with rural transitions at the
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community level, whether these be within rural communities (Peace, Stehlik)
themselves, or in the political contest for values over the ‘rural’ (Botterill, Morris,
J. Gray). Let us briefly review tensions and dimensions that authors have
identified in the processes of rural transformation in the settings they have
considered.
John Gray identified the constant pressure on policymakers in the European
Union to ensure the viability of rural areas through changing policy schemes,
demonstrating the gradual broadening of what he called a ‘policy effect’. Gray’s
chapter charts a shift from agriculture as the ‘primary vehicle’ for the
construction of European communal space and presents a view of the Common
Agricultural Policy (CAP) as a ‘history’ of the concept of rurality as it moves
through various forms. The CAP was concerned to underscore the importance
of rural areas not only as primarily agricultural regions, but as bearers of national
identity. It also sought to ensure that goals of national food self-sufficiency were
achieved. Another distinct phase of ‘policy effect’ becomes visible in the struggles
to balance social equity and economic efficiency concerns: the focus of value in
the operation of the CAP shifts from material production per se to the question
of the economic viability of farming ventures that often tend towards
overproduction. Lastly, there emerges an emphasis on forms of rurality no longer
grounded in agrarian production but in a diversity of activities and spaces that
have value as alternatives to urban forms of life. These transitions that Gray
describes are accompanied and partly prompted by new forms of representation
at the bureaucratic level. These new definitions of rural land use emphasise
regional diversification and can involve the break up of larger landholdings into
areas that are evaluated in terms of their potential for agriculture and for other
activities. This uncoupling of agriculture and rurality creates a space in which
diversification of activities can figure more prominently. In Europe, such
diversification can take place because bureaucratic categories for such changes
exist and many European regions have strong and effective traditions of local
and regional government.
Gray indicates that the relationship between social and economic activities on
farms on the one hand, and government actions to define, direct and support
particular modes of economic production on the other, is a dialectical one, and
thus is a relationship that requires constant ‘adjustment’. What Gray also
underlines is that the economic goals that initially drove the CAP—ensuring a
food supply, guaranteeing affordable prices for European consumers and
maintaining a social equity among farmers so as to achieve these two goals—have
been superseded by more diverse and less measurable goals. Not only does
ruralism, in the eyes of the European Union, comprise ‘heterogeneous activities
and types of spaces’ (Gray this volume), its importance now involves
environmental preservation and recreational amenity for urban populations,
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with each of these goals being defined as critical to the benefit of society as a
whole.
Importantly, the history of the efforts to sponsor or legislate for the survival of
rural communities within nations, and national rural sectors within the European
Union, has its background in the evolution of distinct regions into nation-states
and in the integration of the nation-states into the European Union. While local
and regional political legacies are very strong in some parts of Europe, they are
much less so in Australia and New Zealand. The rural economies of Australia
and New Zealand that came to dominate indigenous societies were never closely
wedded to the political power that was located in colonial capitals, and later,
national, state and provincial governments. There is little tradition of effective
regional governance in Australia (Gray and Lawrence 2001); unlike Europe,
governance has been fomented from the outside in or from the top down.
Ian Gray’s paper is an assessment of the legacy of this situation in Australia: he
sees the nation as characterised by its administrative centrism and,
correspondingly, rural administrative dependency. His examination of this
dependency through several key forms of rural infrastructure reveals a disparity
between the enthusiasm of farmers to acquire Graincorp, which they can envision
as the capture of a government function, with the low levels of their real
ownership of it; the difficulty farmers have in reimagining water management
in localist and regionalist terms; and the lack of preparedness to engage in local
ownership and management of railway systems. This leads him to the crux of
the political potential generated in such a situation: there is no local government
to which governmental functions might suitably devolve. At the same time,
there is popular sentiment for rural regionalism. This can be the overt message
of such vehicles of ruralism as the National Party, but with no realistic possibility
of regional control and institutionalisation of government functions.
A memorable feature of Botterill’s chapter is her argument that agrarianism, or
country-mindedness (Aitkin 1985), is a value that has so thoroughly permeated
Australian thinking that its existence and effects often go unrecognised. Now,
in the often-painful struggles over rural viability and various forms of the
uncoupling of agrarian activity from rural spaces—especially at a small, familial
scale—agrarian sentiment and representation resurface. This is often epitomised
by prime ministerial appearances in those troubled rural areas in an Akubra hat
and R. M. Williams bush clothing. While this is taken as a ‘natural’ expression
of government inclination, Botterill brings us to see this deep-seated
country-mindedness as something that contributes to a lack of critical scrutiny
of rural problems and prospects. It could contribute to supporting a continuously
agonised process of uncoupling, which, on the other hand, has been driven for
nearly three decades now by the ideological vehicle of neo-liberalisation.
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Adrian Peace’s chapter has given us the means to critically understand an often
staged scenario. The non-viability of rural spaces deemed ‘marginal’ from an
agrarian perspective makes them the object of projects of biodiversification and
conservation, with their familiar modalities of national parks and wilderness
areas. In Peace’s case, biodiversification explicitly involves the issue of ‘return’
of a natural species and the practice of reversing the extinction and disappearance
of species. In the Yorke Peninsula of South Australia, however, which is Peace’s
ethnographic focus, agrarian activity continues and his chapter shows the
tensions that arise in the effort to merge the goals of different land uses. The
superior institutional power of government proponents of biodiversity, compared
with local farmers, results in what he calls ‘rituals’ of consultation. These
consultations are rituals that are performed, but without genuine hearing or
acceptance of the forms of local knowledge earned through lives of farming
activity.
We can, however, neither merely point to the need for ethnographic research
to better understand the nature of rural transitions nor uncritically champion
the perspectives of long-term locals. While the immediate experience of rural
populations and communities is crucial in understanding the nature of transitions
and competing perspectives and interests, there must be a critical understanding
of the framework of competing interests that converge in contests for legitimate
identification with ruralism.
Carolyn Morris’s chapter foregrounds a theme that also is relevant to the situation
that Peace describes, but which is not his focus. Her chapter pivots on the
anthropological theme of the mutual constitution of people and place. She
discusses legal forms of land tenure in New Zealand grazing regions that, aside
from defining and allowing particular land uses, are integral to the production
of personal subjectivities. The topography and the pioneer history of the New
Zealand high country have produced a form of agrarian activity in which farmers
have been able to see themselves, and to be seen by others, as pioneers occupying
a cultural position that dominates the lower valleys. The high country is home
to a distinctive form of activity and those who live in and work this country are
thus seen as stewards of lands that have been crucial to New Zealand imaginings
of self, place and nation. In recent times, the high country has been admitted to
prevailing processes of rural market liberalisation. This has meant the valuation
of lands to determine their potential conversion to freehold or to conservation
estate. Through this process, some high country graziers have come to regard
themselves as business operators. Many others have had their morally sanctioned
position as stewards of the high country challenged by conservationists, tourism
operators and other non-agricultural actors. Morris reports a sense among high
country graziers and others that liberalisation undercuts the kinds of personal
and national imaginings fundamental to New Zealand.
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Lesley Hunt’s chapter also focuses on mutual constitution of people and place
in New Zealand, but in other circumstances. She writes of ageing baby boomers,
many of them former farmers, opting in their later years to become orchardists
of kiwifruit. She examines differing kinds of relationships that these farmers
establish between themselves and their orchards. She shows that the choices
they make are based not only on economic calculations, but are, very importantly,
oriented to creating continuity in their lives between their earlier, and usually
more intensive, careers and those they adopt towards retirement. Hunt argues
that the resulting diversity of farming modes is an important source of rural
sustainability. This chapter might lead us to ask how consistent is later ‘lifestyle’
occupational choice among ageing baby boomers with other economic and
aesthetic choices that have accompanied the trajectory of this large demographic
cohort. It might also lead us to ask, more broadly, how this sort of development
compares and contrasts in its implications for rural areas with early retirement
schemes that have been used in some places (for Europe, see Shucksmith et. al.
2005) to achieve social and structural objectives.
Related to this, Daniela Stehlik’s chapter takes up what has been a longstanding
issue in rural sociology: the challenge posed by an ageing rural population. Her
research on the rural farming populations of the Great Southern region of Western
Australia takes as its original focus the problem of the transfer of social capital
and knowledge at an intergenerational level. Now, as ever, this raises questions
about the future demographic trajectory of rural areas. The pivotal sociological
feature of her chapter is the proposal that we model various kinds of resources
and relationships—including non-land goods, dimensions of information, social
membership and position—within a more diversified framework that can better
explore the challenges of intergenerational transfer as they will relate to rural
areas.
Lyons and Scrinis, finally, emphasise how much technological change of relevance
to rural production goes under the regulatory radar. Practically, their argument
concerns the need for a present and forward-looking regulatory framework
capable of dealing with the challenges of nanotechnology. Their chapter also,
however, raises the wider anthropological question of the relationship of the
public to scientific innovation—and here there is a growing literature on the
range of orientations to biotechnology. In a New Zealand-based study,
Fairweather et al. (2007) consider a range of ethical public positions and also the
importance of ‘post-materialist’ values, as they relate to the practice of
biotechnology and the prospect of nanotechnology. Fairweather et al. (2007)
conclude that biotechnological applications in agriculture and food technology
are perceived to be risky and the benefits of such applications are seen as flowing
to commercial interests, not to individuals or communities. Importantly, though,
Fairweather et al. (2007:17) stress that evaluations of the benefits and risks of
scientific applications to agriculture and food are made in a context in which
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‘technological optimism’ has diminished and the dominance of productivist
agricultural values is in retreat. The social evaluation of risk, costs and benefits
takes place alongside the evaluation of claims of productivist agriculture. What,
then, could be an effective modality in the management and oversight of rural
technological activities? Given the ubiquitous character of nanotechnological
applications—in spheres of production and consumption—how can the regulation
of its operation be fixed in place? Given the high level of technical expertise
and political cooperation already demanded by the advent of genetically modified
crops in Australia, we would foresee that one or more regulatory bodies would
be created to manage nanotechnological developments. This would be another
step along the path of administrative centrism to which Gray sees rural
communities as subject. Lyons and Scrinis invite research on what policy
structures can best fill the roles created by such novel developments.
These contributions illustrate that rural space and people who reside in rural
areas are being progressively integrated with economic, cultural and social
influences that are larger, more diverse and often contradictory. Or, to put it
another way, at a societal level, more is being asked of rural spaces and people
than ever before. The role of primary production that has been assigned to
country areas has declined in terms of political priority, yet the food, fibre and
fuel needs around which rural economies are organised are arguably greater
now than in the period that Aitkin (1985) identifies as the high point of
country-mindedness in Australia: 1925–60.
Technology and rural transitions
In Australian and New Zealand contexts, the colonisation and development of
rural regions have been achieved through the interplay of international
commodity trade, emerging provincial and national governments and evolving
agricultural technologies. It is these factors that, with varying degrees of success
and failure, have dominated the indigenous societies and ecological conditions
found in Australia and New Zealand.
It would be easy to focus on the role of the technological hardware and the
introduced ‘livestock’ of agricultural practices: the ploughing, reaping and
clearing technologies, the successes of farm animal breeding and the
transplantation of foreign crop varieties. A host of other technologies, however,
has been crucial in determining the course of rural development in Australia.
The specific planning practices of governments, such as land selection legislation,
government credit schemes, sponsored rural migration programs such as soldier
settlement programs and other specific features of land tenure (Meinig 1962) all
underwrote particular patterns of rural life. More recently, efforts to engage
indigenous people and interests in conservation and management constitute new
and complex areas of activity linked to specific histories of policy and practice
in Australia and New Zealand (see, for example, for Australia: Yibarbuk et al.
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2001; Bowman et al. 2004; Reid et al. 2004; for New Zealand: Todd et al. 1997;
Gibbs 2005).
Historical and political research has helped to contextualise the role of
infrastructure in promoting and shaping the character of the colonisation of
rural lands in Australia and New Zealand. Railways, roads, ports, distribution
networks, bulk handling and storage facilities and telecommunications have all
been contextualised in wider patterns of urban and rural development
(Wade-Marshall 1988; Eversole and Martin 2005; Denoon 1983; Williams 1974).
This need for economic infrastructure is a constant refrain in the lobbying efforts
of agricultural and resource industries and in the promises or complaints of
governments. Removal of so-called ‘capacity constraints’ is put forward as crucial
to the enhancement of export prospects in a competitive trading environment.
At a less visible level, though, are technologies that cut deep into agricultural
practices. The application of fertilisers and pesticides in cropping and horticulture
and the development and use of selected or cloned seed and plant varieties all
potentially bring a new level of biotechnological dependence to agriculture. The
patenting of biotechnologies and the willingness of patent-holders to enforce
the rights associated with patenting ensure that agriculture’s dependence on
biotechnologies is grounded in a strong commercial imperative. Regulating the
rights and interests in the agricultural sector has proved a significant challenge
for governments and has sparked much controversy among rural communities.
Regulation of the nano-level, where the objects of regulation are so deeply
enmeshed in so many facets of production, distribution and consumption, is a
challenge for which there is simply no precedent.
It would be too easy to focus on the specifically economic aspects of technology
at the expense of an examination of the social and cultural possibilities and
constraints that are afforded to rural communities through infrastructure such
as telecommunications. Currently, there is a big emphasis on telecommunications
(Commonwealth of Australia 2008); broadband and telephony services to regional
and rural areas are seen as key factors not just in the productivity of rural-based
industries, but in their potential social and cultural composition. Aitkin (2007)
argues that broadband services would enable more people to operate businesses
that have a wide geographical reach while residing in rural areas. With such
business practices enabled by broadband technology, the very composition of
a rural community would be less dependent on the industries traditionally
associated with rural areas: agriculture, mining and associated service industries.
Equally, in parts of Europe, for instance, this technological decoupling allows
people to live outside urban areas and still perform jobs typically associated
with urban living. In this way, the knowledge economy facilitated by
telecommunications makes redundant not only the rural–agricultural nexus,
but the knowledge economy–urban nexus also. This ‘double de-coupling’, with
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the cultural impacts it brings to rural communities, is an unprecedented
phenomenon.
There is now a technological ability to financialise almost all rural/agricultural
phenomena, to make land and its produce assets that can be the object of
speculation and other forms of financial investment. Importantly, this is relevant
not merely for agricultural products, such as the futures trading of agricultural
commodities, but is something that is happening in the emerging post-carbon
economy, in which ruralism has been assigned a big role. For instance, forestry
plantations run by managed investment schemes, aided by generous tax
concessions, have become sponges for large amounts of financial capital. There
are many examples of this being a big, direct challenge to the operation of other
rural enterprises (Hobson 2004; Herbohn and Harrison 2004).
Policy and rural transitions
Schusky (1989) noted the phenomenon that he dubbed the ‘neo-caloric
revolution’: the massive increase in the economic productivity of farms and the
massive increase in agricultural energy expenditure that these productive regimes
demanded. In Australia, the unsustainability of such a system is heralded by
the Garnaut report (2008). This report seeks to cost the externalities of an
economy, in particular carbon, and reduce these carbon emissions by various
schemes. This signals a determined effort to mitigate the damage of climate
change and shift to a ‘low-carbon economy’—one in which the production and
trade of goods and services are not as heavily dependent on fossil fuels. Such a
transition poses a huge set of social, technical and policy challenges, which will
undoubtedly be particularly felt in rural areas, since they are host to
energy-dependent primary industries and are dependent on fuel-intensive
transport infrastructure. Equally important is the prospect of rural spaces being
increasingly dedicated to host projects and activities that ‘offset’ or reverse the
adverse ecological impacts wrought by carbon emissions. We have already seen
much evidence of the difficulties of accommodating these competing economic
agendas within rural spaces (Schirmer and Tonts 2002; Ajani 2007).
Bio-sequestration of carbon is a role that Garnaut suggests Australia is well
equipped to play, and he designates rural Australia as the physical space where
this could happen. At the very least, this would require significant new physical
infrastructure in rural Australia, acquisition of land and the importation of a
high degree of technical skill to rural areas. How might these developments be
hosted in a way that allows rural communities to have a stake in the new economy
(see, for example, Grubb and Neuhoff 2006)?
The Salzburg Conference (2003) organised by the European Union identified
three broad policy objectives in relation to the rural sector. There was consensus
on the need to work towards:
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• a competitive farming sector
• managing the land for future generations
• a living countryside (including promotion of its sustainability and its
diversification).
The proposal is to continue to improve the competitiveness of farming and
forestry; to place emphasis on land management and environmental concerns;
and to support improvements in quality of life in ways that recognise the need
for and the reality of livelihood diversification. Other European perspectives
propose variant phrasings of fundamental priorities linking agriculture with a
shift to a wider framework of sustainable development, including food security,
employment and income generation, environmental and natural resource
conservation and popular participation (for example, van Mansvelt and Mulder
1993). Shucksmith et al. (2005:200) propose that even more encouragement
should be given to diversification and that there is a great need to integrate
policies at local, regional and national levels (p. 202). It must be noted that local
structures are much stronger and more functional in some parts of Europe than
others, but also that there is an evident polarisation between core areas and
peripheries. The European Union is committed to a policy of balanced territorial
development, which also spells commitment to considerable planning and
management, and certainly something other than neo-liberal self-adjustment in
rural areas.
While Australia and New Zealand remain overtly committed to neo-liberal policy
(Peck and Tickell 2002; Larner 2003; Harvey 2005), recent events have showed
some departures from this, in the sense that government interventions have
been significant. In the introduction to this volume, one signal example was
mentioned: the announcement in 2007 of $10 billion, subsequently increased to
$12.9 billion, for a national water plan, the aims of which included reform of
irrigation and water allocation in the troubled Murray-Darling river system of
south-eastern Australia (<http://www.environment.gov.au/water/
mdb/index.html>). A sum of $3.9 billion has been earmarked to purchase water
entitlements from willing sellers in order to try to restore some of the rivers’
flow. As a second example, numerous local and federal government initiatives
have been announced to reward farmers and others for biodiversity and native
vegetation conservation. Third, food and other exporters are able to apply to
an Australian Government scheme called Export Market Development Grants
(EMDG), which provides financial and other assistance supporting development
for export of a wide range of industry sectors and products. These and other
‘departures’ suggest that measures not consistent with neo-liberal ideals of
minimal state intervention in markets are adopted where it is felt to be politically
strategic and necessary. They also raise fundamental questions concerning a
neo-liberal agenda as an adequate overarching framework in the face of the large
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issues Australia will necessarily face in the immediate and longer term, including
national resource management, population distribution, sustainability, climate
change and the fostering of social and technological responses to these issues.
Le Heron and Roche (1997) apply an institutional building thesis (derived from
Buttel 1997 and Redclift 1997) to the transformation of New Zealand agriculture
since the 1950s. They outline the major transitions of New Zealand agriculture:
first, the withdrawal of interventionist state structures from the agriculture
sector; second, the ‘re-regulation’ of agricultural sectors; and third, the
paradoxical result—a proliferation of industry and region-specific governance
arrangements. They chart the shift in responsibility for sustainable land use to
individual landholders. The very commitment to individual responsibility,
though, is unachievable without state regulation of particular regimes, including
property rights, export controls and safety standards. Successful re-regulation
of the agricultural industries, then, is dependent on a high degree of knowledge
and empowerment among decision makers (Perry et al. 1997). Le Heron and
Roche (1997) point to the need for social institutions that can meet community
and commercial imperatives and the need to re-examine any singular adherence
to market mechanisms in the social management of rural spaces.
It seems, in short, that although Australia and New Zealand took a bold
pioneering position in initiating national neo-liberalisation projects with respect
to the governance of rural areas in the 1980s, European states, in contrast,
remained much more interventionist at various levels in practice and in overtly
retaining a wide spectrum of policy concerns. At the same time, they have also
had to participate in the reanimation of state-building projects in neo-liberal
terms in the past two decades (Peck and Tickell 2002). Now that sustainability
and climate change have become dominant agenda items of governance
everywhere, it remains to be seen how neo-liberal regulatory methods focusing
on marketisation and commoditisation can be implemented in relation to them.
It seems ever more doubtful that the usual tools of the neo-liberal tool kit can
be an adequate basis of coordinated approaches to the range of issues involved.
The examples given above from Australia have shown the regularity and the
extent of departures in practice from that position.
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